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This thesis examines various forces that aect aggregate performance. In particular,
it focuses on competitive pressures and analyses their determinants. It also analyses
the importance of the human capital portfolio composition for aggregate performance.
Specically, in the rst chapter, it oers an endogenous growth framework, where it
models knowledge (patent) licensing among high-tech rms. In such a framework it
evaluates how dierent types of competitive pressure can matter for innovation in high-
tech industries. In the second chapter, it oers empirical evidence that the country-wide
uptake of telecommunication technologies increases competition in services and goods
markets. In turn, in the third chapter, it denes two types of human capital and
suggests how the human capital portfolio matters for long-run growth and welfare.
In the rst chapter, I present an endogenous growth model, where the engine of
growth is in-house R&D performed by high-tech rms. I model knowledge (patent)
licensing among high-tech rms where licenses are essentially permits for licensees to
use the knowledge of the licensor in the R&D process. I show that if there is knowledge
licensing, high-tech rms innovate more, and economic growth is higher than when
there are knowledge spillovers, or there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech
rms. Conditionally that high-tech rms innovate, I show that increasing intensity and
toughness of competition in the high-tech industry increases innovation. When there
is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms, in terms of licensing or spillovers,
increasing the number of high-tech rms also increases innovation. However, when
there is no exchange of knowledge, the relationship between innovation in the high-
tech industry and the number of high-tech rms has an inverted-U shape.
Finally, endogenizing the number of high-tech rms I show again that when there
is knowledge licensing, high-tech rms innovate more and economic growth is higher
than in the latter two cases. However, the number of high-tech rms is lower.
In the second chapter, co-authored with Anna Kochanova, we use evidence from
21 EU countries to investigate the relationship between the country-wide uptake of
high-tech goods such as telecommunications and the level of product market compe-
tition in services and goods markets. We nd that the uptake of telecommunication
technologies signicantly increases the level of product market competition. Our result
is consistent with the view that the use of these technologies can lower the costs of
rm entry. This result contributes to the ongoing debate about the impact of telecom-
munication technologies, as well as information and communication technologies on
aggregate performance. In particular, since competitive pressures matter for allocative
and productive eciency, our results imply that the benets from a particular type of
ICT, telecommunication technologies, may come not only from direct use (e.g., email
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vs. mail) but also from higher competition.
In the third chapter, co-authored with Evangelia Vourvachaki and Sergey Slo-
bodyan, we propose a new way to dierentiate horizontally across skill types in order to
analyze the impact of human capital composition on aggregate economic performance.
As in the existing literature, we exploit the cross-occupational dierences with an ex-
ception that our denition derives from cross-industry heterogeneity in the production
function: We dierentiate human capital skills according to their "industry specicity."
In particular, we dene two types of human capital: "specic" and "general." As spe-
cic human capital, we dene a set of skills that are required for production in few
industries. As general human capital, we dene a set of skills that are required for
production in a broad set of industries.
We use Czech labor survey data to summarize the facts regarding the employment
and education levels of the two types of human capital for the Czech economy. We nd
a rather uniform level of skills across the specic and general types of human capital
that agrees with our horizontal dierentiation of skills. Moreover, we nd that in 2007
approximately 36 percent of total labor input was comprised of specic human capital.
Our evidence also suggests that this share has been steadily falling since the mid-90s.
To provide an explanation for this trend and illustrate how it can matter for long-
run growth and welfare, we build up an endogenous growth model, where education
and R&D are costly activities. In the model, both general and specic human capital
are used in nal goods production, while only specic human capital can serve as input
into the educational sector and R&D. We also explicitly take into account the com-
plementarity between basic R&D and the education process and positive externalities
in R&D. In this respect, the model implies a positive relation between specic human
capital intensity and economic growth. This suggests that there can be long-run wel-
fare costs involved in the falling share of specic human capital as observed in the




Tato diserta£ní práce zkoumá r·zné síly, které ovliv¬ují agregátní výkonnost. Zejména
se zam¥°uje na konkuren£ní tlaky a analyzuje jejich determinanty. Práce také analyzuje
d·leºitost sloºení portfolia lidského kapitálu pro agregátní výkonnost. Konkrétn¥ v
první kapitole p°edstavuje rámec endogenního r·stu, ve kterém modeluje licencov-
ání znalostí (patent·) mezi high-tech rmami. V tomto rámci pak vyhodnocuje,
jak rozdílné druhy konkuren£ních tlak· mohou být d·leºité pro inovace v high-tech
odv¥tví. V druhé kapitole p°edstavuje empirické d·kazy o tom, ºe ²iroké p°ijetí teleko-
munika£ních technologií v ur£ité zemi vede ke zvý²ení konkurence na trhu zboºí a
sluºeb. Pro zm¥nu ve t°etí kapitole denuje dva typy lidského kapitálu a ukazuje, jak
je portfolio lidského kapitálu d·leºité pro dlouhodobý r·st a prosperitu.
V první kapitole p°edstavuji model endogenního r·stu, kde zdrojem r·stu je výzkum
a vývoj high-tech rem. Modeluji licencování znalostí (patent·) mezi high-tech r-
mami, kdy licence v zásad¥ umoº¬ují jejímu drºiteli vyuºívat znalosti prodejce licence.
Ukazuji, ºe pokud existuje licencování znalostí, high-tech podniky více inovují a eko-
nomický r·st je vy²²í neº v p°ípadech, kdy existuje p°elévání znalostí nebo nedochází
k vým¥n¥ znalostí mezi high-tech rmami. V p°ípadech, kdy high-tech rmy inovují,
ukazuji, ºe vy²²í intenzita a tvrdost konkurence v high-tech odv¥tví zvy²uje inovace.
V p°ípadech, kdy dochází k vým¥n¥ znalostí mezi high-tech rmami v podob¥ licen-
cování nebo p°elévání, zvy²ování po£tu high-tech rem také zvy²uje inovace. Av²ak v
p°ípad¥, kdy nedochází k vým¥n¥ znalostí, závislost mezi inovacemi v high-tech odv¥tví
a mnoºstvím rem má tvar oto£eného U.
Kone£n¥ v p°ípad¥, ºe po£et rem je endogenní, ukazuji znovu, ºe p°i existenci
licencování znalostí high-tech rmy inovují více a ekonomický r·st je vy²²í neº ve
zbývajících dvou p°ípadech. Mnoºství rem je ale men²í.
V druhé kapitole, jejíº spoluautorkou je Anna Kochanova, pouºíváme data z 21
zemí EU ke zkoumání vztahu mezi ²irokým p°ijetím high-tech zboºí jako jsou teleko-
munikace a úrovní konkurence na trhu zboºí a sluºeb. Zji²tujeme, ºe p°ijetí teleko-
munika£ních technologií signikantn¥ zvy²uje úrove¬ konkurence na trhu produkt·.
Na²e výsledky jsou konzistentní s názorem, ºe pouºívání t¥chto technologií sniºuje
vstupní náklady rem. Tento výsledek p°ispívá k probíhající debat¥ o dopadu teleko-
munika£ních technologií i informa£ních a komunika£ních technologií (ICT) na agregátní
výkonnost. Konkrétn¥ pak, vzhledem k tomu, ºe konkuren£ní tlaky jsou d·leºité pro
aloka£ní a produk£ní efektivitu, na²e výsledky implikují, ºe výhody z konkrétního typu
ICT, telekomunika£ních technologií, mohou plynout nejen z p°ímého pouºívání (nap°.
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email versus po²ta), ale také z vy²²í konkurence.
Ve t°etí kapitole, jejíº spoluautory jsou Evangelia Vourvachaki a Sergey Slobodyan,
navrhujeme nový zp·sob, jak diferencovat mezi typy dovedností, abychom mohli ana-
lyzovat dopad sloºení lidského kapitálu na agregátní ekonomickou výkonnost. Podobn¥
jako v existující literatu°e vyuºíváme rozdíly mezi zam¥stnáními s tím rozdílem, ºe
na²e denice vychází z r·znorodosti produk£ní funkce mezi odv¥tvími: Rozli²ujeme
dovednosti v rámci lidského kapitálu podle jejich odv¥tvové speci£nosti. Konkrétn¥
denujeme dva typy lidského kapitálu specický a obecný. Jako specický lidský
kapitál denujeme soubor dovedností, které jsou pot°ebné pro produkci v omezeném
po£tu odv¥tví. Zatímco obecný lidský kapitál denujeme jako soubor dovedností, které
jsou poºadovány pro produkci ve velké mnoºin¥ odv¥tví.
Pouºíváme data z pr·zkum· na £eském trhu práce ke shrnutí fakt· týkajících se
zam¥stnanosti a úrovn¥ vzd¥lání dvou typ· lidského kapitálu pro £eskou ekonomiku.
Zji²tujeme spí²e rovnom¥rné rozd¥lení úrovn¥ dovedností mezi specický a obecný typ
lidského kapitálu, coº se shoduje s na²ím horizontální rozd¥lením dovedností. Dále
zji²tujeme, ºe v roce 2007 p°ibliºn¥ 36 procent celkového pracovního vstupu zahrnoval
specický lidský kapitál. Na²e výsledky také nazna£ují, ºe tento podíl setrvale klesal
od poloviny 90. let.
Abychom poskytli vysv¥tlení tohoto trendu a ilustrovali, jaké m·ºe mít d·sledky
pro dlouhodobý r·st a prosperity, konstruujeme model endogenního r·stu, ve kterém
vzd¥lání a výzkum a vývoj jsou nákladné aktivity. V modelu je obecný i specický
lidský kapitál pouºit k produkci nálních statk·, zatímco pouze specický kapitál m·ºe
být pouºit jako vstup do sektoru vzd¥lání a výzkumu a vývoje. Také explicitn¥ bereme
v potaz komplementaritu mezi základním výzkumem a vývojem a procesem vzd¥lávání
a pozitivní externality p°i výzkumu a vývoji. V tomto ohledu model implikuje poz-
itivní závislost mezi intenzitou specického lidského kapitálu a ekonomickým r·stem.
Toto by znamenalo, ºe klesající podíl specického lidského kapitálu, pozorovaný na
£eských datech, m·ºe p°edstavovat dlouhodobé negativní dopady na prosperitu. Také
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R&D-driven Endogenous Growth
Abstract
In this paper, I present an endogenous growth model where the engine of growth is in-house
R&D performed by high-tech rms. I model knowledge (patent) licensing among high-tech
rms. I show that if there is knowledge licensing, high-tech rms innovate more and economic
growth is higher than in cases when there are knowledge spillovers or there is no exchange of
knowledge among high-tech rms. However, when there is knowledge licensing the number
of high-tech rms is lower than in cases when there are knowledge spillovers or there is no
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1.1 Introduction
A number of growth models treat private rms' intentional investments in R&D as the
driver of long-run growth and welfare (e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992;
Smulders and van de Klundert, 1995). These models assume that there are knowledge
spillovers in R&D process and R&D builds on a pool of knowledge. In this sense these
growth models abstract from the role of knowledge (patent) licensing and from the
details about the exchange of knowledge in the economy. Nevertheless, licensing and
establishing consortia for exchanging patents is common in high-tech industries (e.g.,
Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002).2 Moreover, it has been extensively argued that exchanging
patents plays a signicant role for innovation in these industries (e.g., Grindley and
Teece, 1997; Shapiro, 2001; Clark, Piccolo, Stanton, and Tyson, 2000).3 For instance,
yet at the beginning of the previous century the major players in the Radio, Television
and Communication Equipment industry in the United States experienced diculties in
innovating and advancing their products until the establishment of a patent consortium,
RCA Corporation. Meanwhile, high-tech industries are the top private R&D performers
and there is a large body of anecdotal and rigorous empirical evidence that they make
a signicant contribution to economic growth (e.g., Helpman, 1998; Jorgenson, Ho, and
Stiroh, 2005).
In this paper I present an endogenous growth model where high-tech rms engage
in intra-rm (or in-house) R&D and that drives long-run growth. High-tech rms
have exclusive rights to the type of their product. In a high-tech rm the innovation
enhances rm/product-specic knowledge which reduces the rm's marginal costs or
increases the quality of its product. High-tech rms nance their R&D expenditures
from operating prots. They set prices and compete strategically in their output
market. My point of departure is that I model knowledge (patent) licensing among
high-tech rms. The knowledge generated in a high-tech rm cannot be used for free,
but it can be licensed. Given that each high-tech rm produces a distinct type of
good, for a high-tech rm the knowledge of other high-tech rms is complementary
to its own. If a high-tech rm licenses the knowledge of another it can combine that
knowledge with its own and improve its in-house R&D process since the latter builds
on the knowledge that the rm possesses.
In such a setup I show how market concentration, intensity of competition as mea-
2In terms of 2-digit ISIC (Rev. 3), according to OECD STAN data high-tech industries as measured
by R&D intensity are, for example, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 64 and 72.
3Currently, there are virtually no comprehensive data for measuring the size of the market for patents
and other types of intellectual property. According to some estimates (Robbins, 2009) in the US in 2002
corporate domestic income from licensing patents and trade secrets was $50 billion or approximately
25 percent of total private R&D expenditure. Moreover, it was expected to grown at more than 10
percent annual rate.
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sured by the elasticity of substitution between high-tech goods, and type of competi-
tion (Cournot or Bertrand) can matter for innovation in the high-tech industry and
aggregate performance. I contrast the inference from this setup to the inference from
setups where there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms and/or there
are knowledge spillovers (i.e., rms obtain others' knowledge for free). Further, it is
often conjectured that the use of high-tech goods such as phones and PCs entails posi-
tive externalities, which lower the transaction costs and increase the eciency of users
(e.g., Le, 1984). I assess how innovation in the high-tech industry and aggregate
performance depend on the magnitude of such externalities.
I show that high-tech rms innovate more and the economy grows at a higher rate
in case when there is knowledge licensing among high-tech rms compared to the case
when there are knowledge spillovers. This result holds since in case when there is
knowledge licensing high-tech rms better appropriate the benets from their R&D.
The availability of complementary knowledge also motivates innovation in the high-tech
industry. High-tech rms innovate more and the economy grows at a higher rate in case
when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms than when there is no
exchange. This is because R&D builds on a bigger pool of knowledge in case when there
is an exchange of knowledge. Moreover, in case when there is no knowledge exchange
high-tech rms might not innovate at all if there are many of them in the market. The
driver behind this result is the scarcity of R&D inputs available per high-tech rm if
there are many such rms.
In case when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms in the form
of licensing or spillovers, innovation in the high-tech industry and economic growth
increase with the number of high-tech rms as long as these rms have sucient in-
centives to innovate. The driver behind this result are the relative price distortions
which are due to price setting by high-tech rms. This distortion adversely aects
the demand for high-tech goods. Given that high-tech rms interact strategically in
the output market a higher number of rms implies lower mark-ups and lower distor-
tion. This increases the demand for high-tech goods and implies higher output and
investments in R&D in the high-tech industry.4 However, if there is no exchange of
knowledge among high-tech rms, then increasing the number of rms has two eects
on innovation in the high-tech industry. One is the lower distortion, which is positive.
Another is negative and is due to lower amount of R&D inputs available per high-tech
rm. When the number of high-tech rms is relatively low the positive eect domi-
nates, whereas for a relatively high number of rms the negative eect dominates. This
negative eect when there is knowledge exchange among high-tech rms is oset by
4O'Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) have a similar result in a Schumpeterian growth model. Vives
(2008) shows that such a result can also hold in partial equilibrium for various types of demand
functions.
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more complementary knowledge made available by high-tech rms.
I further show that in all the setups that I consider innovation in the high-tech
industry and economic growth increase with the intensity of competition, again, pro-
vided that high-tech rms have sucient incentives to innovate. Under such condition,
tougher competition, which is dened as the type of competition with lower mark-ups
(Bertrand vs. Cournot; Sutton, 1991), also implies more innovation in the high-tech
industry and higher growth. These results are in line with the results of Smulders and
van de Klundert (1995) and van de Klundert and Smulders (1997), and hold because
both more intensive and tougher competition reduce mark-ups and the relative price
distortions.5
The higher magnitude of positive externalities from the use of high-tech goods
implies lower innovation in the high-tech industry. Nevertheless, economic growth
increases with the magnitude of these externalities. Innovation declines because the
higher magnitude of positive extenralities brings no additional internalized benet to
high-tech rms and in equilibrium it implies a higher rate of interest. In turn, eco-
nomic growth increases since the higher magnitude of externalities implies a higher
contribution of innovation in the high-tech industry to growth.
Finally, I endogenize the number of high-tech rms assuming cost-free entry. Inno-
vation in the high-tech industry and economic growth are the lowest in case when there
is no exchange of knowledge among these rms. In turn, innovation in the high-tech
industry and economic growth are the highest in case when there is knowledge licensing
among these rms. This happens, however, at the expense of the number of high-tech
rms (or the variety of high-tech goods.) In other words, the number of high-tech rms
is the lowest in case when there is knowledge licensing and the highest in case there is
no exchange of knowledge.
Increasing the intensity and/or toughness of competition reduces the number of
rms. In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms, this has
no eect, however, on allocations, innovation in the high-tech industry, and economic
growth. Meanwhile, allocations change and innovation and economic growth tend to
increase with the intensity and toughness of competition in cases when there is no
exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms.
This paper is related to the endogenous growth literature (e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion
and Howitt, 1992; Smulders and van de Klundert, 1995) where the positive growth of the
economy on a balanced growth path is a result of technological and preference factors.
In particular, it is related to studies which in an endogenous growth framework suggest
how the aggregate performance can be aected by imperfect competition in an industry
5The results regarding the relation between innovation and dierent types of competitive pressure are
consistent with the empirical ndings of Nickell (1996), Blundell, Grith, and van Reenen (1999),
and Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Grith, and Howitt (2005).
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where the rms engage in in-house R&D (e.g., van de Klundert and Smulders, 1997). It
contributes to these streams of studies while showing how knowledge licensing in such
an industry can aect innovation in that industry and the aggregate performance. It
also contributes while showing how the positive externalities from the use of the goods
of such an industry can aect the decentralized equilibrium outcomes.
Further, there is a number of papers that model knowledge (patent) and tech-
nology licensing in standard Schumpeterian growth framework and show how patent
policy and international technology licensing can aect innovation and growth (e.g.,
O'Donoghue and Zweimüller, 2004; Yang and Maskus, 2001; Tanaka, Iwaisako, and
Futagami, 2007). In these papers licensing happens between incumbents and entrants
given that in standard Schumpeterian growth framework incumbents have no incentives
to innovate. Licensing does not explicitly aid R&D process and licenses are essentially
permits for production. In such a framework in order to maintain incentives for licens-
ing, these papers assume that either licensors and licensees (incumbents and entrants)
collude in the product market or licensees can access larger market (e.g., one of the
countries bans FDI). The share in collective prots and licensing fees compensate in-
cumbents' loss of the product market (and costs of technology transfer) and are either
exogenous or exogenously determined by patent policy. In contrast, this paper has
a non-tournament framework where incumbents innovate because that allows stealing
market share and licensing happens among incumbents. Firms have incentive to license
knowledge from other rms because that aids their R&D process. Further, license fees
are determined by the structure of the market for knowledge, which can depend on
patent policy, and supply and demand conditions. To that end, the framework and
analysis of this paper can be thought to be complementary.
In this paper, the value of the knowledge/patent of a rm is the sum of license
fees that the rm collects and its benet from using the knowledge in production
of its good and in R&D. This is the Lindahl value of the knowledge, although in
this context knowledge is not a purely public good since it is excludable. To that
extent, this paper is related to a number of papers which derive the Lindahl price
of knowledge in an R&D-driven growth framework (e.g., Grimaud and Tournemaine,
2006; Chantrel, Grimaud, and Tournemaine, 2012). Methodologically, this paper is
most closely related to Chantrel et al. (2012). Given their focus, the authors in a
similar growth framework model rms that do not have their own knowledge and need
to purchase it for production and R&D from "public domain." Moreover, rms engage
in in-house R&D in order to sell their R&D output in the "public domain." These
proceeds are the sole motives for performing R&D.
There is also a large body of rm- and industry-level studies that analyze the impli-
cations of patent licensing, patent consortia or pools, and knowledge exchange among
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rms on innovation and market conduct (e.g., Gallini, 1984; Gallini and Winter, 1985;
Shapiro, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Bessen and Maskin, 2009). This paper ana-
lyzes such issues at the aggregate level in a dynamic general equilibrium framework
which assumes an undistorted market for knowledge/patents. This assumption allows
to have tractable inference and can be justied to the extent that this paper aims to
address long-run issues, for example. In turn, the dynamic general equilibrium frame-
work allows to endogenize the growth rate of the economy and the eect of knowledge
licensing on, for example, interest rate which aects the incentives to perform R&D.
Licensing in this paper ceteris paribus motivates R&D. This, in turn, implies higher
growth rate and higher rate of interest which reduces the incentives to perform R&D.
The next section oers the model. Section 3 analyzes the features of dynamic
equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 The Model
Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical and innitely lived households of
mass one. The representative household is endowed with a xed amount of labor (L). It
inelastically supplies its labor to rms which produce nal goods and to high-tech rms.
The household has a standard CIES utility function with an inter-temporal substitution
parameter 1
θ
and discounts the future streams of utility with rate ρ (θ, ρ > 0). The
utility gains are from the consumption of amount C of nal goods. The lifetime utility






exp (−ρt) dt. (1.1)
The household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint,
Ȧ = rA+ wL− C, (1.2)
where A are the household's asset holdings [A (0) > 0], r and w are the market returns
on its asset holdings and labor supply.







(r − ρ) . (1.3)




Final goods are homogeneous, Y . The household's demand for nal goods is served by
a representative producer. The production of nal goods requires labor and X, which is
a Dixit-Stiglitz composite of high-tech goods {xi}Ni=1 with an elasticity of substitution
ε.
Ceteris paribus the increasing demand of X creates externalities in nal goods
production, which are measured by X̃. These externalities increase the productivity
of the nal goods producers. For example, these externalities stand for network eects
that stem from using high-tech goods such as PCs and phones.
The production of the nal goods has a Cobb-Douglas technology and is given by












1 > σ > 0, ε > 1,
where LY is the share of the labor force employed in nal goods production.











where Y is the numeraire. The optimal rules that follow from this problem describe
the nal goods producer's demand for labor and for high-tech goods.
[LY ] : wLY = (1− σ)Y, (1.6)





for ∀j = 1, ..., N, (1.7)









By construction this index is the private marginal value of X. Moreover, given that
X is constant returns to scale in high-tech goods the following two conditions hold.






Further, I assume that the measure of externalities X̃ is given by
X̃ = Xµ,
where µ measures the strength of these externalities (1− σ > µ ≥ 0).6
High-tech Goods
At any time t there are N(t) producers in the high-tech industry.7
Production
Each high-tech rm owns a design (blueprint) of distinct high-tech good x, which it
produces. The production of a high-tech good requires labor input Lx. The production
function of a high-tech good x is
x = λLx, (1.11)
where λmeasures the producer's knowledge of production process or quality of the high-
tech good. This knowledge is rm/product-specic since each high-tech rm produces
a distinct good.
High-tech rms are price setters in their output market and discount their future
prot streams π with the market interest rate r. I assume that high-tech rms cannot
collude in the output market.
Knowledge Accumulation
High-tech rms can engage in R&D for accumulating knowledge and increasing λ. This
can be interpreted as a process innovation that increases productivity (the rms are
able to produce more of x), or as a quality upgrade (the rms are able to produce the
same amount of higher quality x). Knowledge is non-rival so that potentially it can be
used at the same time in multiple places/rms.
In this section I oer three dierent settings of knowledge accumulation/R&D pro-
cess. The dierences stem from whether and how knowledge is exchanged among
high-tech rms.8,9
6It is necessary to have 1−σ > µ in order for the production function of nal goods (3.1) to be concave
in X in the Social Planner's problem.
7In order to avoid complications arising from integer constraints I allow N to be real number.
8The functional forms of the knowledge accumulation processes are selected so that they ensure a
balanced growth path.
9In these setups each high-tech rm engages in in-house R&D and there is no R&D cooperation.
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Hereafter, when appropriate for ease of exposition I describe the properties of the
high-tech industry while taking as an example high-tech rm j, j ∈ (1, N ]. In order to
improve its knowledge λj the rm needs to hire researchers/labor Lrj . Researchers use
the current knowledge of the rm in order to create better knowledge.
Knowledge Licensing: This is the benchmark setup (S.1). Knowledge in this setup
can be licensed. In the market for knowledge the licensors (or the suppliers of knowl-
edge) have the bargaining power in the sense that they can make a `take it or leave it'
oer. I assume that license contracts do not allow sub-licensing.
The benet from licensing knowledge is that it can be used in the in-house R&D
process. If high-tech rm j decides to license knowledge from other high-tech rms, its
researchers combine that knowledge with the knowledge available in the rm in order
to produce new knowledge. The knowledge available in the rm is an essential input
in the knowledge accumulation process of the rm. Moreover, it is the only essential
input. This implies that the high-tech rm does not need to acquire knowledge from
other rms in order to advance its own. However, it needs to have its knowledge for
building on it. This is in line with that high-tech rms produce distinct goods.








λ1−αj Lrj , (1.12)
ξ > 0, 1 > α > 0,
where ξ is an exogenous eciency level, ui,j is the share of knowledge of rm i (λi)
that rm j licenses, and uj,j ≡ 1.10
It can be shown that in (1.12) the elasticity of substitution between the dierent
types of knowledge that the high-tech rm licenses is equal to 1
1−α . It can also be
shown that the elasticity of substitution between the high-tech rm's knowledge and
any knowledge that it licenses is lower than 1
1−α (see Appendix T.1). This restates the
importance of the rm's knowledge for its knowledge accumulation process.
In this knowledge accumulation process because of summation the productivity of
researchers increases linearly with knowledge licensed from an additional high-tech rm.
This means that the variety of knowledge matters in this setup. Such a formulation can
Appendix E.1 analyzes the case when rms cooperate in R&D and compete in the product market.
10This R&D process leads to scale eects. Jones (1995) argues against scale eects, and many papers
following that argument present frameworks which eliminate these eects (e.g., Young, 1998; Peretto
and Smulders, 2002). This paper maintains the current framework for its analytical simplicity. Al-
though, some of the results regarding growth rates will not generalize in "second generation" growth
models such as Jones (1995), they can generalize in "third generation" models such as Young (1998)
where labor allocations matter.
20
be justied if there are signicant complementarities among the knowledge of high-tech
rms.
In the context of knowledge spillovers between countries, Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) also assume an additive structure for knowl-
edge in the R&D process. They assume that in a country knowledge builds on the sum
of the knowledge of all countries. Smulders and van de Klundert (1995) and Peretto
(1996) have an additive structure in the context of knowledge spillovers among rms in
an industry. In their setups, however, the degree of complementarity can vary.11 Mean-
while, Peretto (1998a) and Peretto (1998b) have an additive structure in the context
of knowledge spillovers among rms, although, they fade away the complementarity
weighting each rm's contribution to spillovers by its market share. In this context,
the major dierence of R&D process (1.12) from the R&D processes used in these
papers is the Cobb-Douglas combination of the knowledge of dierent rms. Such a
modelling assumption is particularly relevant in the context of licensing since it allows
to have well behaved demand functions. Further, such a formulation of R&D process
leads to simple and analytically tractable inference. It ensures that there exists a bal-
anced growth path and allows to focus on the eect of market structure of the high-tech
industry on innovation in that industry through competitive pressure.
Further, it might seem brave to assume that knowledge accumulation in a single rm
can have non-decreasing returns. In this respect, a high-tech rm can be a rm that
started with tabulating machines and reached the point of producing supercomputers
and articial intelligence systems (i.e., IBM). This assumption can be relaxed setting
uj,j ≡ 0 in square brackets in (1.12). In such a case in this model knowledge licensing
(or exchange of knowledge) is a necessary condition to ensure non-decreasing returns
to knowledge accumulation and positive growth in the long-run (Appendix E.3 oers
the main properties of the model in case when uj,j ≡ 0).
One way to think about this setup is that each high-tech rm can license the
patented knowledge of other rms in order to generate its patented knowledge that
helps to improve its production or output. The rm does not use the knowledge that it
licensed directly in the production of its high-tech good because that knowledge needs
to be combined with its own knowledge, and that requires investments in terms of hiring
researchers (and time). The latter seems plausible for technologically sophisticated
(e.g., high-tech) goods.
11Appendix E.2 and Appendix E.6 oer generalizations of the R&D process employed in this paper. Ap-
pendix E.2 incorporates knowledge spillovers and depreciation in this process. Meanwhile, Appendix
E.6 oers the main properties of the model for more general CES formulation of this process where
the degree of complementarity varies.
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Knowledge Spillovers: In this case (S.2) there are knowledge spillovers among high-
tech rms. In high-tech rm j the researchers combine the knowledge that spills over
from other high-tech rms with the knowledge available in the rm while generating
new knowledge. I assume also that the researchers do not fully internalize the use of
the current knowledge available in the rm and have external benets from it. This
assumption is merely for technical convenience. It allows to focus on the eect of mar-
ket structure of the high-tech industry on innovation through competitive pressure. In
particular, under this assumption all rms have the same external returns, no matter
what is the size of their knowledge relative to the stock of knowledge of all rms. Fur-
ther, this assumption allows to maintain symmetry between this and previous setups.
(Appendix E.3 relaxes this assumption and oers the main properties of the model.)
The knowledge accumulation process is
λ̇j = ξΛ̃λ
1−α
j Lrj , (1.13)







An interpretation of this case is that there are knowledge externalities/spillovers
within high-tech rms and there is a market for knowledge where the potential licensees
have a right to make a `take it or leave it' oer. The licensees under this assumption
receive the knowledge at no cost if the supply of knowledge is not elastic (i.e., ui,j ≡ 1
and there are knowledge spillovers). The supply is necessarily inelastic if licensors
do not have trade-os and/or costs associated with licensing knowledge. It seems
natural to assume that once knowledge is created its supply entails virtually no costs.
Meanwhile, there would be no trade-os if licensors do not take into account that the
knowledge they license is used for business stealing: the licensees use it in order to
reduce their prices and steal market share. I assume that licensors do not take into
account this eect.
Such an assumption is not new to this line of literature. Many papers (e.g., van de
Klundert and Smulders, 1997) assume that the originators of knowledge spillovers (here,
high-tech rms) do not internalize the eect of spillovers (here, licensed knowledge) on
other's knowledge accumulation and production processes. This assumption helps to
avoid complications in dierential games arising from the dependence of the current
choice on the entire future (or history) of states.12 Further, in the frames of this model
12In this model, under this assumption high-tech rms do not realize that the knowledge which they
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this assumption is necessary in order to give such a market-based interpretation to
knowledge spillovers, which links this setup (S.2) with the previous one (S.1).
In this model, similar to λ, the design of a high-tech good can be interpreted
as knowledge/patent. In order to guarantee that high-tech rms have incentives to
innovate it needs to be assumed that (at least for sometime) the knowledge on the
design of high-tech goods does not spill over or cannot be used by other rms without
appropriate compensation. Any high-tech rm, nevertheless, could sell the design of
its high-tech good at market value: the discounted sum of prot streams earned selling
the high-tech good.13 Therefore, the market structure of knowledge on the production
process or the quality of high-tech goods λ where the licensors have a right to make a
`take it or leave it' oer seems to be more appropriate in such a setup.
In this model λ can also be viewed as a patent on the production process or the
quality of the product. Such market-based interpretations are then appropriate if,
for example, there is strong enforcement of intellectual property rights and patent
infringements are detectable. Given the recent history of the high number of patent
infringement lawsuits in high-tech industries, both assumptions seem to be plausible.
No Exchange of Knowledge: In this case (S.3) there is no exchange of knowledge
among high-tech rms. Moreover, to maintain symmetry between this and previous
setups I assume that in the process of generation of new knowledge the researchers
do not fully internalize the use of knowledge available in the rm and have external
benets from it.
The knowledge accumulation is given by
λ̇j = ξλ̃λ
1−α
j Lrj , (1.15)
where λ̃ stands for the external benets and I assume that in equilibrium
λ̃ ≡ λαj .14 (1.16)
It is clear that (1.12) and (1.13) reduce to (1.15) in case when there is no exchange
of knowledge among high-tech rms [i.e., (1.12) and (1.15) are equivalent if ui,j = 0
accumulate enters the knowledge accumulation process of other high-tech rms and from the next
instance augments their rivals' productivity. If they realized that, then by integrating over the (future)
changes of knowledge of their rivals they could track how their current investment in knowledge aects
the productivity and market share of their rivals in the future.
13This simply implies that the name of the high-tech rm does not matter.
14van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) have a similar formulation for the knowledge accumulation
process. Peretto (1998a) and Peretto (1998b) also have a similar knowledge accumulation process,
though these papers assume that α = 1. This implies that knowledge in R&D process is a pure
externality.
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for ∀i 6= j and limiting case α = 0; (1.13) and (1.15) are equivalent if ui,j = 0
for ∀i 6= j.] Therefore, the comparison between results for knowledge accumulation
processes (1.12), (1.13), and (1.15) can highlight the eect of knowledge exchange
among high-tech rms. Further, the knowledge accumulation process (1.15) might be
interpreted as if the exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms is banned (e.g.,
because of antitrust concerns) or it is made very costly.
Optimal Problem
The revenues of high-tech rm j are gathered from the supply of its high-tech good and
in the case when there is knowledge licensing (S.1) from the supply of its knowledge
(uj,iλj;∀i 6= j). The costs are the labor compensations and license fees in case when
there is knowledge licensing. The high-tech rm maximizes the present discounted
value V of its prot streams subject to (1.7), (1.11), and either (1.12), or (1.13), or
(1.15). Under Cournot competition, the high-tech rm chooses the supply of its product
(i.e., Lxj) given the (inverse) demand for it. In contrast, under Bertrand competition
the rm chooses the price of its product (i.e., pxj) given the demand for it.
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Formally, the problem of the high-tech rm is
max
Cournot: Lxj ,Lrj ,{uj,i,ui,j}
N
i=1;(i6=j)















(1.7), (1.11) and either (1.12), or (1.13), or (1.15),
where t̄ is the entry date and















In prot function πj the term in square brackets stands for knowledge licensing, and
puj,iλj and pui,jλi are the prices of uj,iλj and ui,jλi.
The solution of the optimal problem implies that the supply of high-tech good xj



















where ej is the elasticity of substitution between high-tech goods perceived by the
high-tech rm and qλj is the shadow value of knowledge accumulation.
The perceived elasticity of substitution (ej) varies with competition type. It can
be shown that under Bertrand competition





and under Cournot competition
















The terms in square brackets in (1.21) and (1.22) measure the impact of other high-
tech rms on the demand of high-tech rm j. In other words, they measure the extent
of strategic interactions among high-tech rms. Moreover, these terms indicate the
dierence between the perceived elasticity of substitution (e) and the actual elasticity
of substitution (ε). Therefore, they indicate some of the distortions in the economy
which stem from imperfect competition with a nite number of high-tech rms. In a
symmetric equilibrium, when the number of rms increases, these distortions tend to
zero since the terms in square brackets tend to zero.






















where the rst term in brackets is the benet from accumulating knowledge in terms
of increased output. The second term is the benet in terms of higher amount of














In turn, the third term in brackets is the benet in terms of increased amount of
knowledge that can be licensed.
The demand for and the supply of knowledge in this case are





Lrj , ∀i 6= j, (1.25)
[uj,i] : uj,i = 1, ∀i 6= j, (1.26)
which means that the rm has a downward sloping demand for knowledge and li-
censes/supplies all its knowledge.
In case when there are knowledge spillovers among high-tech rms (S.2) the returns
on knowledge accumulation are given by (1.23) but













The rst expression means that the licensees receive knowledge/patents for free [i.e.,
1.26 holds and ui,j ≡ 1]. In turn, there is a dierence between (1.24) and (1.28) because
in S.1 case there are no knowledge externalities within high-tech rms.
In turn, if there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.3) the returns
on knowledge accumulation are given by (1.23) where the third term is absent and
∂λ̇j
∂λj
= ξ (1− α)Lrj .16 (1.29)
The expression for the price of knowledge (1.25) indicates that licensees pay a
xed fee for it. The fee is equal to their marginal valuation, which includes all future
benets from using that knowledge for augmenting their current knowledge. Therefore,
licensors appropriate all the benet from licensing knowledge (i.e., they make the `take
it or leave it' oer). With a continuous accumulation of knowledge, as given by (1.12),
at each and every instant the licensees acquire new knowledge at a xed fee.
It is clear from (1.23) that I have assumed that the rm does not take into account
the eect of accumulating knowledge on the price of knowledge puj,iλj . From (1.25)
it follows that puj,iλj declines with λj. In this sense, I focus on a perfect market for
knowledge (where the price of knowledge is equal to its marginal value and licensors
appropriate all benet.) An alternative assumption would be that the rm internalizes
this eect. In such a circumstance there is an additional term in (1.23): the derivative
16Clearly, such a result holds in cases when either uj,i = 0 or puj,iλj = +∞ for ∀i 6= j.
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of puj,iλj with respect to λj.
Even though taking into account this eect changes the incentives of accumulating
knowledge, it does not aect the supply of knowledge (1.26). This is because supply
entails no costs and/or trade-os.17
In the frames of this model the assumption that licensors do not take into account
that their knowledge is used for business stealing amounts to assuming that rm j
takes qλi for any i dierent than j as exogenous. This is in line with assuming that it
takes puj,iλj as exogenous.
Finally, in equilibrium there is no dierence if high-tech rms license their knowledge
in return to wealth transfer or knowledge of other rms (plus-minus a fee.) Therefore,
knowledge licensing among high-tech rms can also be thought to resemble patent
consortia or pools.
Firm Entry
I focus on two regimes of "entry" into the high-tech industry. In the rst regime there
are exogenous barriers to entry (i.e., there is no entry) and all rms in the market are
assumed to have entered at time 0 (t = 0.) In the second regime there are no barriers
to entry into the high-tech industry. Moreover, entry entails no costs. To certain
extent such a setup might be more appropriate for modelling exit rather than entry.
This setup allows to have tractable results for the case when there is no exchange of
knowledge among high-tech rms. Later in the text I oer and highlight the balanced
growth path properties of a setup where entry entails endogenous costs for the cases
when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms.
In order to support symmetric equilibrium, I assume that the entrants into the
high-tech industry have the highest productivity available at the entry date. Further,
I assume that high-tech rms do not coordinate on their entry and exit strategies.
1.3 Features of the Dynamic Equilibrium
I restrict the attention to a symmetric equilibrium in the high-tech industry.
The growth rate of knowledge/productivity in cases when there is an exchange of
knowledge among high-tech rms (S.1-2) is given by (1.12), (1.13), and (1.14). In case
when there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3) it is given by (1.15). Denoting the growth
rates of variables by letter g, for all S.1-3 cases growth rate of knowledge can be written
17Appendix E.4 derives the model under this alternative assumption. It shows that high-tech rms
innovate less if they take into account the eect of knowledge accumulation on the price of knowledge.











Parameter INS.1−2 shows the extent that the availability of complementary knowledge can
improve the R&D process in cases when there is an exchange of knowledge compared
to the case when there is no exchange of knowledge.
The (internal) rate of return on knowledge accumulation can be derived from the
optimal rules of the high-tech rm (1.19), (1.20), and (1.23)-(1.29). It is given by












This parameter indicates the magnitude of not appropriated returns on R&D and in
that context it can be called a monetization indicator.
The expression for the rate of return on knowledge accumulation (1.31) determines
the allocation of labor to R&D in a high-tech rm relative to the allocation of labor
to production. Here, this ratio does not (explicitly) depend on competitive pressure in
the high-tech industry. This is because high-tech rms decide on the division of labor
between production and R&D internally and Lx and Lr are paid the same wage.
From the conditions that follow from high-tech rm's optimal problem (1.6)-(1.9)










This relationship shows the eect of price setting by high-tech rms. In symmetric
equilibrium the perceived elasticities of substitution are








Therefore, competition is tougher and mark-ups are lower if high-tech rms compete
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in prices, eBR > eCR. Moreover, mark-ups decline with the number of rms N and ε.
This implies that the ratio LY
NLx
declines with N , ε and toughness of competition. This
is because as the competitive pressure in the high-tech industry increases the relative
price of x declines, which increases NLx. Meanwhile, nal goods producers substitute
X for LY which reduces LY .
From (1.32) it is clear also that LY
NLx
declines with σ and does not depend on µ.
The rst result holds because higher σ implies higher marginal product of X and lower
marginal product of LY . The second result stems from the assumption that eciency
gains due to external eects are Hicks-neutral.
The relationship between NLx and LY (1.32) together with labor market clearing
condition,
L = LY +N (Lx + Lr) , (1.36)
implies a relationship between NLx and NLr,
NLx = D
k (L−NLr) , (1.37)
where Dk measures the eect of competitive pressure in the high-tech industry on








Meanwhile, in the nal goods market since either there is no entry or entry entails
no costs and the assets in this economy are the high-tech rms it has to be the case
that
Y = C, (1.39)
which means that all nal output is consumed.
Entry Regime 1: Exogenous Barriers to Entry
I take N > 1 and allow prots π in (1.18) to be negative. This is needed in order
to characterize the behavior of labor force allocations and growth rate of knowledge
for any N > 1, ε, and type of competition, and can be supported by subsidies, for
example.
18 Appendix E.5 shows that in the limiting case when σ = 1 competitive pressure in the high-tech




Since there are exogenous barriers to entry the number of rms is xed,
Ṅ = gN = g ek−1
ek
= 0.
Moreover, from (1.39) it follows that consumption and nal output grow at the same
rate,
gC = gY . (1.40)
Let the consumers be suciently patient so that θ ≥ 1, which is a standard stability
condition in multi-sector endogenous growth models and seems to be the empirically
relevant case.





L > ρ. (1.41)
In such a case, in decentralized equilibrium in all S.1-3 cases the economy makes a
discrete "jump" to balanced growth path where labor force allocations and growth rates






























(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
, (1.44)
and








(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
. (1.46)
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
I use NE superscript for equilibrium labor force allocations and growth rates to
denote the case when there is no entry. Parameter restriction (1.41) ensures that the
inter-temporal benet from allocating labor force to R&D outweighs its cost.
If parameter restriction (1.41) does not hold high-tech rms do not innovate. There-
fore, the economy is static (gλ = gY = 0) and the labor force allocations in all S.1-3
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cases are given by







This restriction may not hold for largeN if there is no exchange of knowledge among
high-tech rms (S.3) since when INS.1−2 = 1 the left-hand side of the inequality tends to
zero as N increases. In case when there is no exchange of knowledge, therefore, if N
is suciently large then the economy is on balanced growth path where gλ = gY = 0
and labor force allocations are given by (1.47)-(1.49). In this respect, if parameter
restriction (1.41) holds for any suciently small N > 1 then it always holds in cases
when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.1-2). This is because
when INS.1−2 = N the left-hand side of the inequality increases with N .
Without loss of generality, hereafter, I assume that (1.41) holds for any nite N
and does not hold in case when there is no knowledge exchange among high-tech rms
(i.e., INS.1−2 = 1) if N is arbitrarily large/innite (N = +∞).
Proposition 2. Let parameter restriction (1.41) hold. If high-tech rms choose not to
engage in R&D then labor force allocations are given by (1.47)-(1.49). Moreover, the
value of high-tech rms is higher if none of the high-tech rms engages in R&D.
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
I further assume that high-tech rms cannot collude and not innovate (for example,
because of antitrust regulation or non-sustainability of collusion). In this respect, the
reason why in decentralized equilibrium each high-tech rm prefers to engage in R&D
is that R&D reduces its marginal cost. Therefore, ceteris paribus it allows the rm to
lower its price and capture more market.
Social Optimum
The hypothetical Social Planner selects the paths of quantities so that to maximize the
lifetime utility of the household (3.11). The Social Planner internalizes all externalities
















[L−N (Lx + Lr)]1−σ , (1.51)
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λ̇ = ξINS.1−2λLr, (1.52)
λ (0) > 0− given.
The Social Planner's optimal choices for Lx and Lr are given by
[Lx] : NLx = D












and I use SP superscript to make a distinction between the Social Planner's choice and
decentralized equilibrium outcomes. Meanwhile, its returns on knowledge accumulation
are given by














This relation is the counterpart of (1.32) in decentralized equilibrium.





L > ρ. (1.58)
In such a case, the Social Planner chooses labor force allocations such that the economy,












(θ − 1) (σ + µ)L+ N
ξINS.1−2
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(θ − 1) (σ + µ)L+ N
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ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP
. (1.61)
and








(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP
. (1.63)
32
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
Parameter restriction (1.58) necessarily holds as long as (1.41) holds since DSP >
Dk. As in decentralized equilibrium, this inequality states that the benet from R&D
outweighs its cost.
Given that C in (1.51) satises Inada conditions no corner solutions in terms of
NLx or LY satisfy the Social Planner's optimal problem.
Proposition 4. Meanwhile, if (1.58) holds no corner solutions in terms of NLr satisfy
the Social Planner's optimal problem. In case, however, parameter restriction (1.58)
does not hold the Social Planner sets
NLr = 0, (1.64)







Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
This parameter restriction does not hold if N is arbitrarily large/innite and there
is no knowledge exchange in the economy (S.3). It holds, however, for any N in cases
when there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) since I have assumed that so does
(1.41).
I further assume that the Social Planner can choose between S.1-2 and S.3 cases. In
terms of policies implemented by a government in decentralized equilibrium this cor-
responds to motivating or banning knowledge exchange in the economy.19 Clearly, the
Social Planner prefers S.1-2 over S.3 since it could set the same labor force allocations
and have higher economic growth in S.1-2 cases. Therefore, in this sense it is socially
desirable to have knowledge exchange in the economy.
Comparative Statics and Comparisons
Within the decentralized equilibrium outcomes, rst, I discuss the case when the num-
ber of high-tech rms N is nite (N < +∞). Next, I discuss the limiting case when
the number of high-tech rms is innite (N = +∞) and, therefore, (1.41) does not
hold if there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.3). In the end of
19An example for such policy/action is the establishment of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA
Corporation) that fostered cross-licensing in the telecommunications industry in the US.
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the section I compare the decentralized equilibrium allocations and growth rates with
the choice of the Social Planner.
Proposition 5. In all S.1-3 cases the growth rate of knowledge/productivity (gλ) and
the growth rate of nal output (gY ) increase with the elasticity of substitution between
high-tech goods (ε). Moreover, gλ and gY are higher under Bertrand competition which
is tougher than Cournot competition.
Proof. These results follow from (1.33)-(1.35), (1.38), (1.45), and (1.46).
The driver behind these results are the relative price distortions, which are due
to price setting by high-tech rms. These distortions increase the demand for labor
in nal goods production. Increasing the elasticity of substitution or the toughness
of competition reduces these distortions. The reduction of distortions motivates nal
goods producers to substitute (a basket of) high-tech goods for labor. Higher demand
for high-tech goods and higher amount of available labor increase the incentives of
high-tech rms to conduct R&D. This increases gλ and gY .
Corollary 1. In this respect, in all S.1-3 cases NLr and NLx grow and LY declines
with the elasticity of substitution ε and toughness of competition.
Proof. This result follows from (1.42)-(1.44).
The comparative statics with respect to the number of high-tech rms in cases when
there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) are dierent from the case when there is no
exchange of knowledge (S.3). The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms
(S.1-2), labor force allocations NLr and NLx and growth rates gλ and gY increase with
the number of rms N , whereas LY declines with it. If there is no exchange of knowledge
(S.3), however, this result does not hold if the number of rms is relatively high.
Proof. These results follow from (1.42)-(1.46).
The driver behind the rst result is the reduction in relative price distortions (or
the intensication of competition) that the higher number of high-tech rms brings
with it. Meanwhile, the second result holds because increasing the number of high-
tech rms if there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.3) has two
eects. It reduces the relative price distortions and the amount of labor force that can
be devoted to R&D [see
INS.1−2
N
term in (1.46)]. The rst eect motivates higher demand
for NLr and increases gλ, whereas the second eect reduces NLr and gλ. The second
eect is absent in cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms
(S.1-2) because increasing the number of high-tech rms also increases the amount
34
of complementary knowledge made available by these rms. Clearly, the result that
these eects exactly oset each other hinges on the functional form assumptions for
knowledge accumulation processes (1.12), (1.13) and (1.14).20
Proposition 7.
• In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.1-2)
gλ and gY are concave functions of the number of rms N .
• In case when there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3) the derivative of gλ, as well
as gY , with respect to N is positive when N is close to 1 and it is negative for
any N greater than 2.
Proof. These results follow from (1.46) and that in cases when there is knowledge
exchange among high-tech rms INS.1−2 = N , whereas I
N
S.1−2 = 1 if there is no knowledge
exchange.
The rst part of this proposition holds because competition intensies more from
adding a rm if there are few high-tech rms. Meanwhile, the second part holds because
in case when there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3) at the higher levels of market con-
centration/lower levels of competition (N ≈ 1) the positive eect of higher competition
is dominant. Meanwhile, at the lower levels of market concentration/higher levels of
competition (N > 2) the negative eect of the reduction in the amount of resource for
R&D is dominant. The full characterization of the behavior of gλ and gY for N ∈ (1, 2)
is not so straightforward, however. This is because of high non-linearity of gλ in that
interval. In the neighborhood of N = 1 the growth rate of knowledge/productivity gλ
is increasing and concave in N and after a tipping point from (1, 2) it becomes convex
and decreasing.21
Proposition 8.
• In all S.1-3 cases labor force allocations NLr and NLx and growth rates gλ and
gY increase with σ, whereas LY declines with it. In contrast, gλ and NLr decline
with µ and gY , NLx, and LY increase with it.
20One way to relax this assumption is to multiply (1.12) and (1.14) by a function z (N). Appendix E.6
oers the main properties of such a generalization of the model and sucient conditions to have gλ
increasing in N .
21This result implies that in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.3)
there is an "inverted-U" shape relationship between gλ and the number of rms N . A similar result can
be obtained in cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.1-2) assuming
xed management costs as in van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) or that (1.12) and (1.14) increase
less than linearly with N . The later assumption would imply that the benets from availability of
complementary knowledge are less than N .
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• In cases when there are knowledge spillovers/externalities (S.2-3) NLr, gλ and
gY decline with α, whereas NLx and LY increase with it.
Proof. These results follow from (1.42)-(1.46).
The rst result holds because higher σ increases the marginal product of high-
tech goods bundle X and reduces the marginal product of labor force employed in
nal goods production LY . Therefore, the demand for LY declines and labor force
allocations NLx and NLr increase. According to (1.45) and (1.46) this implies that gλ
and the growth rate of nal output gY increase with σ. In contrast, higher µ does not
aect the balance between the demand for X and LY and in this sense does not alter
the production and R&D incentives of high-tech rms. Meanwhile, ceteris paribus
it increases the growth rate of nal output gY and equilibrium interest rate r [see
(1.3)], which discourages investments in R&D. Lower NLr implies lower growth rate of
knowledge/productivity gλ. Finally, the second part of this proposition holds because in
case there are knowledge spillovers/externalities as α increases the internalized returns
on R&D decline and rms invest less in R&D. Therefore, more labor force is allocated
to production activities, and gλ and gY decline.
In order to preserve space, hereafter, unless stated otherwise, I exclusively discuss
the results for the growth rate of knowledge/productivity gλ while keeping in mind
that the growth rate of nal output gY is proportional to it.
Corollary 2. If the number of high-tech rms is arbitrarily large/innite
• in case when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.1-2)
labor force allocations and growth rate gλ are given by (1.42)-(1.44), and (1.46)
where
Dk ≡ D = σ (ε− 1)
ε− σ
;
• in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.3)
gλ = 0 and labor force allocations are given by (1.47)-(1.49) where D
k ≡ D.
The rst part of this corollary implies that when there is an exchange of knowledge
among high-tech rms and N = +∞ neither labor force allocations nor the growth rate
of knowledge depend on the type of competition and the number of high-tech rms.
It implies also that the remaining comparative statics stay intact in these cases. The
second part of the corollary holds because when there is no exchange of knowledge
among high-tech rms and N = +∞ parameter restriction (1.41) does not hold. It
can be shown that in this case, NLx increases and LY declines with σ and ε and both
NLx and LY do not depend on the type of competition and parameters α and µ.
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Corollary 3. For both nite and innite number of high-tech rms the comparison





















This means that in decentralized equilibrium with no entry high-tech rms innovate
the most in case when there is knowledge licensing (S.1). High-tech rms innovate the
least if there is no exchange of knowledge among these rms (S.3). Therefore, for a
given N the growth rate of nal output is the highest in case when there is knowledge
licensing and the lowest in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-
tech rms.
In order to further highlight the contrast between all knowledge accumulation/R&D
setups (S.1-3) Figure 1.1 plots gλ for parameter values θ = 4, ρ = 0.01, σ = 0.3,
µ = 0.01, ε = 4, L = 1, ξ = 1, and α = 0.1 and Cournot and Bertrand types of
competition.22
Figure 1.1: The Growth Rate of Productivity in S.1-3 Cases
Note: This gure plots gλ as a function of N for parameter values θ = 4, ρ = 0.01, σ = 0.3, µ = 0.01, ε = 4, L = 1,
ξ = 1, and α = 0.1 and for Cournot and Bertrand types of competition.
22The parameter values were selected so that the growth rate of nal output has a reasonable value.
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Comparisons Between Decentralized Equilibrium and Socially Optimal Re-
sults: Dierent types of competitive pressure matter for these decentralized equilib-
rium outcomes because of market interactions among high-tech rms. They do not
matter, however, for the outcomes of the Social Planner's problem (1.59)-(1.63).
Corollary 4. In contrast to the decentralized equilibrium results NLSPr , NL
SP
x , gλ, and
gY increase with µ and L
SP
Y declines with this parameter.
Proof. This result follows from (1.59)-(1.63).
This result holds because the Social Planner internalizes µ and higher µ implies
higher marginal product of X.
Corollary 5. For both nite and innite N the comparison between decentralized equi-
librium growth rates and allocations and socially optimal growth rates and allocations




















where Q indicates that the relation depends on model parameters.
This means that in decentralized equilibrium the economy innovates less than it is
socially optimal and therefore grows at a lower rate. Moreover, in decentralized equi-
librium it fails to have socially optimal labor force allocations. The driver behind these
results are the relative price distortions and externalities. Due to these distortions nal
goods producers substitute labor for high-tech goods which lowers the output of high-
tech rms and the number of researchers that high-tech rms hire. The externalities
in R&D have an eect of similar direction. If such externalities are present then high-
tech rms do not fully internalize the returns on R&D. This reduces their incentives
to invest in R&D and they hire lower number of researchers. Meanwhile, externalities
in nal goods production increase interest rate r. Since high-tech rms do not take
into account these externalities they invest less than it is socially optimal. Final goods
producers also do not take into account these externalities. Therefore, they demand
less than socially optimal amount of high-tech goods.
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The dierences between socially optimal and decentralized equilibrium growth rates
and labor force allocations in terms of the relative price distortions and externalities







This equality holds because for suciently high N the limiting case ε = +∞ would
imply perfect competition in the high-tech industry. In such a limiting case, however,
in decentralized equilibrium high-tech rms make zero prots and have no market
incentives to innovate.
In this respect, if there are no subsidies that keep the prots of high-tech rms non-
negative, the positive relationship between innovation and ε holds as long as high-tech
rms have sucient prots to cover the costs of R&D. Prots of high-tech rms and ε
are inversely related. Once prots net of R&D expenditures are equal to zero increasing
ε reduces innovation to zero. Therefore, if there are no subsidies the relationship
between intensity of product market competition (ε) and innovation has an "inverted-
U" shape. Such a relation is consistent with Schumpeter's argument that rms need to
be suciently big in order to innovate. Moreover, it is in line with the empirical ndings
of Aghion et al. (2005) and provides an alternative explanation for those ndings.
Entry Regime 2: Cost-free Entry
In this section I endogenize the number of rms assuming that entry cost is zero.
Decentralized Equilibrium













Given that entry cost is zero the condition that endogenizes the number of high-tech













π = 0⇔ π̄ = 0. (1.69)
Proposition 9. At time 0 (t = 0) N makes a discrete jump to the balanced growth
path equilibrium level.
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Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
This implies that in decentralized equilibrium with cost-free entry the economy is
on a balanced growth path (for any t > 0), where
Ṅ = gN = g ek−1
ek
= 0.
Therefore, labor force allocations and growth rate of knowledge/productivity are given
by (1.42)-(1.44) and (1.46), where the number of high-tech rms N is endogenous.
In turn, N can derived from the zero prot condition (1.69) and gλ that solves the
capital market equilibrium (1.46). The growth rate of productivity gλ that solves the
zero prot condition (1.69) is
gλ =
ρ
ek − 1− αI1S.2−3 − (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
. (1.70)
Let
ε− 1− α− (θ − 1) (σ + µ) > 0,
which implies that gλ can be positive for suciently large N or, equivalently, there can
exist decentralized equilibrium where high-tech rms innovate.
Hereafter, I call gλ from (1.70) ZP - zero prot - and gλ from (1.46) CME - capital
market equilibrium. If α > 0 and/or θ > 1 the number of high-tech rms N that
satises
ek − 1− α− (θ − 1) (σ + µ) = 0
is strictly greater than 1. Denote it by N∗. For N ∈ (1, N∗) it can be shown that gλ




Meanwhile for N > N∗ it can be shown that ZP is positive, decreasing, and convex




Proposition 10. In decentralized equilibrium with endogenous entry it cannot happen
so that N ∈ (1, N∗).
Proof. This is because for N ∈ (1, N∗) high-tech rms do not innovate, which implies






Therefore, there will be entry that will increase the number of high-tech rms above
N∗.
Both CME and ZP are continuous functions of N for N > N∗, the values of CME
are nite for any N > 1, and ZP is arbitrarily large around N∗. Therefore, at least for
N suciently close to N∗ it has to be the case that ZP is higher CME. This means
that there exists decentralized equilibrium where high-tech rms innovate.
If ZP crosses CME from above then the decentralized equilibrium determined by
the intersection is stable in the sense that the entry of rms reduces π̄ in (1.68) and exit
increases it. The number of rms and the growth rate of productivity can be solved
from the intersection of CME and ZP in such a case. Moreover, if at time 0 (t = 0)
the number of high-tech rms is higher than (and in S.3 case suciently close to) the
number determined by the intersection of ZP and CME then high-tech rms will exit
the market till ZP and CME are equal. Considering such a setup, or exit of high-tech
rms instead of entry, can support the zero entry costs assumption.
In order to have meaningful equilibrium in each of S.1-3 cases [i.e., (1.69) holds] I
further assume that the parameters are such that there exists N∗∗ where ZP crosses
CME under Cournot competition in case when there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3).
Given that (1.46) shifts up and (1.70) shifts down with the elasticity of substitution ε
this can be equivalent to assuming that the elasticity of substitution ε is suciently
high. It implies that ZP crosses CME in all the remaining S.1-3 cases.23
The previous section showed that if there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) the
growth rate of knowledge gλ from (1.46), or CME, is monotonically increasing function
of N .
Corollary 6. In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms
(S.1-2) ZP crosses CME from above and the number of high-tech rms under Cournot








where k = CR,BR and eCR and eBR are given by (1.34) and (1.35). In turn, from
(1.71) and (1.30), (1.36), (1.37), and (1.46) it follows that
gCFE,S.1−2λ =
ξσL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + 1
, (1.72)
23van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) oer a model which resembles the case when there is no exchange
of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.3). The authors assume parameter values such that ZP crosses
CME from above. Clearly, such a set of parameter values is restrictive for cases when there is an













(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3
]
+ ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + 1
, (1.74)
LCFE,S.1−2Y = (1− σ)L, (1.75)
where CFE stands for cost-free entry.
If there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3), however, CME is not a monotonic
function for all N . It is monotonically increasing function in the neighborhood of
N = 1 and monotonically decreasing after some N ∈ (1, 2). Moreover, it is continuous
and nite for any N and negative for N = 1 and N = +∞. Therefore, given that ZP
is a monotonically decreasing function and it is positive for any N , ZP crosses CME
at least twice.
Corollary 7. If there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms then the































(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3
]
+ ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + 1
, (1.79)
LCFE,S.3Y = (1− σ)L. (1.80)
It is straightforward to show that (1.76) is a quadratic equation in N . This means in
case there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.3) ZP crosses CME
twice. It does so from above and from below. The smaller root of (1.76) corresponds
to the stable equilibrium where ZP crosses CME from above. Meanwhile, the bigger
root corresponds to the case when ZP crosses CME from below and the equilibrium
is not stable. Denote it by N∗∗2 . If the economy starts with a number of rms greater
or equal to N∗∗2 then π̄ does not decline to zero as N increases. In order to rule this
out I further assume that the economy starts with a number of high-tech rms that is
lower than N∗∗2 . Therefore, depending on whether ZP is higher or lower than CME,
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rms exit or enter till (the point where) ZP crosses CME from above.24
Social Optimum
In this case the hypothetical Social Planner solves the optimal problem (1.50) and
chooses N .
The Social Planner's optimal choice for N in case when there is an exchange of








N = +∞, (1.81)




C1−θ ≥ qλξλLr, (1.82)
The former result (1.81) holds because if there is an exchange of knowledge then
INS.1−2 = N and the Social Planner has no trade-os while increasing N .
25 In contrast,
if there is no exchange of knowledge then INS.1−2 = 1 and it has a trade-o. Higher N
implies lower growth rate.
In order to be able to solve the optimal control problem in cases when there is an
exchange of knowledge (INS.1−2 = N) with rst order conditions C needs to be rescaled
by N so that at time zero C < +∞ (i.e., C needs to be divided to N
σ+µ
ε−1 ).
Proposition 11. The Social Planner selects labor force allocations and N such that
the economy makes a discrete jump to balanced growth path.
• If there is an exchange of knowledge, on this path labor force allocations and
growth rate of knowledge gλ are given by (1.59)-(1.61) and (1.63) and N = +∞.
• If there is no exchange of knowledge and (1.82) is binding then
N =
ξ (σ + µ)
ρ
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ)
L, (1.83)
24The functional forms of knowledge accumulation process in cases when there is an exchange of knowl-
edge among high-tech rms (S.1-2) help to avoid this assumption.
25In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) the Social Planner selects at time zero
N = +∞ because of the assumption that rm entry or creating high-tech goods entails no costs. If
there were costs associated with entry (or costs associated with maintaining the goods/rms as in
van de Klundert and Smulders, 1997) the Social Planner might not select at time zero (or at any




ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
. (1.84)
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
If there is no exchange of knowledge and (1.82) is binding labor force allocations
can be derived from (1.52), (1.53), (1.57), and (1.84), where the expression (1.84) is
the counterpart of ZP (1.70) with N = +∞ and α = 0.
Comparing the lifetime utility of the household it can be shown, however, that
the Social Planner prefers to set N = +∞ also in case when there is no exchange of
knowledge. Therefore, (1.82) does not bind. The following proposition summarizes
this result.












Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
As it was shown in the Social optimum section of Entry Regime 1 this implies that
the Social Planner prefers the case when there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2) over
the case when there is no exchange of knowledge (S.3). This result is not stemming from
the cost-free entry assumption. Even if there were xed costs associated with entry
the Social Planner could set the number of rms in case when there is an exchange of
knowledge (S.1-2) equal to the number of rms it nds optimal in case when there is
no exchange of knowledge (S.3). In such a circumstance according to (1.63) it would
have higher growth rate and, therefore, welfare in case when there is an exchange of
knowledge (S.1-2).
Comparative Statics and Comparisons
The following proposition establishes the comparative statics results for the number of
high-tech rms.
Proposition 13.
• In all S.1-3 cases, there are fewer high-tech rms in equilibrium under Bertrand
competition than under Cournot competition. Further, the number of rms de-
clines with ε and increases with µ.
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• In cases when there are knowledge spillovers/externalities (S.2-3) the number of
rms increases with α. It does not depend on α in case when there is knowledge
licensing (S.1).
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
The number of rms declines with toughness of competition and ε since tougher
competition and higher ε imply lower mark-ups, which reduces π̄ for a given N .
In turn, it increases with µ since higher µ implies lower R&D investments (xed
costs), which increases π̄ for a given N . Higher α in cases when there are knowledge
spillovers/externalities (S.2-3) also implies lower R&D investments. The comparative
statics with respect σ depend on model parameters.
Corollary 8.
In cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.1-2), from
(1.72)-(1.75) it follows that
• gλ and labor force allocations do not depend on competition type and ε.
• gλ and NLr decrease with α and µ and increase with σ, NLx increases with these
parameters, LY does not depend on α and µ and declines with σ, and according
to (1.45) gY declines with α but increases with σ and µ.
In turn, in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.3),
from (1.77)-(1.80) and Proposition 13 it follows that
• gλ and NLr increase and NLx declines with toughness of competition and ε.
Meanwhile, LY does not depend on the type of competition and ε.
• gλ and NLr decrease and NLx increases with α and µ, LY does not depend on α
and µ and declines with σ.
For the cases when there is an exchange of knowledge (S.1-2), this corollary indicates
that in-house R&D of high-tech rms does not depend on competitive pressures in the
high-tech industry. Such a result holds because of two reasons. First, entry reduces
prots of high-tech rms to zero and makes labor force allocations in rms independent
of the intensity and toughness of competition. Second, (1.12) and (1.13) are linearly
increasing with the number of high-tech rms. This exactly osets the decline in the
amount of labor force that can be available to a high-tech rm for R&D as the number of
high-tech rms grows and makes labor force allocation to R&D in the rm independent
of the number of rms. (Appendix E.6 shows that for more general formulation of R&D
process this result might not hold.)
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Meanwhile, in case when this no exchange of knowledge, it is not straightforward
to derive the relationships between gλ, NLr, and NLx and σ and the relationships
between gY and µ and σ. Using numerical methods it is possible to show that these
comparative statics depend on model parameters.26
The following corollary summarizes the comparisons among dierent settings for
R&D process.





















Given that R&D investments are xed costs, this implies that there are more high-
tech rms in case when there are knowledge spillovers among these rms (S.2) than in
case when there is knowledge licensing (S.1). Moreover, there are more high-tech rms
in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among these rms (S.3) compared to
the case when there are knowledge spillovers (S.2), i.e.,
NCFE,S.3 > NCFE,S.2 > NCFE,S.1.
These results show that high-tech rms innovate more in cases when there is an
exchange of knowledge compared to the case when there is none. Moreover, these rms
innovate more in case when there is knowledge licensing compared to the case there
are knowledge spillovers/externalities. Meanwhile, using (1.59)-(1.61), (1.63), (1.88)
and (1.89) it can be shown that in all S.1-3 cases in decentralized equilibrium with
cost-free (endogenous) entry into the high-tech industry the economy invests in R&D
less than it is socially optimal. Therefore, it grows at a lower than socially optimal
rate. Further, it fails to have socially optimal number of high-tech rms.
Policies leading to the rst best outcome in decentralized equi-
librium
In this section I oer policies that if implemented in decentralized equilibrium lead to
the rst best outcome. I assume that there is knowledge licensing in decentralized equi-
librium. This can amount to assuming that the government has motivated knowledge
exchange among high-tech rms that happens in a market where the licensors have the
26The intervals of parameter values used in numerical simulations are oered in Appendix E.8.
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right to make a `take it or leave it' oer (i.e., they have the bargaining power). In this
respect, such an action is one of the necessary policy instruments for increasing wel-
fare in decentralized equilibrium.27 As I show in Appendix E.8 this instrument alone
cannot be sucient, however. For example, in decentralized equilibrium for suciently
low values of α welfare can be higher in case when there are knowledge spillovers (S.2)
compared to the case when there is knowledge licensing (S.1).
I assume that the set of additional policy instruments includes marginal taxes on
(or subsidies to) purchases of high-tech goods (τx) and high-tech rms' expenditures
on buying knowledge (τλ). It also includes lump-sum transfers to high-tech rms (Tπ)
and households (T ). The latter balances government expenditures.
Under such a policy from the nal goods producer's problem it follows that (1.7)











In turn, the prot function of high-tech rm j is














Therefore, the demand for knowledge of the high-tech rm (1.25) needs to be rewritten
as





Lrj , ∀i 6= j.
Considering symmetric equilibrium and combining these optimal rules with (1.6),
(1.9), (1.24) and labor market clearing condition (1.36) gives the counterparts of the
relation between NLx and LY (1.32), returns on knowledge accumulation (1.31), and



















GO (L−NLr) , (1.92)
27This is because in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms there is no
set of (orthodox) policy instruments in terms of welfare transfers which in decentralized equilibrium
equates labor force allocations and growth rate of knowledge to their socially optimal counterparts.
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and I use GO to denote decentralized equilibrium with government.
Proposition 14. Let the marginal tax rates be constant. In such a case, labor force































Proof. See Proofs Appendix.




r , NLx = NL
SP
x .
To achieve such an outcome it is sucient to subsidize the purchases of high-tech goods,
τλ = 0, (1.93)
τx =
ekµ+ σ
ek (σ + µ)
, (1.94)
where τx equates DGO to DSP . It is enough to subsidize the demand for high-tech
goods because the returns on knowledge accumulation are fully appropriated (i.e.,
I1S.2−3 = 0).
28
Although under this policy labor force allocations and growth rate of knowledge
in decentralized equilibrium are equal to their socially optimal counterparts, welfare is
not. This is because in decentralized equilibrium there is lower number of high-tech
rms/goods. The policy instrument that can correct for this is Tπ. It is straightforward
28Appendix E.7 oers a policy which instead of subsidizing the purchases of high-tech goods subsidizes
the production and R&D expenditures of high-tech rms. It shows that the subsidy rates to these
expenditures should be equal in order to have rst best allocations and growth rates. This is because
in a high-tech rm the allocations of labor to production and R&D are aected by relative price
distortions equally.
48
to show that it is sucient to set
Tπ = wLxτπ, (1.95)
where τπ is such that for any nite N the prots of high-tech rms are greater than
zero, but for N = +∞ prots are zero.
Corollary 10. The rate τπ can be derived from a zero prot condition and is given by
τπ =
ε− 1 +DSP









Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
The second line of (1.96) needs to be positive in order to have N > 1 in (1.83).
Therefore, τπ is greater than zero implying that entry into high-tech industry needs
to be subsidized. Such subsidies are in the spirit of R&D subsidies in Romer (1990)
model to the extent that entry can be thought to be a result of R&D that generates
new types of high-tech goods.29
The result that τπ is greater than zero is not stemming from the cost-free entry
assumption. Next section shows that even if entry into the high-tech industry entailed
positive costs then still it could be that at least in very long-run the Social Planner sets
N = +∞ whereas in decentralized equilibrium the market is saturated for N < +∞.
The Social Planner can prefer having N = +∞ because as λ grows the marginal
product of N increases.
Entry Regime 3: Costly Entry
In this section I assume that entry into the high-tech industry entails endogenous costs.
I focus on the cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms.
Further, I do not assume that parameters are such that CME necessarily crosses ZP .
This restriction can be lifted since in case when entry entails endogenous costs positive
prots can be allowed.
Firm Entry
In order to enter into the high-tech industry and to generate its distinct type of high-
tech good, the potential producer has to invest. The investment is in terms of nal
29Appendix E.4 shows how τλ can be used together with τx in case when high-tech rms do not take
the price of knowledge as exogenous. If τλ 6= 0 then subsidy rate τπ is not given by (1.96).
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goods. The entrant should borrow the resources for the investment from the household
at the market interest rate r.
The creation of the distinct type of high-tech good is given by
Ṅ = ηS, η ≥ 0, (1.97)
where Ṅ is the new high-tech good created by the investment S and η is the eciency
of investments.
The entrants are assumed to break-even on a zero net-value constraint,
V Ṅ = S. (1.98)
From this expression, (1.2), (1.6), (1.9), (1.10), (1.18), (1.98), and Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation V̇ = rV − π it follows that for η ∈ (0,+∞)
Y = C + S, (1.99)
given that the assets in this economy are the high-tech rms (A = V N .) Meanwhile,
in terms of previously analyzed cases of entry, η = 0 in (1.97) corresponds to the case
when there are exogenous barriers to entry. In such a case (1.98) does not bind. The
limiting case η = +∞ corresponds to cost-free endogenous entry. In such a case any
innitesimally small investment leads to entry. Given that this investment is a cost,
the entrants would select to invest 0 and enter. Therefore, in both limiting cases η = 0
and η = +∞ (1.39) holds.
Hereafter, I assume that η is a small number (η ≈ 0). Such a restriction allows to
have no transition in the hypothetical Social Planner's solution.
Decentralized Equilibrium
It is instructive to derive the prot function of a high-tech rm rst. As in case when
















1 for Ṅ 6= 0,
0 otherwise.
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Corollary 11. π̄ in (1.100) is monotonically decreasing function of N .
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
The competition intensies with the number of rmsN . When strategic interactions
in the product market are non-negligible, the intensity of competition and prots are
related negatively. The negative relation between N and π̄ reects exactly this point.
Hereafter, I focus only on the balanced growth path analysis. Depending on the
household's preferences, nal goods production technology and the high-tech rm's
knowledge accumulation process, there are two cases when the economy grows at con-
stant rates. In the rst case there are so many high-tech rms that the new entrant's
impact on others' demand is negligible. Whereas in the second case, the next entrant
will have negative prot streams (i.e., there are endogenous barriers to entry).30
In the rst case, the counterpart of CME in (1.46) is always lower than the counter-
part of ZP in (1.70). On the balanced growth path there are innitely many high-tech
rms and there is permanent entry (N = +∞, Ṅ > 0.)






θ − 1 + I0
Ṅ=0
)
B + αI1S.2−3 +D
, (1.101)
where I use superscript CE - costly entry - in order to distinguish the outcomes of this
setup and
B =





Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
Labor force allocations in this case can be derived from (1.30), (1.36), and (1.37).
In the denominator of gCEλ (1.101) I
0
Ṅ=0
captures the eect of continuous entry into
the high-tech industry on innovation incentives of high-tech rms. Continuous entry
erodes the returns on innovation. Ceteris paribus this leads to lower investments in
R&D.
In the second case, let N∗∗ (< +∞) be the last high-tech rm that will have non-
negative prot streams if it enters. There is no entry after N∗∗ (i.e., Ṅ = 0) because for
any N > N∗∗ the value V would be negative.31 When there is no entry, the economy is
30This ordering is possible given that π̄ in (1.100) is negatively related to the number of rms and the
investments in knowledge accumulation are xed costs.
31Strictly speaking, the rm that has zero prots invests zero; therefore, according to (1.97), it also
does not enter. Therefore, N∗∗ is an upper bound for the number of rms in the high-tech industry.
However, since π̄ in (1.100) is a continuous function of the number of rms, N∗∗ is exactly the number
of rms in high-tech industry.
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on a balanced growth path; therefore, N∗∗ is determined from the intersection of CME
and ZP curves. In such a case, labor force allocations, growth rates and the number
of rms under dierent types of competition can be obtained from (1.42)-(1.46) and
(1.71).32
Social Optimum
The hypothetical Social Planner's problem is given by (1.50)-(1.52) and (1.97). I
assume that the Social Planner can make negative investments in the high-tech industry
(i.e., in N) and η is close to zero. These assumptions allow to have no transition in
the social optimum.










(ε− 1) (σ + µ)
ε− 1− (σ + µ)
.
Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
In turn, the socially optimal labor force allocations can be found from (1.36), (1.53),
and (1.57).
Corollary 12. There is permanent entry in the social optimum.
The permanent entry result is due to the absence of market incentives in the social
optimum. It stands in contrast to the decentralized equilibrium result where it may be
the case that there are endogenous barriers to entry. It holds because the accumulation
of knowledge (R&D) increases the marginal product of N .
Comparisons and Policy Inference
It is straightforward to show that in both cases when there are endogenous barriers to
entry in decentralized equilibrium (Ṅ = 0) and there are no barriers to entry (Ṅ > 0)






32In case when there is no exchange of knowledge and the counterpart of ZP crosses the counterpart of
CME from above at nite N then the balanced growth path properties of the model are summarized
in the section Entry Regime 2. However, in case when ZP does not cross CME on balanced growth
the economy needs to be static in case B is nite and positive.
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Further, similar to the previous sections, it is straightforward to show that in both
cases when Ṅ = 0 and Ṅ > 0 in decentralized equilibrium the economy fails to have
socially optimal labor force allocations. From (1.102) and (1.103) it also follows that
in the social optimum the growth rate of nal output is higher if there is continuous
entry compared to the case when there is no continuous entry.
Corollary 13. If there is continuous entry into the high-tech industry (Ṅ > 0) and
knowledge licensing among high-tech rms, then the following policy delivers socially
optimal allocations and growth rates as a decentralized equilibrium outcome.
τx =
ekµ+ σ














Proof. See Proofs Appendix.
In this policy τx is the same as in (1.94) and subsidizes the purchases of nal goods.
In contrast, τλ in this policy is greater than zero which means that this policy subsidizes
also knowledge licensing. It does so in order to motivate R&D in the high-tech industry
and alleviate the negative eect of continuous entry on innovation incentives of high-
tech rms.
Continuous entry, in turn, can be guaranteed with lump-sum transfers to high-tech
rms (1.95) which make the prots of these rms marginally greater than zero for any
N .
Discussion of Implemented Policies
Many recently implemented policies, such as for example the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, have a structure which is similar to the one of the suggested optimal poli-
cies. The similarities are that these policies promote demand for high-tech goods
(e.g., telecommunications goods/services) and as a market regulation they motivate
entry. Despite these similarities, these policies seem to lack important components.
For example, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 overlooks the incentive of telecom-
munications rms to under-invest in R&D and the negative eect of entry on the rate
of return on that investment.33 It also does not incorporate transfers which could allow
permanent/continuous entry, if needed.
33It has to be acknowledged that, for instance, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in
the US envisions the need to foster innovation in the telecommunications industry (see, for instance,
FCC, 2008). However, the FCC tries to foster innovation by the means of more competition in the
telecommunications industry by motivating free entry.
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1.4 Conclusions
The model presented in this paper incorporates knowledge (patent) licensing into a
stylized endogenous growth framework, where the engine of growth is high-tech rms'
in-house R&D. The inference from this model suggests that if there is knowledge li-
censing high-tech rms innovate more and economic growth is higher than in cases
when there are knowledge spillovers and/or there is no knowledge exchange among
these rms. The results also suggest that innovation in the high-tech industry and
economic growth increase with the intensity and toughness of competition in that in-
dustry. Such an inference holds also for the number of high-tech rms if there is an
exchange of knowledge among these rms in the form of licensing or spillovers. Increas-
ing the number of high-tech rms increases innovation in the high-tech industry and
the growth rate of the economy. However, if there is no exchange of knowledge among
high-tech rms, then increasing the number of rms can also discourage innovation in
the high-tech industry and reduce economic growth.
Innovation in the high-tech industry declines with the magnitude of externalities
which stem from the use of high-tech goods. However, the rate of economic growth
increases with it. Further, the existence of such externalities creates a wedge between
resource allocations in decentralized equilibrium and socially optimal allocations. In
this model, this implies that the existence of externalities also creates a wedge between
growth rates in decentralized equilibrium and the socially optimal growth rate.
If entry (or exit) is endogenous and entails no costs, innovation in the high-tech
industry and economic growth are again higher in case when there is knowledge li-
censing. However, this happens at the expense of lower number of high-tech rms.
More intensive and/or tougher competition reduce the number of high-tech rms. If
there is an exchange of knowledge among these rms the intensity and toughness of
competition do not aect, however, allocations, innovation in the high-tech industry,
and economic growth. In contrast, allocations change and innovation and economic
growth tend to increase with the intensity and toughness of competition if there is no
exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms.
If entry entails no costs a policy consisting of four instruments can be sucient
for achieving the rst best outcome in decentralized equilibrium. The policy gives the
bargaining power in the market for knowledge to the licensors so that they appropriate
all the benet. Further, it subsidizes the purchases of high-tech goods so that it
osets the negative eect of price setting by high-tech rms and takes into account
the externalities from the use of high-tech goods. Finally, it subsidizes entry into the
high-tech industry and uses lump-sum taxes to cover all these subsidies.
Meanwhile, if entry entails endogenous costs then in the social optimum there is
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continuous entry into the high-tech industry. In decentralized equilibrium continuous
entry erodes the returns on innovation and therefore reduces R&D eort of high-tech
rms. In order to alleviate this eect and achieve rst best outcomes in decentralized




Proof of Proposition 1: The growth rates of quantities and prices that characterize
the essential dynamics of this model can be obtained from (1.3)-(1.10), (1.11), (1.19),




(r − ρ) , (1.104)




gN + gx, (1.106)
gY = gw + gLY , (1.107)
gx = gλ + gLx , (1.108)
gw = gqλ + gN + gλ. (1.109)
Combining (1.31) with (1.19), (1.20), (1.30), (1.32), (1.36), (1.37), (1.40), and
(1.104)-(1.109) gives a dierential equation in Lr,
L̇r =
L−NLr














for all S.1-3 cases.
Let parameter restriction (1.41) hold. The rst term of the dierential equation
(1.110) is non-negative. Without that term, the characteristic root of the dierential
equation is positive, ∂L̇r
∂Lr
> 0. This, together with the neoclassical production function
of nal goods (3.1), implies that there is a unique Lr such that (1.110) is stable and








(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
. (1.111)
Combining this expression with the relations between NLx and LY (1.32) and NLx
and NLr (1.37) gives the equilibrium allocations of labor force (1.42)-(1.44). Given





















(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
.
Therefore, in decentralized equilibrium with no entry if (1.41) holds the economy
makes a discrete "jump" to balanced growth path in all S.1-3 cases.
Proof of Proposition 2: The value of a high-tech rm if high-tech rms innovate
[i.e., NLr ∈ (0, L)] is
V NLr∈(0,L) =
1
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) gλ + ρ
π (t) exp [− (σ + µ) gλt] ,
where I have dropped the superscript NE and π (t) can be derived from (3.1), (1.5),













exp [(σ + µ) gλt]
×











In turn, if none of the high-tech rms innovates then the economy is static (gY =





























It can be easily shown that
V NLr∈(0,L) < V NLr=0,
which means that the value of any high-tech rm is higher if none of the high-tech
rms engages in R&D.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Using (1.54), the expression for the returns on knowledge













Meanwhile, from (1.51)-(1.54) and (1.57) it follows that








gqλ = −gλ − gLx − (θ − 1) gC . (1.116)
Combining (1.112)-(1.116) gives a dierential equation in Lr,
L̇r =
L−NLr














Without the rst non-negative term this expression implies that ∂L̇r
∂Lr
> 0. Therefore,








(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP
. (1.118)
The numerator in (1.118) is positive if (1.58) is positive.
Combining (1.118) with (1.53) and (1.57) gives the socially optimal (interior) allo-
cations of labor force (1.59)-(1.61).
Given that labor force allocations are constant from (1.39) and (1.114) it follows
that
gNE,SPY = (σ + µ) g
NE,SP
λ ,






(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +DSP
.
Therefore, the Social Planner chooses allocations such that the economy, where there
is "no entry", makes a discrete jump to balanced growth path.
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Proof of Proposition 4: The lifetime utility of the representative household in case
when the Social Planner innovates is
UNE,SP,NLr∈(0,L) ≡ U = − 1
θ − 1
1














where NLNE,SPx , L
NE,SP
Y , and g
NE,SP
λ are given by (1.60), (1.61), and (1.63). In turn,
in case when the Social Planner does not innovate it is

















where NLNE,SPx and L
NE,SP
Y are given by (1.65) and (1.66).












(θ − 1) (1 + µ) ξDSP INS.1−2N L1ρ + 1









and take the natural logarithm of both sides of this inequality:
0 ≤ [(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1] [ln ((θ − 1) (1 + µ) z + 1)− ln ((θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1)]
− (θ − 1) (1 + µ) ln z.
The derivative of the right-hand side of this inequality with respect to z is greater
than zero. Meanwhile, the right-hand side is equal to zero in case when z = 1. There-
fore, given that (1.58) holds z > 1 and
UNE,SP,NLr=0 ≤ UNE,SP,NLr∈(0,L).
Proof of Proposition 9: It is straightforward to show that if the number of rms
N is xed the economy is on a balanced growth path. Further, it is straightforward
to show that π̄ in (1.68) declines with N (see also Corollary 11). This, together with
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cost-free entry and that π̄ in (1.68) is constant on balanced growth path, implies that
at time zero (t = 0) N makes a discrete jump to the balanced growth path equilibrium
level where π̄ = 0. Therefore, thereafter in decentralized equilibrium with cost-free
entry the economy is always on a balanced growth path.
Proof of Proposition 11: If (1.82) and the remaining optimal rules/constraints are
binding, then for the case when there is no exchange of knowledge (INS.1−2 = 1) it is
straightforward to show that the optimal labor force allocations are
NLCFE,SP,S.3r =
σ + µ
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ)
L, (1.119)
NLCFE,SP,S.3x =
(ε− 1) (σ + µ)
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ)
L, (1.120)
LCFE,SP,S.3Y =
(ε− 1) (1− σ)
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ)
L. (1.121)
It can be further shown that the returns on knowledge accumulation are given by
gqλ = ρ− ξ
INS.1−2
N
ε (σ + µ)
ε (1 + µ)− (1− σ)
L. (1.122)
In turn, from (1.51), (1.52), (1.82) and (1.119)-(1.121) it follows that
gLY = gNLx = gNLr = 0, (1.123)







gλ = ξLr, (1.125)
gqλ = −gλ − (θ − 1) gC + gN . (1.126)
Combining these conditions with (1.122) gives a dierential equation in N ,
gN = −
ε− 1
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
×
[
ξ (σ + µ)
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)









> 0 the only stable solution is (1.83),
N =
ξ (σ + µ)
ρ
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)





Therefore, from (1.52) and (1.119) it follows that (1.84) holds,
gCFE,SP,S.3λ =
ρ
ε− 1− (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
.
This implies that the economy needs to make a discrete jump to balanced growth path
at time zero.
Proof of Proposition 12: In order to check whether (1.82) is binding denote





From (1.51) it follows that
ŪCFE,SP,S.3,N<+∞ = − 1
θ − 1
1










where N , gSPλ , NLx, and LY are given by (1.83), (1.84), (1.120), and (1.121) corre-
spondingly.










implying that the solution with nite N is not optimal.













and the economy is static.
Proof of Proposition 13: If there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech
rms, the expression for perceived elasticity of substitution ek (1.71) indicates that ek
does not depend on the type of competition. Since for any given number of rms the
perceived elasticity of substitution is higher under Bertrand competition (eBR > eCR),
from (1.71) it follows that in equilibrium there are fewer high-tech rms under Bertrand
competition than under Cournot competition. Further, given that perceived elasticities
of substitution monotonically increase with the number of rms and actual elasticity
of substitution, from (1.71) it follows that the number of rms under both types of
competition declines with ε and increases with µ. It also increases with α if there are
knowledge spillovers (S.2) and does not depend on α if there is knowledge licensing
(S.1).
If there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms the right-hand side of
(1.76) and perceived elasticity of substitution ek from (1.34) and (1.35) are increasing
in N and eBR > eCR for any N . Therefore, also in this case there are more rms under
Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition.34 Moreover, the number of
rms N declines with ε and increases with µ and α.
Proof of Proposition 14: Let the marginal tax rates be constant. This implies that




N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1]
×
{[




















Remaining labor force allocations can be derived from (1.90) and (1.92).
34It can be shown also that the quadratic polynomial in (1.76) opens upward and under Bertrand com-
petition for any N it is lower than under Cournot competition. Since stable equilibrium corresponds
to the smaller roots of the polynomials, the number of rms is lower under Bertrand competition.
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Proof of Corollary 10: Subsidy/tax rate τπ can be derived from zero prot condi-
tion














(θ − 1) (σ + µ) ξDSPL+DSPρ
.
Proof of Corollary 11: To prove that π̄ is monotonically decreasing in N consider
its rst term. It can be shown that
∂ek
∂N
> 0 k = CR,BR.









































































Therefore, the second term is monotonically decreasing function of the number of rms
as well. Hence, π̄ is monotonically decreasing function of N .
An alternative proof for π̄′ < 0 uses the labor market clearing condition (1.36),
nal and telecom goods production functions (3.1), (1.11), and the relation between
labor demand in nal goods and high-tech goods production. A sucient condition
to observe the desired is bσL1−σ
1+µ
< NLx, which can be shown to hold from the labor
market clearing condition.
Proof of Proposition 15: The growth rates and labor force allocations can be
derived from (1.30)-(1.38) and (1.104)-(1.109). In case when there is continuous entry
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into the high-tech industry the growth rate of knowledge is
gCEλ =
ξDL− ρ(
θ − 1 + I0
Ṅ=0
)
B + αI1S.2−3 +D
. (1.127)










Proof of Proposition 16: Given that in this caseN is endogenous state variable it is
convenient to rewrite labor force allocations to knowledge accumulation and production
of high-tech goods as
L̄r = NLr,
L̄x = NLx.

















L− L̄x − L̄r
)1−σ
, (1.129)
λ̇ = ξλL̄r, (1.130)
Ṅ = ηS, (1.131)
λ (0) > 0, N (0) > 1− given.
The Social Planner's optimal choice for accumulation of N is given by





















[λ] : q̇λ = qλρ−
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Since C and S are in the same terms it has to be that
C−θ = ηqN . (1.136)
Using expression (1.134) and labor market clearing condition (1.36) the returns on











In turn, from (1.36) and (1.129)-(1.134) it follows that




gN + gλ + gL̄x
)
+ (1− σ) gLY , (1.138)











gqλ = −θgC + gY − gLY − gλ. (1.140)















Since growth rate of LY increases with LY the only stationary solution of this equation
is gLY = 0. This implies that labor force allocations are constant in the social optimum
gL̄r = gL̄x = gLY = 0.
Moreover, (1.141) implies a relation between N and λ on balanced growth path and
gC = gN .
These results, together with (1.128)-(1.132) and (1.135), imply that
gN = const
and
gN = gS = gC = gY .



















ξ (θ − 1)BSPL+ ρ








ξ (θ − 1)BSPL+ ρ
(θ − 1)BSP +DSP
. (1.144)
It can be shown that as long as there can be negative investments in N and η is
suciently low in the social optimum the economy makes a discrete jump to balanced
growth path at time zero (t = 0.) This holds because when the economy is relatively
abundant of N [(1.144) does not hold] then the Social Planner at time zero selects
negative investments inN so that (1.144) holds from the following instance. Meanwhile,
suciently low η guarantees that balanced growth path value of N is so low that when
the economy is relatively abundant of λ there are sucient resources for savings that
(immediately) cover the gap between initial and balanced growth path value of N . The
Social Planner in such a case also selects savings so that the economy makes a discrete
jump to balanced growth path.
Proof of Corollary 13: Let Ṅ > 0 and
τx =
ekµ+ σ
ek (σ + µ)
so that DGO and DSP are equivalent. Combining equations (1.104)-(1.109) with (1.91)






































then labor force allocations and growth rates in decentralized equilibrium coincide with
the choices of the Social Planner.
Appendix E.1
In this section I present a setup where high-tech rms cooperate in R&D and select
optimal rules for R&D so that to maximize joint prots. High-tech rms later compete
in the product market. I call this case CO - R&D cooperation.35
I oer below the setup of the high-tech industry and the optimization problem of
high-tech rms in the stage of R&D cooperation.
R&D Cooperation: Each high-tech rm has its knowledge. At R&D cooperation
stage high-tech rms establish a research joint venture where they pool their knowl-
edge and jointly hire researchers. In a "laboratory" a group of researchers combines
the knowledge of dierent rms in order to produce a better one for a rm. There are
as many laboratories (or dierent knowledge production processes) as many there are
high-tech rms. This research joint venture takes into account the eect of the accu-
mulation of one type of knowledge on the accumulation of other types of knowledge.36























Lxj − wNLr, (1.145)







λ1−αj Lrj . (1.147)








35It might be argued that rms' cooperation in R&D increases the odds that they will collude in the
product market. I rule this out in order to focus on the dierences between knowledge exchange
mechanisms.
36An alternative cooperation mode is that high-tech rms in R&D stage jointly hire researchers and
produce the same knowledge for all. In such a case the knowledge accumulation process is λ̇ = ξλNLr.
It can be easily shown that the decentralized equilibrium outcome of this cooperation mode is no



























































The third term in the second line of (1.150) illustrates eect of the accumulation of
the jth type of knowledge (the knowledge of high-tech rm j) on the accumulation of
remaining types of knowledge.
In symmetric equilibrium, according to (1.147) the growth rate of knowledge is
gλ = ξNLr. (1.152)
The rate of return on knowledge accumulation can be derived from (1.19), (1.148)-
(1.151). It is the same as (1.31) where I1S.2−3 = 0.
The growth rates of quantities and prices that characterize the essential dynamics
of this model if there is R&D cooperation are given by (1.104)-(1.108) and
gw = gqλ + gλ. (1.153)
This equation is the counterpart of (1.109).
Combining (1.31) with (1.19), (1.32), (1.36), (1.37), (1.104)-(1.108), (1.148), (1.152),
and (1.153) gives a dierential equation in Lr,
L̇r =
L−NLr











which is the counterpart of (1.110).
Let θ ≥ 1 and (1.41) hold. Therefore, given that the rst term of this dier-
ential equation is non-negative there is unique Lr such that (1.154) is stable and
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(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk
.
Combining this expression with the relations between NLx and LY (1.32) and NLx
and NLr (1.37) and (1.152) gives the equilibrium allocations of labor force and growth









(θ − 1) (σ + µ)L+ 1
ξ
ρ






[(θ − 1) (σ + µ)]L+ 1
ξ
ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk
,





(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk
.
Therefore, in decentralized equilibrium with no entry and R&D collaboration if (1.41)
holds the economy makes a discrete jump to balanced growth path. Further, the growth
rates and labor force allocations are the same in cases when there is knowledge licensing
(S.1) and R&D collaboration (CO). This means that if there is no (continuous) entry
knowledge licensing and R&D cooperation deliver equivalent equilibrium outcomes.
Therefore, the policy (1.93)-(1.94) also leads to the rst best outcome in terms of
allocations and growth rates in this case.
Further, in line with the results oered in the section where I discuss policies in
order to have socially optimal number of high-tech rms there need to be lump-sum
transfers to high-tech rms given by (1.95). These transfers make sure prots are
greater than zero for any nite N and are zero for N = +∞.
In case when there is continuous entry into the high-tech industry equations (1.109)
and (1.153) identify the dierence between R&D cooperation (CO) and knowledge
licensing (S.1). The rate of return on knowledge accumulation in case when there is
knowledge licensing declines with continuous entry of rms (Ṅ > 0). In contrast, in case
when there is R&D cooperation it does not do so. This is because in R&D cooperation
case rms choose R&D expenditures to maximize joint prots. Meanwhile, in case
when there is knowledge licensing entry erodes the prots and returns on knowledge
accumulation of high-tech rms.
It can be easily shown that when there is continuous entry and R&D cooperation
69
the growth rate of knowledge/productivity is
gCEλ =
ξDL− ρ
(θ − 1) (ε−1)(σ+µ)
ε−1−(σ+µ) +D
. (1.155)
This implies that, the policy (1.93)-(1.94) leads to the rst best outcome in terms of
allocations and growth rates in this case.




This is because continuous entry (Ṅ > 0) into high-tech industry decreases the returns
on knowledge accumulation if high-tech rms engage in R&D disjointly.
Appendix E.2
In this section I show that adding knowledge depreciation and spillovers in case when
there is knowledge licensing does not alter the main results. I consider exclusively S.1
and S.3 cases and the decentralized equilibrium of the model. I further assume that
there are exogenous barriers to entry into the high-tech industry.
In order to support symmetric equilibrium I assume that the rate of depreciation of
knowledge is the same across high-tech rms, δ (> 0). This implies that the knowledge
accumulation processes in case when there are is no knowledge exchange among high-
tech rms (S.3) can be written as
λ̇j = ξλ̃λ
1−α
j Lrj − δλj. (1.156)
Meanwhile, adding spillovers in the knowledge accumulation process in case there








λα2j Lrj − δλj, (1.157)
α1 + α2 > 1− α,
where I assume that in equilibrium
λ̂i ≡ (ui,jλi)1−α1−α2 .
In this setup 1−α1−α2 can be thought to represent the bargaining power of licensees.
The optimal problem of high-tech rm j in such a case is given by (1.17) where
(1.12) and (1.15) are replaced by (1.157) and (1.156), respectively.
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From the optimal problem it can be shown that the demand functions for labor




















































and the supply of and demand for knowledge are
[uj,i] : uj,i = 1, ∀i 6= j,
[ui,j] : pui,jλi = qλjξα1λ̂i (ui,jλi)
α1−1 λα2j Lrj , ∀i 6= j.
Meanwhile, in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms










Lxj + (1− α) ξλ̃λ−αj Lrj − δ
]
.
In a symmetric equilibrium, in cases when there is knowledge licensing (S.1) and no
exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.3) returns on knowledge accumulation
can be rewritten as







where IαS.3 measures the magnitude of not appropriated returns on R&D (i.e., in S.1
case the bargaining power of licensees):
IαS.3 =
{
1− α1 − α2 for S.1,
α for S.3.
Using (1.37), (1.104)-(1.109), (1.158) and (1.159) this expression can be rewritten
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as a dierential equation in Lr,
L̇r =
L−NLr
N [(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1]
×([

















L− IαS.3δ − ρ > 0.









(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk
]
δ − ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + IαS.3
.
This implies that the economy immediately jumps to balanced growth path where









(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk
]
δ − ρ













L− IαS.3δ − ρ




























Relationships (1.161) imply that the growth rate of productivity and labor force al-
location to productivity/knowledge accumulation are decreasing with the degree of
not appropriated returns on knowledge accumulation. Meanwhile, NLx and LY are
increasing with it. This is analogous to the results in section Entry Regime 1.
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Appendix E.3
In this section I relax the assumption that there are externalities within high-tech
rms in two ways and present the main properties of the model. First, I assume that
there are decreasing returns to knowledge accumulation at rm-level unless there is an
exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms. Next, I assume instead that there are
no externalities within high-tech rms and, as in the main text, returns on knowledge
accumulation are constant even if there is no exchange of knowledge.
I have assumed that N is a real number. If N also changes continuously then in
the sums in (1.12) and (1.13) each rm has zero size. Since λ of each rm is nite
dropping rm j or any nite number of rms from those sums makes no dierence for
the inference.
If N changes discretely (and each rm has unit size) I assume that N − 1 > 1 so
that exchange of knowledge can only increase the productivity of researchers. In such a
circumstance I assume that if there is knowledge licensing the knowledge accumulation








λ1−αj Lrj . (1.162)
This is the counterpart of (1.12) where uj,j ≡ 0. In turn, if there are knowledge





If there is no knowledge exchange among high-tech rms I assume that knowledge
accumulation process is given by (1.15) where
λ̃ ≡ 1. (1.164)
Therefore, the counterparts of (1.24), (1.28), and (1.29) are given by
∂λ̇j
∂λj






















= ξ (1− α)λ−αj Lrj . (1.167)
I further consider symmetric equilibrium in the high-tech industry. For the subse-
73




N − 1 otherwise.
Using this denition the growth rate of knowledge in the high-tech industry in all




The (internal) rate of return on knowledge accumulation can be obtained from the
optimal rules of high-tech rm j (1.19), (1.20), and (1.23), (1.27), (1.165)-(1.167). It
is given by (1.31),







Combining (1.31) with (1.19), (1.20), (1.32), (1.36), (1.37), (1.40), (1.104)-(1.109)
and (1.168) gives the counterpart of (1.110),
L̇r =
L−NLr





















L− ρ > 0,






(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
.





(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
.
This implies that the comparative statics with respect to σ, µ, α, ε, and type of
competition presented in the section Entry Regime 1 hold. Moreover, gλ increases with
N and at least for suciently high N (N > 2) it is concave in N .
Meanwhile, in case there is no exchange of knowledge the expression (1.169) is
second order dierential equation in knowledge λ. It describes the path of λ. In the
steady-state the growth rate of knowledge and labor force allocation to knowledge
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accumulation are zero. Therefore, labor force allocations to high-tech and nal goods
production are given by (1.48) and (1.49).
No Knowledge Externalities within High-tech Firms
In this subsection I assume that everything else the same in case when there are knowl-








where I assume that in equilibrium Λ̃ is given by (1.163). Meanwhile, in case when
there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms I assume that the knowledge
accumulation process is given by
λ̇j = ξλjLrj . (1.171)













In turn, from (1.171) it follows that (1.29) needs to be rewritten as
∂λ̇j
∂λj
= ξ (1− α)Lrj . (1.173)
The (internal) rate of return on knowledge accumulation can be derived from the
optimal rules of high-tech rm j (1.19), (1.20), and (1.23), (1.27), (1.170), (1.171),
(1.172), and (1.173). In a symmetric equilibrium, in case there are knowledge spillovers
it is given by









and in case when there is no exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms it is given
by (1.31) where I1S.2−3 = 0,







From (1.175) it follows that if the knowledge accumulation process is given by
(1.171) then the growth rate of knowledge and labor force allocations are given by
(1.42)-(1.46) where I1S.2−3 = 0 and I
N
S.1−2 = 1. Therefore, the comparative statics with
respect to σ, µ, ε, N and type of competition presented in the section Entry Regime 1
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hold. Meanwhile, gλ does not depend on α.
Further, combining (1.174) with (1.19), (1.20), (1.30), (1.32), (1.36), (1.37), (1.40),
and (1.104)-(1.109) gives the counterpart of (1.110),
L̇r =
L−NLr
N [(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1]
×{[













(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + αN−1
N
.
This implies that the growth rate of knowledge is given by
gS.2,NExλ =
ξDkL− ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) +Dk + αN−1
N
.
Therefore, the comparative statics with respect to σ, µ, α, ε, and type of competition
presented in the section Entry Regime 1 hold.
If N changes continuously then N−1
N
can be replaced by 1 and gS.2,NExλ is increasing
and concave in N . Meanwhile, in case when N changes discretely gS.2,NExλ is increasing
and concave in N if parameters θ, ρ (and σ and µ) are suciently high and N is
suciently small. However, if θ and ρ are low (e.g., θ = 1, ρ = 0) or N is high then











It is also worth noting that in these case with cost-free entry the allocations and
growth rates depend on the toughness and intensity of competition. This is because
in this case the size of the rm relative to the market N−1
N
matters for the amount of
knowledge that it can receive and for spillovers.
Appendix E.4
In this section I present the main properties of the model if high-tech rms take into
account the eect of knowledge accumulation on the price of knowledge puj,iλj . Further,
I oer a policy that if implemented in decentralized equilibrium leads to socially optimal
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outcomes.37
The high-tech rms in this case internalize the demand (1.23). Therefore, the prot
function of high-tech rm j "at the stage" when it designs its supply of knowledge and
knowledge accumulation is





































Therefore, in symmetric equilibrium the rate of return on knowledge accumulation is








In this expression the third term in square brackets captures the adverse eect of higher
knowledge accumulation on the price of knowledge.
Combining (1.104)-(1.109), (1.37), and (1.176) gives the counterpart of (1.110),
L̇r =
L−NLr
N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1]
×
{[



































37I assume that price discrimination is not feasible. This is necessary in order to avoid the problem with
determination of the price of durable goods (Coase, 1972). In this framework it can be supported,
for example, by an assumption that the licensors have to license their entire knowledge (at a uniform
price). Another assumption that could support this is that licensors rent (but not sell) their knowledge
and cannot monitor its use.
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where I use M in order to indicate that the rms are price setters in the market for
knowledge in the sense that they internalize the eect of knowledge accumulation on
the price of knowledge. If N changes continuously then N−1
N
can be replaced by 1 in
all these expressions.




























NCFE,S.1 < NCFE,M < NCFE,S.2.
This is because ZP is monotonically decreasing function of N .
If N changes continuously then gNE,Mλ is increasing and concave in N . It is increas-
ing and concave in N also in case N changes discretely if parameters θ, ρ (and σ and
µ) are suciently high and N is suciently small. However, if θ and ρ are low (e.g.,
θ = 1, ρ = 0) or N is high then gNE,Mλ can be decreasing and convex in N .
These results imply that if high-tech rms take into account the eect of knowledge
accumulation on the price of knowledge they innovate less. Therefore, the economy
grows at a lower rate than the economy where high-tech rms do not take into account




the economy (again) fails to grow at the socially optimal rate and fails to have socially
optimal labor allocations.
A policy that can equate decentralized equilibrium allocations and growth rates
to their socially optimal counterparts subsidizes the demand for high-tech goods and
high-tech rms' demand for knowledge. It can be shown that this policy is
τx =
ekµ+ σ
ek (σ + µ)
,
τλ = 1− α.
Further, in line with the results oered in the section where I discuss policies in
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order to have socially optimal number of high-tech rms there need to be lump-sum
transfers to high-tech rms given by (1.95). These transfers make sure prots are
greater than zero for any nite N and are zero for N = +∞.


































This implies that unlike τπ from (1.96) the rate τMπ can be negative, for example, if
α ≈ 0.38
Appendix E.5
In this section I present the main properties of the model in case when nal goods
producers do not hire labor (σ = 1) or LY is xed.
If σ = 1 then (3.1) is given by
Y = X̃X. (1.178)
and nal goods producers' demand for high-tech goods bundle is given by
PX = X̃. (1.179)
Assuming symmetric equilibrium this implies that (1.105) needs to be rewritten as
gY = (1 + µ) gX , (1.180)
and (1.107) needs to be replaced by
gqλ = µ (gλ + gLx) , (1.181)
which follows from (1.5), (1.8), (1.11), (1.19), (1.20), and (1.179).
Since LY = 0 the labor market clearing condition is
L = NLx +NLr. (1.182)
38In order to have a meaningful policy a parameter restriction is required so that τMπ which solves zero
prot condition for (1.177) is increasing in N .
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Combining (1.31) with (1.30), (1.40), (1.104), (1.106), (1.108), and (1.180)-(1.182)
gives a dierential equation in Lr,
L̇r =
L−NLr
N [(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1]
×
{[




























(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + 1
,






(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + 1
.
Given that in this case LY = 0 these expressions coincide with (1.42)-(1.46) in the
limit when σ = 1. They suggest that if σ = 1 labor force allocations and, therefore,
growth rates do not depend on competitive pressure in the high-tech industry. This is
because in this case there are no relative price distortions in the sense that all prices
are aected in the same way.











Increasing competitive pressure in the high-tech industry increases e in these ex-
pressions. Therefore, NLx increases with e, whereas NLr declines with it, which means
that increasing the competitive pressure in this case increases the output of the high-
tech industry but reduces the amount of resources devoted to innovation. This is
because increasing the competitive pressure increases NLx and since LY is xed that
reduces NLr.
In case when the wage of researchers Lr is given wLr ≡ ζ2Z the demand for labor
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Combining this expression with (1.19) gives the relative demand for labor for produc-










Combining these expressions with returns on knowledge accumulation (1.23) and (1.24)-
(1.29) gives













(θ − 1) (1 + µ) + 1
×
{[
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3
]







In turn, from (1.37) it follows that
L̇r =
L−NLr
N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1]
×
{[
















Therefore, labor force allocation to R&D in the high-tech industry and growth rate of




















(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + wwLrD
k
.





In this section I use more general knowledge accumulation processes and present the
main properties of the model for the cases when there is an exchange of knowledge
among high-tech rms (S.1-2) and the number of high-tech rms is xes.






















λ1−αj Lrj , (1.184)
where ε1 > 0. I call these cases G.1 and G.2 - generalization 1 and generalization 2 -
correspondingly.
Rewriting (1.23), (1.25) and (1.28) and using (1.23) it is straightforward to show
that in cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech rms (S.1-2) in
a symmetric equilibrium the returns on knowledge accumulation are given by (1.31).

















and rewriting the growth rates gives
gG.1−2λ = ξIG.1−2NLr. (1.187)
Combining (1.187) with (1.31), (1.32), (1.37), (1.40), and (1.104)-(1.109) gives the
analogue of the dierential equation in Lr (1.110),
L̇r =
L−NLr
















kL− ρ > 0,
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this implies that there is a unique Lr such that (1.188) is stable and NLr, NLx, LY ∈





(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
. (1.189)
A sucient condition to have that the growth rate of λ is non-decreasing in N for




This condition is sucient since ∂D
k
∂N
> 0 and limN→+∞Dk = const > 0. It holds, for
example, when ε1 > 1 in G.1 case and when ε1 > 1 and α is close to 1 in G.2 case.




(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 +Dk
.
Such a growth rate of λ holds if, for example, (1.12) is multiplied by z (N) ,








In this more general case, sucient conditions to have that the growth rate of λ is






















z (N) > 0.
The rst line of the second condition is weaker than (1.190) and holds as long as
z (N)Dk grows with N at a suciently high rate.





In such a circumstance the results for the cases when there is an exchange of knowledge
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among high-tech rms (S.1-2) are similar to the case when there is no exchange of
knowledge (S.3). In particular, the results for S.2 coincide with the results for S.3.
Furthermore, in case there is cost-free entry, it can be shown that the analogues of
(1.71)-(1.75) are
ek =


















(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3
]
+ ρ
(θ − 1) (σ + µ) + αI1S.2−3 + 1
,
LY = (1− σ)L.
Therefore, with this more general formulation of R&D process, in case when there
is cost-free entry and exchange of knowledge, labor force allocations depend on the
toughness and intensity of competition in the high-tech industry.
Appendix E.7
In this section I show that subsidies to production of high-tech goods (τLx) and R&D
expenditures (τLr) can also lead to rst best labor force allocations and growth rates.
Under such a policy the prot function of high-tech rm j is











In turn, its demand for labor for the production of its high-tech good (1.19) and demand

















Assuming symmetric equilibrium and combining these optimal rules with (1.6),
(1.9), (1.24) and labor market clearing condition (1.36) gives the counterparts of the
relation between NLx and LY (1.32), returns on knowledge accumulation (1.31), and
84





























Assuming that subsidy rates are constant and combining these conditions with
(1.104)-(1.109) gives the counterpart of (1.110),
L̇r =
L−NLr
N [(1 + µ) (θ − 1) + 1]
×
{[

























(θ − 1) (µ+ σ)L+ 1
ξ
ρ
(θ − 1) (µ+ σ) +DGO 1−τLx
1−τLr
,









r , NLx = NL
SP
x .
In order to achieve such outcomes it is sucient to subsidize the expenditures of
high-tech rms
τLx = τLr =
ekµ+ σ
ek (σ + µ)
,
In this case, τLx and τLr are equal because in decentralized equilibrium the relative
price distortions aect wages of Lx and Lr in the same way.
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Appendix E.8
In this section I oer comparative statics for consumer and total welfare with respect
to parameters α, ε, and N (in case when N is exogenous). The comparative statics
are exclusively for the cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech
rms (S.1-2) and Entry Regime 1 and 2: no entry and cost-free entry.
Using (3.11), (1.3), (3.1), (1.5), (1.11), (1.39), and that the economy is always on a

















Clearly, for the current analysis of consumer welfare it is enough to focus on a monotonic








(θ − 1) (σ + µ) gλ + ρ
. (1.192)
In case when there is no entry (Entry Regime 1), in these expressions gλ is given
by (1.46) and labor force allocations are NLr = 1ξgλ, NLx = D
k (L−NLr), and
LY = L−NLx −NLr.
Meanwhile, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in case when there is no entry
the producers' surplus is
NV =
1



















Therefore, in case when there is no entry the total welfare is




























In case when there is cost-free entry (Entry Regime 2), producers' surplus is zero,
NV = 0, and the perceived elasticity of substitution ek is given by (1.71)
Combining (1.71) with (1.21) and (1.22) gives the endogenous number of rms
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1 + αI1S.2−3 + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
]
ε (ξσL− ρ)− ξσL
[
1 + αI1S.2−3 + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
] , (1.195)
NBR =
(ε− 1) (ξσL− ρ)
ε (ξσL− ρ)− ξσL
[
1 + αI1S.2−3 + (θ − 1) (σ + µ)
] , (1.196)
where NCR > NBR. Clearly, in this case total welfare can be written as W = Ũ .
Setting I1S.2−3 ≡ 1, it is straightforward to notice that the inference from S.1 is a







ek,S.2 = ek,S.1, lim
α→0
Nk,S.2 = Nk,S.1.
Therefore, the comparative statics can be performed for the more general S.2 case.
Because of high non-linearity of welfare functions analytical derivations of com-
parative statics are not trivial. I perform the comparative statics using numerical
simulations where L is normalized to 1 and the remaining parameters are from the
following intervals
θ ∈ [1, 10] , ρ ∈ [0.01, 0.1] , σ ∈ [0.01, 0.99] , µ ∈ [0.01, 0.99] , ξ ∈ [0.1, 10] , (1.197)
α ∈ [0.01, 0.99] , ε ∈ [1.1, 10] , N ∈ [1.1, 20] , λ (0) ∈ [1, 10] ,
and satisfy parameter restrictions σ+µ < 1, ξDkL−ρ > 0, ε−1−α−(θ − 1) (σ + µ) >
0, NBR > 1. I use the interval for N in case when there is no entry in the high-tech
industry.
In order to distinguish no entry and cost-free entry I again use superscripts NE
and CFE and summarize the results in the following table
Table 1.1: Numerical Comparative Statics for S.1-2 Cases
WNE ŨNE WCFE
α ± − ±
ε ± ± −
N ± +
Note: This table oers numerical comparative statics for cases when there is an exchange of knowledge among high-tech
rms (S.1-2). The sign + means positive relationship, − negative, and ± that the relationship depends on model
parameters. In case there is cost-free entry N is not a parameter. Therefore, in the table there is no value in front of
N for WCFE . The values of parameters are from intervals (1.197) and satisfy parameter restrictions. Grids are equally
spaced and each has 5 points.
Focusing on comparative statics with respect to α, the results indicate that in case
when there is no entry consumer welfare declines with α. This means that consumer
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welfare is higher in case when there is knowledge licensing (S.1) compared to the case
when there are knowledge spillovers (S.2) if there is no entry. However, the sign of the
derivative of total welfare with respect to α depends on model parameters. It depends
on model parameters also in case when there is cost-free entry and coincides with the
sign of the derivative of consumer welfare with respect to α.
Further, the results indicate that in case when there is cost-free entry the sign of the
derivative of total welfare with respect to α is positive when α is very close to zero. This
means that, if there is cost-free entry and α is relatively small, total welfare is higher
in case when there are knowledge spillovers (S.2) compared to the case when there is
knowledge licensing (S.1). Figure 3.2 plots WCFE as a function of α for Cournot type
of competition.
Figure 1.2: Total Welfare as a Function of α in Case When There is Cost-free Entry
In turn, the negative relation between WCFE and ε follows from Proposition 13
and Corollary 8. Proposition 13 shows that in case when there is cost-free entry the
number of rms declines with ε. Meanwhile, Corollary 8 shows that allocations and
growth rates do not depend on ε in such a case.
Appendix T.1
The elasticities of substitution between the knowledge that high-tech rm j licenses
from other rms and between its knowledge and the knowledge of other rms can be
derived from (1.12).
88
The elasticity of substitution between the knowledge licensed from rm m and rm





In turn, the elasticity of substitution between the knowledge bought from rm k and



























and rewrite ελj,k as
ελj,k =
1














This means that the elasticity of substitution between the rm's knowledge with the
knowledge that it licenses from other rms is lower than the elasticity of substitution
between the dierent types of knowledge that it licenses from other rms.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Telecommunication
Technologies on Competition in Services and
Goods Markets: Empirical Evidence
(Joint work with Anna Kochanova)
Abstract
In this paper we empirically show that a more intensive use and wider adoption of telecommu-
nication technologies signicantly increases the level of product market competition in services
and goods markets. Our result is consistent with the view that the use of telecommunication
technologies can lower the costs of entry. This nding is robust to various measures of com-
petition and a range of specication checks.
JEL Codes: L16; O33; O25
Keywords: Telecommunication technologies; Product market competition; Entry costs
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2.1 Introduction
"...[I]n most of the economy IT will help to increase competition.
Broadly speaking, the Internet reduces barriers to entry, because it is cheaper to set
up a business online than to open a traditional shop or oce. The Internet also makes
it easier for consumers to compare prices. Both these factors increase competition."
The Economist, September 21, 2000
The internet is a type of telecommunication technology. Conjectures like this in The
Economist indicate that there can be a positive relationship between the more intensive
use and the wider adoption (hereafter, diusion) of telecommunication technologies and
competition in services and goods markets (for similar arguments see also Le, 1984;
McFarlan, 1984; Freund and Weinhold, 2004; Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer, and Woess-
mann, 2011). Another mechanism behind such a positive relation is that telecommu-
nication technologies can lower information acquisition costs, which are argued to be
signicant for the decision on entry into a market (e.g., see Geroski, 1995b).
These arguments are certainly not conclusive, however. It may be argued as well
that the diusion of telecommunication technologies can help rms loosen competition.
For example, rms can use the internet and other types of telecommunication networks
for (extensive) advertisement of their products, which can help to increase product dif-
ferentiation. In turn, lower information acquisition costs can help rms to learn about
the demand and the general market environment. This can allow them to better target
their marketing appeals and can increase price discrimination and product dierenti-
ation (for well-known examples see Taylor, 2004; Mikians, Gyarmati, Erramilli, and
Laoutaris, 2012).
In this study, we empirically investigate the eect of the country-wide diusion of
telecommunication technologies on the competition in services and goods markets. In
order to alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use a dierence-in-dierences framework in
the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998). More specically, we ask whether in countries
where, a priori, the diusion of telecommunication technologies is higher, the intensity
of product market competition is disproportionately dierent in the industries that
depend more on these technologies compared to the industries that depend less. We
use evidence from 21 EU countries in order to establish our results.
Our results suggest that the diusion of telecommunication technologies has a
strong positive eect on the intensity of competition in services and goods markets.
This supports conjectures such as in the quote above from The Economist.
According to the standard theoretical inference, our results imply that the diu-
sion of telecommunication technologies increases allocative eciency in the economy.
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Moreover, in line with many empirical studies (e.g., Nickell, Wadhwani, and Wall, 1992;
Nickell, 1996; Disney, Haskel, and Heden, 2003), our ndings imply signicant produc-
tivity gains due to the diusion of telecommunication technologies. According to, for
example, Aghion et al. (2005), the diusion may also imply higher innovative activity
(see also Geroski, 1995a; Blundell et al., 1999).2
Our study also contributes to the ongoing debate about the impact of telecommu-
nication technologies, as well as of information and communication technologies (ICT),
on economic performance. Macro-level empirical studies suggest that the diusion of
these technologies has a positive impact on the development level and growth (e.g.,
Röller and Waverman, 2001; Czernich et al., 2011). Micro-level empirical studies, in
turn, suggest that the use of telecommunication technologies and ICT can reduce price
dispersion and average prices in online markets (e.g., Jensen, 2007; Lee, 1998; Strader
and Shaw, 1999; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000). There can be various drivers behind
these results. For instance, the literature on the economics of ICT (e.g., Jorgenson
et al., 2005; Vourvachaki, 2009) emphasizes the productivity improvements/cost re-
ductions that stem from the "direct" application of ICT (for example, the switch from
mail to e-mail). The literature on the economics of telecommunications, in addition,
argues that the use of these technologies can improve access to information. In line
with Stigler (1961), this literature further argues that it would reduce distortions and
frictions in the markets (e.g., Le, 1984; Jensen, 2007; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000).
Our empirical ndings oer support for these conjectures. They imply that the dif-
fusion of telecommunication technologies intensies the competition in services and
goods markets (i.e., reduces mark-ups). Meanwhile, given that the latter can matter
for allocative and productive eciency, our results suggest another driver behind the
results of these macro- and micro-level empirical studies. In this respect, they also
add to the suggestions of the literature on general ICT and indicate that the economic
benets from a particular type of ICT, telecommunication technologies, may come not
only from direct use but also from intensied competition.3
The results of this study can be interesting also for policymakers. The results
imply that policies that motivate higher use and wider adoption of telecommunication
technologies can complement competition/antitrust policies.
Having mentioned what we identify in this study, it is also worth mentioning what
2Aghion et al. (2005) nd an inverted-U shape relationship between the number of patents issued and
the intensity of competition. Therefore, according to Aghion et al. (2005), our results imply higher
innovative activity at least for lower levels of competition.
3Using growth accounting Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2008) argue that the (direct) contribution of
ICT to labor productivity growth in US industries has sharply declined recently. The authors also
oer evidence that increased competitive pressures explain a signicant portion of recent growth. In
this respect, our results highlight the possible role of ICT in increased competitive pressures in US
industries.
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we do not intend to identify. The diusion of telecommunication technologies can
reduce some of the costs of entry. However, it is ultimately the corresponding changes
in rms' and consumers' behavior that would aect the competition in services and
goods markets. Given the data we have, we neither can nor intend to identify exactly
how those changes would happen.
In addition to the literature on the economics of ICT and particularly on the eco-
nomics of telecommunications, this paper is related to studies that try to identify the
determinants of product market competition. Although competition seems to be an
important engine of economic activity, to our best knowledge, there are very few such
studies. There is evidence, for example, that railroad networks intensied competition
in the US shipping industry in the 19th century (Holmes and Schmitz, 2001). There is
also evidence that policies, including but not limited to those that intend to promote
entry and competition, can aect the intensity of competition in various markets (see,
for instance, Creusen, Minne, and van der Wiel, 2006; Feldkircher, Martin, and Wörz,
2010; Fisman and Allende, 2010). Our study is related to these studies to the extent
that telecommunication technologies, similar to the railroad, are general purpose tech-
nologies. Moreover, according to our results, the policies that promote the diusion of
telecommunication technologies should aect the intensity of competition in services
and goods markets.
There is also a vast amount of theoretical studies that analyze the eect of search
frictions on price dispersion (see, for instance, Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; Varian, 1980).
The typical model assumes that consumers know only the distribution of prices and
have search costs. These costs are argued to be lower in electronic marketplaces com-
pared to regular ones (Bakos, 1991). This motivates many empirical studies that try to
nd whether there is a signicant dierence in terms of price dispersion, as well as in
term of average prices, between electronic and regular market places (e.g., Lee, 1998;
Strader and Shaw, 1999; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Brown and Goolsbee, 2002).
Our study is related to these papers to the extent that the diusion of telecommunica-
tion technologies also can also lower consumers' search costs and these, together with
price dispersion, can be related to the intensity of competition. In this respect, while
these studies focus on particular markets (e.g., books, CDs, and life insurance) and
market places, our inference is for (virtually) the entire economy.
The next section describes the theoretical background, motivates the methodology,
and formally denes the objective of this study. The third section describes the data
and their sources. The fourth section summarizes the results. The last section con-
cludes. The tables of basic statistics, correlations, and regression results are presented
at the end of the paper.
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2.2 Theoretical Background and Methodology
How Telecommunications can Matter
The entry (and the potential entry) of rms can strengthen competition. It is often
argued that information acquisition costs matter for rms' and entrepreneurs' decision
to enter into a market (see Demsetz, 1982; Geroski, 1995b). For example, a rm which
considers entry into a market would need to gather information about that market.
It seems that it is a common thought in the literature that the use of telecommu-
nication technologies can reduce the information acquisition costs (e.g., see Le, 1984;
Norton, 1992; Röller and Waverman, 2001; Jensen, 2007; Czernich et al., 2011). A
contemporary observation, which can support this argument is that these technologies
enable internet, which in many cases can serve as a very cheap source of information.
Clearly, the decision of entry can be aected also by initial investment costs in
infrastructure such as oce equipment. The quote from The Economist suggests that
the diusion of telecommunication technologies can reduce these costs since it is cheaper
to establish an online business. In turn, following Etro (2009), it can be argued that the
diusion of telecommunication technologies can reduce the initial investment costs in
computer software and hardware. This can hold since telecommunication technologies
support and enable cloud computing.
These arguments indicate that there can be a positive link between the diusion
of telecommunication technologies and the (potential) entry of rms. Therefore, they
indicate that the diusion can intensify the competition in services and goods markets
which is in line with the conjectures of, for example, Freund and Weinhold (2004) and
Czernich et al. (2011).4 However, these arguments are certainly not conclusive. In this
regard, it can be argued as well that the diusion of telecommunication technologies
can help rms gain market power. For example, it may help rms to increase product
dierentiation through the (extensive) advertisement of products over the internet and
other types of telecommunication networks. Moreover, lower information acquisition
costs can help rms to learn about the demand and the general market environment.
Therefore, they can help to increase price discrimination and product dierentiation.
Such practices seem to be commonly applied in online as well as traditional rms (Tay-
lor, 2004). Online rms, for example, can track via visited web sites, search keywords,
and IP address the preferences and location of visitors and use that information for
targeting their marketing appeals.
4Freund and Weinhold (2004) hypothesize that the diusion of telecommunication technologies and, in
particular, of internet can reduce the costs of entry. Further, they oer a stylized model, where the
reduction of entry costs induces the entry of rms and increases the intensity of competition.
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Methodology
Having contrasting arguments in hand, in this study, we try to identify the eect of the
diusion of telecommunication technologies on the competition in services and goods
markets. Doing so is not straightforward, however. According to many theoretical
models, the level of competition in services and goods markets matters for resource
allocation in an economy. This in its turn can matter for the country-wide diusion of
telecommunication technologies, which is largely a market outcome. Therefore, there
can be a reverse causality between the diusion of telecommunication technologies and
competition in the services and goods markets.
Nevertheless, there is a seemingly intuitive variation that can be used in order to al-
leviate the reverse causality concerns. The eect of the diusion of telecommunication
technologies on the costs of entry would be dierent for industries that depend more
heavily on these technologies compared to industries that depend less. Such variation
can arise because the industries that depend more heavily on telecommunication tech-
nologies ceteris paribus would increase their demand for these technologies more due
to that diusion. In turn, in line with the arguments oered in Le (1984) or Jensen
(2007), the increased demand can result in more information about the industry. An
observation that supports these arguments is that telecommunication technologies are
used exactly for transmitting and disclosing information. A further supporting obser-
vation is that nowadays, for instance, computer producers and retailers seem to be
more widely known than the core manufacturers, when the former use signicantly
more of these technologies. According to these arguments the diusion will alter the
information acquisition costs disproportionately in industries that depend more heav-
ily on telecommunication technologies. (In the Technical Appendix, we oer a very
stylized and simplistic model that delivers predictions in line with our inference.)
Our test looks for exactly such a disparity. We test whether in countries where,
ex ante, the diusion of telecommunication technologies is higher, ex post, the level of
product market competition is disproportionately dierent in industries that depend
more on these technologies compared to the industries that depend less. One of the
advantages of this test is that we need not explain the drivers behind the diusion
of telecommunication technologies, market or regulatory. In order for the diusion to
matter in such a setup, we need only to have a world where the diusion cannot happen
instantaneously or is costly. Either of these assumptions seems plausible given that the
diusion requires building infrastructure. Such a test also permits country and industry
xed eects. These can be important for capturing, for instance, regulatory dierences
and the variation in the xed costs of entry into dierent industries. Moreover, with
such a test, our inference would not depend on a particular country-level model of
competition. This allows us to avoid using country-level variables, which often create
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ambiguities with the interpretation of the results. Instead, we focus on the varying
eects of country-level variables across industries that are expected to be the most
responsive to them.
To implement this test, our dependent variable is the level of product market com-
petition in industry i and country c (averaged over the time/sample period). After
controlling for industry and country xed eects, in our empirical specication we
should nd that the coecient on the interaction between the initial/ex ante level of
the diusion of telecommunication technologies and industries' dependence on those
technologies is dierent from zero. In the empirical specication, we also control for
the initial share of an industry in a country in total output (Industry Share), which can
capture potential convergence eects. For instance, it can correct for the possibility
that the larger industries in a country experience lower entry rates (Klapper, Laeven,
and Rajan, 2006), which can aect the intensity of competition.
Our (baseline) empirical specication is then
Competitioni,c = α1,i + α2,c (2.1)
+α3 · (Industry i's Dependence× The Diusion in Country c)
+α4 · Industry Sharei,c + εi,c,
where εi,c is the error term, and our focus is on the coecient of the interaction term
α3. If we follow, for instance, Le (1984) and Jensen (2007) and believe that cheaper
information reduces the costs of entry, then we expect to have a positive α3 (negative
if we use an inverse measure for competition).
2.3 Measures and Data
We employ data for 21 countries from the European Union and focus on the period
19972006. We concentrate on this set of countries since we use the OECD STAN and
Amadeus databases and want to focus on a somewhat coherent sample. We need these
databases in order to construct the measures of competition, for instance. Particularly,
we need the Amadeus database for constructing competition measures such as the
Herndahl index and the market share of the four largest rms, which require rm-level
data and tend to be widely used both in the literature and by regulatory institutions.
Although we could employ data starting from 1993, we do not do so since we have
very few observations in the Amadeus database for the period 19931996. We could as
well employ data until 2008, but we want to avoid incorporating data from the recent
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nancial crisis.5
That we use data from a rather homogenous set of countries involves trade-os.
It can eliminate the inuence of various unobservable factors on our inference, for
example. However, at the same time it can weaken our inference from cross-country
comparisons.
In order to estimate the specication, we need appropriate measures for the dif-
fusion of telecommunication technologies, the level of industries' dependence on these
technologies, and the competition in services and goods markets.
Measuring the Diusion of Telecommunication Technologies
Our measure for the diusion of telecommunication technologies (hereafter, telecom
diusion) is the number of xed-lines and mobile telephone subscribers per capita
(Telecom Subscribers).6 This variable can indicate the adoption and use of telecommu-
nication technologies in the entire economy and is extensively used in that context (e.g.,
Röller and Waverman, 2001).7 This is important for us since potential entrepreneurs
can use their personal/private telecommunications for acquiring information, while en-
trepreneurs and rms can use corporate ones. However, clearly at least some part of
the use if measured in this manner will be hard to associate with the competition in
goods and services markets. An example would be an uninformative discussion over
the phone about weather. From this perspective, therefore, using this measure can
play against us since it can bias our results towards zero.
We obtain the data for this measure from the ITU and GMID databases. Table
2.1 oers basic statistics for the main variables, which are described in detail in the
Data Appendix (see Table A). Tables 2.6-2.11 in the Appendix - Further Results and
Table B in the Additional Data Appendix oer correlations and basic statistics and
descriptions of additional data.
Measuring the Dependence on Telecommunication Technologies
In a country, a naive measure of an industry's dependence on telecommunication tech-
nologies (hereafter, telecom dependence) would be its share of expenditures on telecom-
munications out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs. The problem with this
5The telecommunication services consumption patterns indicate strong dierences between pre- and
post-nancial crisis periods, and no visible dierences around the dot-com bubble period 19992001.
6Adding also internet subscribers can lead to signicant double counting since, for example, xed-lines
are used extensively for dial-up and DSL internet. Nevertheless, we have checked that our results
remain qualitatively the same if we use the per capita number of internet subscribers separately as a
diusion measure (see Table 2.12 in the Appendix - Further Results).
7Our results are qualitatively the same when we use, instead of this measure, the revenues of the
telecommunications industry per capita which, in contrast, is a ow variable (see Table 2.12 in the
Appendix - Further Results).
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measure is that it reects both the supply and the demand of those technologies when
we need only the demand.
To alleviate this problem, as in the rest of the literature following Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998), we try to identify the industries' dependence on telecommunication tech-
nologies from US data. This involves three important assumptions. The rst and
second are that in the United States the supply of telecommunication technologies is
perfectly elastic and frictionless. The rst assumption can be supported by the argu-
ment that the marginal cost of production in the telecommunications industry is very
low. Meanwhile, the second can nd support in the observation that the US has one of
the most developed information and communication technologies sectors. Moreover, it
tends to have exemplary regulations for the telecommunications industry and the low-
est market prices for telecommunication services in the world. The third assumption
is that the dependence identied from the US data also holds in other countries. More
rigorously, we assume that there is some technological reason which creates variation
in the industries' dependence on telecommunication technologies. Further, we assume
that these technological dierences persist across countries so that the dependence
identied from the US data would be applicable for the countries in our sample.
These assumptions may seem to be rather strong. All we actually need, however, is
that the rank ordering of the expenditure share on telecommunications in US industries
corresponds to the rank ordering of the technological dependence of the industries. We
need as well that rank ordering to carry over to the rest of the countries in our sample.
At least one argument can motivate why this rank ordering, perhaps together with
the actual dependence level, can carry over to the rest of the countries. The share of
expenditures on telecommunications is constant in a steady state equilibrium. There-
fore, much of the variation within industries may arise from shocks that would change
the relative demand for telecommunication technologies. An example of such a shock
would be a factor-biased technological innovation. As long as, however, there is tech-
nological convergence across countries and these shocks are worldwide, our measure
would be a valid proxy. From another perspective, if our measure is noisy, our ndings
may only suer from attenuation bias.
Our most disaggregated data for the share of expenditures on telecommunications
out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in US industries are at the 2-digit
industry level. We obtain these data from the input-output tables of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). The original data are in NAICS 2007 and have a time span
19932007. We transform these data to ISIC rev. 3.1 (hereafter, ISIC), in order to
align them with the rest of our data and exclude the industries that are expected to
have a large state involvement (80, 85, 90, and 91 of ISIC).8 Further, we average these
8Our results are robust to their inclusion.
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data over the period 19972006 and use the average as a measure for dependence.9
To gain more condence about the validity of our measure, we perform a simple
ANOVA exercise on our data for the share of expenditures on telecommunications out
of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in US industries. This exercise shows that
industry-level variation accounts for 99.48% of the total, and time variation accounts
for only 0.52%, which provides support for the validity of our measure. Further, from
the input-output tables from the OECD STAN database, we obtain the share of ex-
penditures on telecommunications out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in
the industries from the European Union countries in our sample. These data have a
structure similar to the 2-digit ISIC, though they are slightly more aggregated. More-
over, they are only for 1995, 2000, and 2005. We take the average of these three years
and compute rank correlations between our dependence measure and these shares. The
rank correlations are highly signicant and range from 0.6 to 0.9 with a mean of 0.8,
which provides further support for our measure (see Table 2.9 in the Appendix - Further
Results).
Measuring Competition and Data for Industry Share
We use ve measures of product market competition averaged over the period 1997
2006. These measures tend to be the most widely applied and/or theoretically robust.
Following Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2005), our primary (inverse) measure
of product market competition is the price cost margin (PCM). Under the assumption
of constant marginal cost, it is the empirical analogue of the Lerner index. Therefore,
it tends to be the reference competition measure and is widely applied in the recent
empirical literature.
Using industry-level data, PCM is a weighted sum of Lerner indices in the industry
across rms, where the weights are the market shares of the rms. In industry i,
country c, and at time t, PCM is given by
PCMi,c,t =
(Revenue− V ariable cost)i,c,t
Revenuei,c,t
,
where the variable costs include labor compensation and expenditures on intermediate
inputs.10
9 Our results remain qualitatively the same when we use expenditures on telecommunications relative
to output (the so-called "technical coecients") and the coecients of inverse Leontief matrix as
measures of dependence (see Table 2.12 in the Appendix - Further Results).
10We follow Collins and Preston (1969), Boone, Grith, and Harrison (2005), and Oliner et al. (2008)
while specifying PCM. In contrast, if we followed Aghion et al. (2005), we would have in the numerator
net operating surplus minus nancial costs. We do not prefer that measure since we have many fewer
data for it. Meanwhile, it is highly correlated with our measure (ρ = 0.7), and our results are
qualitatively the same with it.
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Our second (inverse) measure for the intensity of competition is the prot elasticity
(PE) introduced in Boone (2008). Prot elasticity captures the relation between prots
and eciency. This relation can be argued to become steeper as competition intensies
since in a more competitive environment the same percentage increase in costs reduces
the prots more. In a given pair of industry and country and for all time periods, the
PE is estimated using the following empirical specication:







where f indexes rms, and ηf,t is an error term. The PE in industry i, country c, and
time t is the estimated coecient β̂3,i,c,t.
The third and fourth (inverse) measures that we use are concentration measures.
The third one is the Herndahl index (HI), which is dened as the sum of the squared









where N is the number of rms. The fourth one is the market share (MS) of the four






where f̃ = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the four largest rms in industry i and country c at time t.
The fth measure of competition is the number of rms in each industry, Ni,c,t. It
may seem to be the most simplistic and disputable. It may relatively rmly approxi-
mate the intensity of competition in situations close to symmetric equilibrium.
Even though these measures are widely applied, in certain cases they may not fully
reect the intensity of product market competition. For instance, when the competition
intensies from more aggressive conduct, some rms may leave the market. In such a
situation the Herndahl index, being a concentration measure, can fail, suggesting that
the intensity of competition has decreased. In the same situation a similar problem can
arise with the market share of the four largest rms when, for instance, one or several
of the largest rms leave the market.11 Meanwhile, the price cost margin may fail in
such a case when, for instance, inecient rms leave the market. This would increase
the weight of more ecient rms and, therefore, can increase the price cost margin (for
11Another possible criticism that applies to concentration measures such as MS and HI is that these are
more tied to the geographic and product boundaries of the market in which the rms operate.
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further discussion see Tirole, 1988). Given its denition, this problem is not present,
however, in the measure of competition prot elasticity. Nevertheless, given that all
our measures have a somewhat dierent nature (i.e., can reect dierent forces behind
the intensity of competition), it seems reasonable to use them for robustness checks of
our results. It is worth noting also that averaging over time would alleviate some of
these concerns since in such a case we focus on a rather long-term level of competition.
The data for the price cost margin and the number of rms we take from the
OECD STAN database. We use the Amadeus database for the remaining measures of
competition.
The Amadeus database has several features that need to be highlighted. First, in
this database there is virtually no data for the nancial intermediation and insurance
and pension funding industries. Therefore, our analysis for competition measures from
Amadeus does not contain those industries. Second, this database does not cover the
universe of rms and may not have a representative sample. For instance, according
to Klapper et al. (2006), it tends to overstate the percentage of large rms. This can
aect the competition measures identied from that database.
Our industry and country xed eects are likely to reduce such biases; nevertheless,
we perform several robustness checks. Klapper et al. (2006) compare the data from
Amadeus with data from Eurostat in terms of the within-industry distribution of the
size of the rms and keep only the industries and countries which are suciently close
to the data from Eurostat. We have checked that all our results hold for the sample of
countries and industries which were employed in Klapper et al. (2006). We have also
calculated the price cost margin from rm-level data from the Amadeus database and
checked that all our results hold for the sample of countries and industries where this
measure is suciently close to its OECD STAN counterpart (i.e., the squared percent-
age dierence between two measures is less than its median in the entire sample).12
Finally, the share of an industry in a country in total (business) output in 1997 is
obtained from the OECD STAN database.
2.4 Results
In column (1) of Table 2.2, we present our main results from the baseline specication
(2.1), which we estimate using the least squares method. The dependent variable is
our main (inverse) measure of intensity of product market competition, PCM, averaged
over the period 19972006. Meanwhile, the interaction term consists of the logarithm
of our telecom diusion measure, Telecom Subscribers, in 1997 and the measure of
dependence on telecommunication technologies, Telecom Dependence.
12We describe further that database and our data cleaning procedure in the Appendix - Data Cleaning.
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The estimate of the coecient on the interaction term is negative and signicant
at the 1% level [-2.72 (0.37)].13 Given that smaller values of PCM correspond to
higher competition intensity, this indicates that in industries that depend more on
telecommunication technologies, competition is more intensive in countries with higher
telecom diusion. The diusion of telecommunication technologies, therefore, has a
positive eect on the intensity of competition in the services and goods markets.
Since we have a dierence-in-dierences estimate, one way to compute the magni-
tude of our result is as follows. We take the countries that rank in the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the level of telecom diusion and compute the dierence between the
logarithms of telecom diusion levels. The countries are Estonia (25th) and France
(75th) in our sample. Further, we take the industries that rank in the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the level of dependence on telecommunication technologies and compute
the dierence between dependence levels. In our sample, these industries are Manufac-
ture of Other Transport Equipment (25th) and Real Estate Activities (75th). Finally,
we compute
α̂3 ×∆Telecom Dependence×∆ log (Telecom Subscribers),
where ∆ stands for the dierence operator between the 75th and 25th percentiles. The
computed number is -0.020. This means that the dierence in PCM (the intensity
of competition) between Real Estate Activities and Manufacture of Other Transport
Equipment is lower (higher) by 0.020 in France as compared to Estonia. This dierence
is relatively large compared to the mean of PCM, 0.190 (11%).
In an attempt to rule out other explanations for our main result, we conduct a
range of robustness checks.
Robustness Checks
Alternative Measures for Competition
In order to check whether our results are robust in terms of the competition measure, we
estimate our baseline specication (2.1) for the remaining four competition measures.
Columns (2)-(5) in Table 2.2 report the results where, all else equal, the dependent
variable is correspondingly the prot elasticity, the Herndahl index, the market share
of the four largest rms, and the logarithm of the total number of rms in an industry
[-29.67 (12.47); -1.58 (0.54); -1.88 (0.62); and 17.05 (3.92)]. All the estimates of the
coecients on the interaction terms have the expected signs and are signicant at least
at the 5% level.
13The major part of the high R-squared is attributable to industry and country dummy variables.
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We further report the estimation results exclusively for PCM. We have checked,
however, that all our results stay qualitatively the same for the remaining measures of
competition.
Alternative Measures for Dependence on Telecommunication Technologies
It could also be that our measure of dependence on telecommunication technologies
fails to identify the ranking of industries correctly. This can happen, for example, when
the shocks that create variation in our measure are not worldwide. Although according
to the rank correlation tests, most likely, this is not the case, we perform robustness
checks.
For a robustness check, we employ the shares of expenditures on telecommunications
out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in industries in Japan. This country
tends to have a relatively well-developed ICT sector and relatively high telecommu-
nication technologies diusion. Therefore, it may be reasonable to expect that our
assumptions are also valid for it. At the same time, it tends to have a dierent indus-
trial composition than the United States, which would be another type of robustness
check.
The data for this measure were obtained from the input-output tables from the
OECD STAN database. These data are slightly more aggregated than the data for our
main measure and are only for 1995, 2000, and 2005. We average the share of Japanese
industries' expenditures on telecommunications over these three years and use it as a
measure of dependence in our baseline specication (2.1).
Column (1) of Table 2.3 reports the results. The estimate on the interaction term
is again negative, which rearms our main result. However, it is somewhat smaller in
absolute value [-1.16 (0.22)]. In order to check this result, we calculate a measure of
dependence using data from the OECD STAN database on US industries. With this
measure the estimate of the coecient on the interaction term is -1.65 (0.24), which
is close to the estimate that we obtain using the measure identied from the data for
Japan. Moreover, it is quite close to the main result although it implies a somewhat
lower eect. It is dierent, however, since the OECD STAN database has a higher
industry aggregation.14
In Column (3) of Table 2.3, we use as a measure of dependence the country-time
average of the expenditure share on telecommunications in industries in our sample of
EU countries. The estimate of the coecient on the interaction term is not qualitatively
dierent from the main one [-1.52 (0.35)].
14We have also estimated the specication (2.1) using the US measures for the overlapping sample of
industries of the BEA and OECD STAN databases. The estimates are very close: -1.80 (0.30) and
-1.09 (0.20), respectively.
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We further report exclusively the results for our main measure of dependence on
telecommunication technologies. We have, nevertheless, checked that all our results
are qualitatively the same for these alternatives.
Non-parametric Estimator
In our dierence-in-dierences estimation, we essentially divide the countries into high
diusion (HDIFF) and low diusion (LDIFF) and the industries into high dependence
(HDEP) and low dependence (LDEP). Abstracting from the control variables, our
estimate is
[HDEP(HDIFF)-LDEP(HDIFF)]-[HDEP(LDIFF)-LDEP(LDIFF)],
which captures the average eect only. The eect that we compute with this non-
parametric estimator is -0.027. This result reassures us that the eect we have identied
previously is generally present in all countries and industries.
Alternative Explanations: Varying Sample Restrictions
Time Period  Do we capture integration processes?
Further, we test whether our results are robust to various sample restrictions. First, we
restrict our sample to 20002006 in order to check whether the integration processes
in the European Union aect our results. Column (4) in Table 2.3 reports the results
from the baseline specication. The dependent variable is PCM and, together with the
measure of telecom dependence, it is averaged over the period 20002006. The measure
of telecom diusion and the industry share variable are from 2000. The estimate of the
coecient on the interaction term is negative and highly signicant [-3.21 (0.55)].15 Its
magnitude has increased in comparison with the main results, but not considerably.
This suggests that the integration processes are not likely to be the drivers behind our
results.
Country-level  Are new EU member countries dierent?
The former transition countries the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland,
and Hungary, which joined the EU in 2004, can be dierent from the remaining coun-
tries in our sample. In these countries, the privatization process has resulted in the
emergence of a large number of private rms (Klapper et al., 2006). Moreover, these
15Our results are virtually the same if we consider the periods 19981999 and 19962005. Our results
also do not change when we add to our specication the interaction between Telecom Dependence and
the ratio of imports and exports to GDP, which can capture integration processes. Similarly, they do
not change when we add the interaction between Telecom Subscribers and the ratio of industry-level
imports and exports to output (we obtain the data for imports and exports from OECD STAN and
OECD Stat).
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countries have gone through large structural/industry changes. The latter can aect
the intensity of competition, whereas the former can aect the patterns of telecommu-
nication technologies use. We want to make sure that our results are not driven by
these factors.
Column (5) in Table 2.3 reports the results when we exclude these countries from
the sample [-3.55 (0.83)]. It also reports on the Chow test for the equality of coecients
on the interaction terms for these countries and the remaining countries in our sample
(p-value: 0.15).
We further check whether sectorial or industry dierences drive or aect our results.
Sector/Industry-level  Are the services industries dierent?
The processes behind our results may be dierent in the services industries compared
to the goods/manufacturing industries. This is because services products can be more
easily marketed and delivered over telecommunication networks. Therefore, in line
with the literature on electronic versus regular market places, it might be reasonable
to expect that the role of the consumers' search costs is dierent for these industries.
These costs can be important since they can aect the intensity of competition (e.g.,
Bakos, 1991). Although theory does not have a clear-cut inference, empirical studies
seem to point out that the relationship is likely to be negative (e.g., Brynjolfsson and
Smith, 2000; Brown and Goolsbee, 2002).
Column (6) of Table 2.3 reports the results when we restrict the sample to the
services industries. The estimate of the coecient is essentially the same as our main
estimate [-3.00 (0.61)]. In turn, the simple Chow test suggests that there is no signi-
cant dierence between the services and the goods industries.
Sector/Industry-level  Are those that use telecommunications the least dierent?
We have also checked that our results are not qualitatively dierent from the main
result for the industries that, most likely, aect telecom diusion the least. In order to
identify such industries, we take the interaction between the variables Industry Share
and Telecom Dependence and for a country take those industries that have a value
lower than the median in that country.
Column (7) of Table 2.3 reports the results. The coecient for the industries that
have lower-than-median interaction between Telecom Dependence and Industry Share
is essentially the same as our main result [-2.97 (1.74)]. This exercise suggests that our
results are not likely to be driven by reverse causality. Nevertheless, we continue to
explore such a possibility.
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Alternative Explanations: Reverse Casuality
Instrumental Variables
Our inference would be incorrect if a third factor is responsible for the intensity of
competition and is correlated with the interaction between dependence and diusion
measures. In this section, we attempt to rule out such an explanation of our results.
First, we try to alleviate further the reverse causality concerns and instrument
the pre-determined level of the diusion of telecommunication technologies. The set of
instruments that we use consists of dummy variables for country groups: countries that
joined the EU in 2004 (new members of the EU), Scandinavian countries, and France-
Germany. The rst set of countries inherited their (antiquated) telecommunications
infrastructure from their socialist regimes. Scandinavian countries, in turn, were very
eective in promoting universal access via state control and subsidies after deregulation
(e.g., Gruber and Verboven, 2001). Meanwhile, France and Germany had the best
access to mobile technologies through industry leaders such as La Compagnie Générale
d'Électricité and Siemens. Column (1) in Table 2.4 reports the results [-2.78 (0.40);
rst stage F-stat p-value: 0.00]. They are no dierent from our main results.
Our country-group-level instrumental variables may not solve the endogeneity prob-
lem, however. It might be that they are correlated with some omitted variables and
therefore do not satisfy the exclusion restrictions.
Omitted Variables  Do we identify other costs of entry?
According to, for example, Klapper et al. (2006), the country groups that comprise our
instruments are quite dierent in terms of variables that matter for entry (and potential
entry) and for the size distribution of rms and, thus, for the intensity of competition.
Following Klapper et al. (2006) and Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel, and Woo (2002),
these variables are the bureaucratic costs of entry, product market regulation, nancial
development, the regulation of labor, property rights, and human capital development
(or the availability of qualied personnel). To the extent that the diusion of telecom-
munication technologies is correlated with these variables (e.g., because it reects the
business environment), and the rank of telecom dependence is correlated with the rank
of the industries that are mostly aected by these variables, our inference would be
incorrect.
We follow the literature to nd measures for these country-level variables and to
identify the ranking of industries according to the eect these variables should have on
them (i.e., on the competition in those industries).
A. Measures for Country-level Variables
We obtain the measure and the data for the bureaucratic costs of entry from Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). These costs include all identiable
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ocial expenses in a country. To measure the country-wide market regulation, we
use the product market regulation indicator from OECD Stat. This indicator takes
into account the public control of business, bureaucratic barriers to entrepreneurship,
trade, and investment. Higher values stand for higher product market regulation. We
measure the level of nancial development as stock market capitalization over GDP.
We take the data from the WDI database. The measure and data for the regulation of
labor we obtain from Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004).
This is an index that takes into account job security, the conditions of employment, and
the provisions in laws regarding alternative employment contracts. Higher values mean
higher protection for a worker. Further, to proxy property rights and their enforcement,
we use the property rights index constructed by the Heritage Foundation. It measures
the protection of private property in a country. Higher values stand for higher private
property protection. Given availability, the data for these measures are for 1999, 1997,
1997, 1998, and 1997 respectively. Finally, as a measure of human capital development,
we use the average years of schooling for the population older than 25. The data are
for 1995, and we obtain them from the Barro-Lee tables, the World Bank.
B. Identifying the Ranking of the Industries According to the Eect
The bureaucratic costs of entry, according to Klapper et al. (2006), have a higher impact
on entry in "naturally" high-entry industries. It would be reasonable to expect that
product market regulation matters in these industries in a similar way. Meanwhile,
nancial development, according to Rajan and Zingales (1998), has a higher impact on
the creation of new establishments in industries that depend more on external nance.
The strictness of labor regulation, in turn, could be expected to have a disproportionate
impact on the industries that have high labor intensity. Further, property rights and
human capital development would have a disproportionate impact on the industries
that have high R&D intensity.
We use the measure and the data of Klapper et al. (2006) to identify the naturally
high-entry industries. It is dened as the percentage of new corporations (rms that
are no older than one year) in an industry in the US, and it is averaged over the period
19981999 in that paper. We take the measures and the data for dependence on external
nance and R&D intensity from Bena and Ondko (2012). The rst is dened as the
industry median of the average of the ratio of capital expenditures minus cash ows
from operations to capital expenditures over the period 19962005. Meanwhile, R&D
intensity is dened as the industry median of the ratio of averages of R&D expenditures
to capital expenditures over the period 19962005. As a measure for labor intensity
we use the ratio of the number of employees to output in US industries averaged over
the period 19972006. We take these data from the OECD STAN database.
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C. Answering the Question
In order to check whether any of these variables matter for our results, we create an
interaction term and add it to the baseline specication (2.1). Columns (2)-(7) of Table
2.4 report the results. Clearly, the fact that we use data for the years 1999 and 1998
for bureaucratic costs of entry and market regulation can raise further endogeneity
concerns. To alleviate these concerns, we have checked that our results are no dierent
when we use data for competition, dependence, and diusion measures from the period
20002006, for example.
The coecient on the interaction term between the measures of dependence and
diusion remains virtually the same in all cases. It somewhat, though, reduces in
absolute value when we insert the interaction between measures of labor regulation
and labor intensity, column (5). However, this eect is neither signicant nor driven
by that interaction term. The estimate of the baseline regression on the sub-sample
where we have values for the latter interaction term is virtually the same.
Generally, the signs of the coecients of additional interaction terms are intuitive,
although the estimates are not signicant. For instance, higher bureaucratic costs of
entry and stricter market regulation are likely to hinder entry (and potential entry)
in naturally high-entry industries. Therefore, they might reduce the intensity of com-
petition in these industries. The strictness of labor regulation can reduce the future
expected value of the entrant more in labor-intensive industries. Therefore, it may
hinder entry (and potential entry) and competition in such industries. The respective
estimates are correspondingly positive. The estimates of the coecients on interac-
tion terms for the nancial development measure and the property rights index are
also positive. A possible explanation for this is that the incumbents use, for example,
patent protection and nance for deterring entry and/or escaping competition. Mean-
while, the negative coecient on the interaction term for the level of human capital
most likely suggests that the availability of qualied personnel reduces entry costs in
R&D intensive industries. Exploring these conjectures is well beyond the scope of this
study.16
All these additional interaction terms, as well as our main interaction term, may
proxy for the business environment in the country. Another rough way to proxy for that,
together with the entrepreneurial culture in the country, is to include an interaction
term of the Telecom Dependence variable with the average intensity of competition
for the country. Column (1) of Table 2.5 reports the result when we include such an
16It might also be argued that the ranking of the industries according to their dependence on telecom-
munication technologies corresponds to the ranking of industries according to the eect these variables
have on them. In Table 2.14 in the Appendix - Further Results, we explore this hypothesis. In that ta-
ble, we also report the results when in addition to our main interaction term we include the interaction
of Telecom Dependence with a market regulation indicator for the telecommunications industry.
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interaction term in our baseline specication [-2.80 (0.39)].
Omitted Variables  Does our measure of dependence simply identify the growth poten-
tial of the industries?
It could also be that the measure of dependence on telecommunication technologies
identies the industries that have high growth potential. Meanwhile, such industries
could depend on the availability of modern technologies, which might be proxied by
the diusion of telecommunication technologies, and face tougher competition due to
attractiveness.
In order to measure the growth potential of the respective industries, following
Fisman and Love (2007), we use the growth rate of output of US industries averaged
over the period 19982007. We obtain these data from the output gures taken from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This measure seems to be the most appropriate given
the relatively low market imperfections in the United States. However, it could fail
if there are important taste dierences in the US compared to our sample countries.
Therefore, we also use the growth rates of output of industries in the three most
developed (measured by GDP per capita in 1997) EU countries in our sample averaged
over the countries and the 19982007 period.
We interact the measures of growth potential with the measure of diusion of
telecommunication technologies, Telecom Subscribers, and include the interactions in
the baseline specication. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.5 report the results. The es-
timate of the coecient on the interaction between Telecom Dependence and Telecom
Subscribers stays virtually unaected. The estimated coecients on the interactions
between Telecom Subscribers and the measures of growth potential are negative. This
suggests that in countries where the diusion of telecommunication technologies is
higher, the competition is more intensive in industries with higher growth potential.
An explanation for this can be that industries with high growth potential depend more
on such (modern) technologies (see Table 2.11 in the Appendix - Further Results for the
correlation between the measures of growth potential and dependence on telecommu-
nication technologies). Therefore, a higher diusion of telecommunication technologies
reduces (potential) entry costs in these industries more than in low growth potential
industries.
As a nal check, we also include in our baseline specication the growth rates of
industries in the EU countries in our sample averaged over the period 19982007. We
report the result in column (4) of Table 2.5. Our main result stays virtually unaected
[-2.37 (0.47)]. Our main result also stays unaected if we include all these additional
terms at once, but these results are not reported. (In the Appendix - Further Results,
we oer results from further robustness check exercises, see Tables 2.12-2.15.)
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2.5 Conclusions
In this study, we use industry-country-level data in order to identify the eect of the
wider adoption and more intensive use (diusion) of telecommunication technologies
on the competition in services and goods markets. Taken together, our results oer
a robust inference that the diusion of telecommunication technologies signicantly
intensies competition. It does so especially in the industries that depend more on
these technologies.
According to the theory and empirical evidence, the intensity of product market
competition matters for allocative and productive eciency. Therefore, our empirical
results highlight a mechanism for how the use of a particular type of ICT, telecom-
munication technologies, can contribute to economic performance. This complements,
for example, the productivity improvement mechanism that tends to be extensively
emphasized in the literature.
Our results also suggest that the policies intended to promote the diusion of
telecommunication technologies can complement competition policies.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Country-level
Bureaucratic costs of entry in 1999 [B.Entry Cost] 20 0.19 0.20 0.01 0.86
Business environment in 1997 [Business Environment] 21 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.23
Telecommunications subscribers per capita in 1997 21 0.61 0.23 0.22 1.06
[Telecom Subscribers]
Financial development in 1997 [Financial development] 21 0.28 0.23 0.02 0.79
Human capital development level in 1995 [Human Capital] 21 9.48 1.28 6.82 11.45
Product market regulation in 1998 [Market Regulation] 18 2.25 0.65 1.07 3.97
Property rights regulation in 1997 [Property Rights] 21 0.77 0.13 0.50 0.90
Regulation of labor in 1997 [Labor Regulation] 20 0.61 0.15 0.28 0.81
Industry-level
Alternative growth potential indicator 19982007 47 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.22
[Growth Potential EU]
Alternative telecom dependence indicator using data 30 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.09
from Japan 19952005 [Telecom Dependence JP]
Alternative telecom dependence indicator using OECD data 30 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10
for US 19952005 [Telecom Dependence OECD]
Alternative telecom dependence indicator using EU data 30 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08
19952005 [Telecom Dependence EU]
Entry rates in the US industries 19981999 [Entry Rate] 44 6.15 1.76 1.74 10.73
External nance dependence 19962005 46 0.32 0.72 -1.55 2.95
[Ext. Fin. Dependence]
Growth potential 19982007 [Growth Potential] 47 0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.09
Labor intensity 19972006 [Labor Intensity] 24 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
R&D intensity 19962005 [R&D Intensity] 46 0.70 1.16 0.00 4.17
Telecom dependence 19972006 [Telecom Dependence] 47 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.06
Industry-country-level
Herndahl index 19972006 [HI] 928 0.14 0.17 0.00 1.00
Logarithm of the number of rms 19972006 [logN] 863 7.24 2.63 1.39 13.49
Market share of four largest rms 19972006 [MS] 928 0.45 0.27 0.02 1.00
Output growth 19982007 (real) [Average Growth] 788 0.05 0.07 -0.61 0.48
Price cost margin 19972006 [PCM] 902 0.19 0.13 0.01 0.89
Prot elasticity 19972006 [PE] 892 -5.29 3.47 -20.56 -0.03
Share of industry in industrial output in 1997 [Industry Share] 926 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.24
Note: This table reports basic statistics for the key variables used in the paper. All variables and data sources are
dened in detail in Table A in the Data Appendix.
Table 2.2: The Main Result and the Results for Alternative Competition Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PCM PE HI MS logN
Telecom Dependence -2.66*** -29.67** -1.58*** -1.88*** 17.05***
× Telecom Subscribers (0.37) (12.47) (0.54) (0.62) (3.92)
Industry Share 0.69*** 17.35*** -0.25 -0.59* 10.55***
(0.26) (4.81) (0.21) (0.34) (2.15)
Observations 902 844 876 876 818
R2 0.72 0.52 0.59 0.73 0.93
Note: This table reports the results from the baseline specication (2.1) for all our measures of product market compe-
tition. All measures are averaged over the period 19972006. See Table A in the Data Appendix for complete denitions
and sources of variables. All regressions include industry and country dummies and use the least squares estimation
method. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level.
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Table 2.3: Alternative Measures of Dependence and Dierent Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
JP (OECD) EU




Telecom Dependence [ ] -1.16*** -1.65*** -1.52***
× Telecom Subscribers (0.22) (0.24) (0.35)
Telecom Dependence -3.21*** -3.55*** -3.00*** -2.97*
× Telecom Subscribers (0.55) (0.83) (0.61) (1.74)
Chow test (p-value) 0.15 0.38 0.99
Industry Share 0.77** 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.72** 0.67** 0.68* -0.47
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.28) (0.37) (0.40)
Observations 618 618 618 900 637 411 461
R2 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.58
Note: This table reports the results from the baseline specication (2.1) for various measures of dependence on telecom-
munication technologies and sample restrictions. The dependent variable is PCM. It is averaged over the period 2000
2006 in column (4) and over the period 19972006 in the remaining columns. In columns (1)-(3) we vary the dependence
measure. In columns (1) and (2), the measures of dependence are identied from OECD STAN data for Japan and
the US. In column (3), the dependence measure is constructed as the average of an industry's share of expenditures on
telecommunications out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in all EU countries from our sample. The data
are from the OECD STAN database. All measures of dependence from the OECD STAN database are averaged over
the years 1995, 2000, and 2005. In column (4), Telecom Subscribers and Industry Share are for 2000 and Telecom
Dependence is averaged over the period 20002006. In column (5), New EU Members (the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) are excluded from the sample. Column (6) excludes the goods industries.
Column (7) excludes the industries in a country that have a higher-than-median Telecom Dependence times Industry
Share in the country. For samples in columns (5)-(7) we perform Chow tests for the coecients on the interaction terms.
The p-values of corresponding t-statistics are reported in the row Chow test. See Table A in the Data Appendix for
complete denitions and sources of variables. All regressions include industry and country dummies and use the least
squares estimation method. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Table 2.4: Specication Check - IV and Additional Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IV
B.Entry Market Financial Labor Property Human
Cost Regulation Development Regulation Rights Capital
Telecom Dependence -2.78*** -2.67*** -3.05*** -2.93*** -1.68*** -2.90*** -2.91***
× Telecom Subscribers (0.40) (0.41) (0.52) (0.36) (0.32) (0.36) (0.36)
Entry Rate 0.01
× B.Entry Cost (0.01)
Entry Rate 0.00
× Market Regulation (0.00)
Ext. Fin. Dependence 0.02
× Financial Development (0.02)
Labor Intensity 2.33
× Labor Regulation (5.25)
R&D Intensity 0.00
× Property Rights (0.01)
R&D Intensity -0.02
× Human Capital (0.02)
Industry Share 0.67*** 0.75*** 0.83*** 0.69*** 0.74*** 0.70*** 0.73***
(0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27)
Observations 902 803 721 882 462 882 882
R2 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.84 0.73 0.73
Note: In regressions reported in this table, the dependent variable is the competition measure PCM averaged over the
period 19972006. Column (1) reports the results from the baseline specication, which we estimate using instrumental
variable techniques (GMM 2S). The instrumental variables are dummy variables for country groups: countries that
joined the EU in 2004 (the new members of the EU), Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), and
France and Germany. Columns (2)-(7) report the results from specications that augment the baseline with additional
interaction terms. See Table A in the Data Appendix for complete denitions and sources of variables. All regressions
include industry and country dummies and in columns (2)-(7) use the least squares estimation method. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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Table 2.5: Specication Check - Additional Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Business Growth Growth Average
Environment Potential Potential EU Growth
Telecom Dependence -2.80*** -2.24*** -2.57*** -2.37***
× Telecom Subscribers (0.39) (0.43) (0.37) (0.47)
Telecom Dependence 13.06
× Business Environment (8.80)
Growth Potential -0.36**
× Telecom Subscribers (0.16)
Growth Potential EU -0.43***
× Telecom Subscribers (0.12)
Average Growth 0.11***
(0.04)
Industry Share 0.69*** 0.68** 0.68*** 0.93**
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.38)
Observations 902 902 902 783
R2 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73
Note: This table reports the results from specications that augment the baseline with additional interaction terms.
The dependent variable is the competition measure PCM averaged over the period 19972006. See Table A in the Data
Appendix for complete denitions and sources of variables. All regressions include industry and country dummies and
use the least squares estimation method. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the




Table A: Denitions and Sources of Variables
Variable Name Denition and Source
Country-level Variables
B.Entry Cost The bureaucratic cost of obtaining legal status to operate a rm as the
share of per capita GDP in 1999. Source: Djankov et al. (2002).
Business Environment PCM averaged over industries in 1997. Source: Authors' calculations
using data from OECD STAN.
Financial Development The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in 1997. Source: WDI.
Human Capital The average years of schooling of the population 25 years of age or over.
The data are for 1995. Source: Barro-Lee tables, World Bank.
Labor Regulation Index of labor regulations in 1997. This index takes into account job se-
curity, the conditions of employment, and the provisions in laws regarding
alternative employment contracts. Source: Botero et al. (2004).
Market Regulation Product market regulation indicator in 1998. This indicator takes into
account the public control of business, bureaucratic barriers to en-
trepreneurship, trade, and investment. Source: OECD Stat.
Property Rights Property rights index in 1997. This index measures the protection of
private property in a country. Source: The Heritage Foundation.
Telecom Subscribers The sum of xed-line and mobile telephone subscribers per capita, in
1997. Source: Authors' calculations using data from ITU and GMID.
Industry-level Variables
Entry Rate The percentage of new corporations (rms that are not more than one
year old) in US industries, averaged over the period 19981999. Source:
Klapper et al. (2006) using Dun & Bradstreet.
Ext. Fin. Dependence The median of the ratio of capital expenditures minus cash ow from
operations over capital expenditures in US industries (where both are
averaged over the period 19962005 for a rm). Source: Bena and Ondko
(2012) using Compustat.
Growth Potential The annual growth rate of real output of US industries, averaged over the
period 19982007. Source: Authors' calculations using data from BEA.
Growth Potential EU The annual growth rate of real output of industries from the three most
developed EU countries in terms of real GDP per capita in 1997, av-
eraged over the countries and the period 19982007. Source: Authors'
calculations using data from OECD STAN.
Labor Intensity The ratio of number of employees to production (in $1000) in US indus-
tries, averaged over the period 19972006. Source: Authors' calculations
using data from OECD STAN.
R&D Intensity The ratio of median R&D expenditures over median capital expenditures
in US industries. Both components are averaged over the period 1996
2005. Source: Bena and Ondko (2012) using Compustat.
Telecom Dependence The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out of total ex-
penditures on intermediate inputs in US industries, averaged over the
period 19972006. Source: Authors' calculations using data from BEA,
I-O tables.
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Table A  (Continued)
Variable Name Denition and Source
Telecom Dependence EU The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out of total ex-
penditures on intermediate inputs in industries in EU countries from
our sample, averaged over countries and the years 1995, 2000 and 2005.
Source: Authors' calculations using data from OECD STAN, I-O tables.
Telecom Dependence JP The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out of total ex-
penditures on intermediate inputs in industries in Japan, averaged over
the years 1995, 2000 and 2005. Source: Authors' calculations using data
from OECD STAN, I-O tables.
Telecom Dependence
(OECD)
The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out of total ex-
penditures on intermediate inputs in US industries, averaged over the
years 1995, 2000 and 2005. Source: Authors' calculations using data
from OECD STAN, I-O tables.
Industry-country-level Variables
Average Growth The annual growth rate of real output of industries from EU countries
in our sample, averaged over the period 19982007. Source: Authors'
calculations using data from OECD STAN.
HI Herndahl index, averaged over 19972006. This index is dened as
the sum of squared market shares of rms within an industry. Source:
Authors' calculations using data from Amadeus.
Industry Share The ratio of output in an industry in a country to the total (business)
output in the country in 1997. Source: Authors' calculations using data
from OECD STAN.
Least Telecom Users Dummy variable that takes value 1 for a industry-country pair if the
interaction between Industry Share and Telecom Dependence is lower
than the median in the country, and zero otherwise. Source: Authors'
calculations using data from OECD STAN and BEA.
logN The logarithm of the number of rms in an industry, averaged over 1997
2006. Source: OECD STAN.
MS Market share of the four largest rms in an industry, averaged over 1997
2006. Source: Authors' calculations using data from Amadeus.
PCM Price cost margin is computed as revenue (sales) minus intermediate cost
and labor costs divided by sales, averaged over 19972006. Source: Au-
thors' calculations using data from OECD STAN.
PE Prot elasticity in an industry-country pair is the estimate of the co-
ecient β3 in the empirical specication (3), averaged over 19972006.
Source: Authors' calculations using data from Amadeus.
Country Sample:
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic1, Denmark2, Estonia1, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary1, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway2, Poland1, Portugal, Slovakia1, Slovenia1, Spain,
Sweden2, and the UK. (1 new EU member countries; 2 3 most developed EU countries in terms of
GDP per capita in 1997.)
Industry sample (ISIC rev. 3.1):
10, 11, 13-36, 40, 41, 45, 50-52, 55, 60-63, 65-67, 70-74, 92, and 93. (Industries 65-67 are not in the
sample for competition measures constructed using Amadeus data. In OECD STAN data, industries
10-14, 15-16, 17-19, 21-22, 36-37, 40-41, 50-52, 60-63, and 65-67 are merged. Further, these data do
not contain industries 92 and 93.)
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Technical Appendix
A very stylized and simplistic model that delivers predictions in line with our inference
is as follows. Assume that there are two industries which produce dierentiated goods







where σ1 + σ2 = 1, λY > 0, and X1 and X2 are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of the goods











, i = 1, 2. (2.4)
Here i indexes the industries, N stands for the number of rms, f indexes the rms,
and ε is the (actual) elasticity of substitution between the products of the rms in
these industries (ε > 1).
Normalizing aggregate demand to 1 and taking the consumption good as the nu-











where px is the price of x.
Further, assume that x1 and x2 are produced using telecommunication technologies






where λ > 0 and α1 > α2: Industry 1 depends on telecommunication technologies
more than industry 2. For simplicity, let the rms live for one period. Meanwhile, the
entrants pay a xed cost Fi for entry into the respective industry, and there is free
entry into the industries (where Fi < σiεi for i = 1, 2 since aggregate demand is equal
to 1). In order to cover the costs of entry, these rms set prices. In an industry each
rm internalizes its eect on the demand for the goods of the remaining rms in the
industry.
The problem of rm j in industry i is
max
Ti,j ,Li,j






















where ei,j is rm j's perceived elasticity of substitution between goods in its industry
ei,j = εi











In this framework competitive pressure in an industry can be expressed in terms of
the Lerner index (LI). For rm j from industry i this index can be derived from (2.6),





Ceteris paribus, in an industry it declines with actual elasticity of substitution ε and
the number of rms N .
Assuming symmetric equilibrium in each of the industries, the perceived elasticity



















Given that there is free entry, the number of rms in each industry is determined
by a zero prot condition πi = 0. Using (2.5), (2.7), (2.10), and (2.11) it can be easily



























From this expression, it is straightforward to show that the number of rms N in
each industry declines with entry cost F . This implies that decreasing entry cost F in
industry i reduces LIi or, equivalently, increases competition. After tedious algebra, it
is also possible to show that increasing elasticity of substitution ε in industry i reduces
LIi or, equivalently, increases competition.
In turn, allocations of T and L can be solved using (2.10), (2.11), and market
clearing conditions:
N1T1 +N2T2 = T,
N1L1 +N2L2 = L.



























Let industries have equal shares (σi ≡ σ), then increasing T increases N1T1 more
than N2T2. Following, for example, Geroski (1995b) and Le (1984) and assuming
that Fi = Fi (NiTi) and F ′i < 0 implies that N1 increases more than N2. There-
fore, increasing T increases competition more in the industry that depends more on
telecommunication technologies (industry 1).
In an industry, rms might also use telecommunication technologies to increase
product dierentiation and reduce competition [i.e., εi = εi (NiTi) and ε′i < 0]. In such
a case, the eect of increasing T on competitive pressure depends on the functional
forms of ε (.) and F (.); therefore, a priori it can be ambiguous.
Increasing T may also increase the productivity of rms, λ. In this model, however,
this would not aect LI given that we have assumed perfectly exible prices. Relaxing
this assumption can give another mechanism that can generate a positive relation
between LI and T .
Finally, this model can be easily extended so that the rms live for more than one
period and have operational xed costs. In such a case, assuming free entry, rms'
discounted value of revenue streams net of variable costs will be equal to the sum
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of entry and (the discounted value of) operational xed costs. The decline of any of
these xed costs will intensify competition. Therefore, as long as increasing T reduces
operational xed costs and/or entry costs, increasing T will increase competition.
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Appendix - Further Results
Alternative Measure for the Diusion of Telecommunication Technologies
Our main measure of telecom diusion is the number of xed-lines and mobile telephone
subscribers per capita (Telecom Subscribers). This variable, however, may not fully
reect the use and the quality of the telecommunication technologies, which can matter
for the costs associated with information transmission.
For a robustness check of our results, we also use the revenue of the telecom-
munications industry per capita (hereafter, Telecom Revenue) as a telecom diusion
measure. This measure can better account for the use and quality. However, from the
between-country-comparison perspective, it may fail to correctly reect the amount
of telecommunication services produced since it could be higher, for example, simply
because prices are higher.17
We obtain the data for the revenue of the telecommunications industry from the
GMID and ITU databases. Table 2.6 oers descriptive statistics for this and the
remaining variables that we use for robustness checks, and Table 2.7 oers correlations
between all country-level variables.
Column (1) in Table 2.12 oers the results where we use the (logarithm of) Telecom
Revenue in 1997 as a measure of the diusion of telecommunication technologies. In
this column, we use our main measures for competition and dependence on telecommu-
nication technologies. The estimated coecient is negative and signicant at the 1%
level, which complements the result reported in column (1) of Table 2.2. Although the
coecient is somewhat smaller [-1.46 (0.24)], the predicted magnitude of the eect is
higher, 0.030 (Hungary is at the 25th percentile, and Finland is at the 75th percentile
in terms of the Telecom Revenue variable). We have also checked that all our remaining
results are qualitatively the same for this measure.
As an additional robustness check we use the per capita number of internet sub-
scribers as a measure of diusion. The data were obtained from the GMID. Column
(2) in Table 2.12 oers the results. The coecient on the interaction term is again
negative.
Alternative Measures for Dependence on Telecommunication Technologies
Our main measure of dependence on telecommunication technologies is the share of
expenditures on telecommunications out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs
in US industries. Our results would be wrong if this measure fails to correctly identify
17This problem may be alleviated with a purchasing power parity index for the telecommunications
industry. We are not aware of any source of such data. Nevertheless, we have checked that our results
are qualitatively not dierent if we adjust the revenue measure by the price of a 3-minute local mobile
phone call.
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the ranking of industries according to their dependence. For robustness checks we also
use expenditures on telecommunications relative to output in US industries (the so-
called "technical coecients") and the coecients of the inverse Leontief matrix of US
industries as measures of telecom dependence.
We obtain the data for these measures from the input-output tables of the Bureau
of Economic Analysis and average the measures over the 19972006 period. Table 2.8
oers rank correlations between all our measures of dependence on telecommunication
technologies. Table 2.9 oers rank correlations between our main measures of telecom
dependence and shares of expenditures on telecommunications in the industries in the
EU countries in our sample.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.12 oer the results where we use these dependence
measures, while for competition and telecom diusion we use our main measures. The
estimated coecients are again negative and signicant which rearms our main result.
It can be also argued that European countries tend to be somewhat behind the
United States in terms of the use of ICT. For a robustness check, we also employ the
share of expenditures on telecommunications in 1994 in the United States.18 Column
(5) in Table 2.12 reports the results. The estimate of the coecient is not dierent
from our main result.
For a further robustness check, we also obtain industry-level data for the United
Kingdom from the input-output tables from the OECD STAN database. Columns (6)
in Table 2.12 oers the results where we use the UK data for measuring dependence on
telecommunication technologies. The estimated coecient is smaller in absolute value
than our main result [-0.67 (0.39)]. However, it is not substantially smaller from the
result for the measure identied from the OECD STAN database for the US, which is
presented in column (2) of Table 2.3, [-1.65 (0.24)]. The former, in its turn, is quite
close to the main result.
A reason behind such variation can be the higher noise in the UK data. For instance,
the dependence measure identied from the data for the UK has lower rank correlations
with the share of telecommunications expenditures in industries in the European Union
countries compared to the measures identied from the data for the US (see Table 2.9).
We have further checked that all our (remaining) results are qualitatively the same
for these alternative measures of dependence.
18We could use any date prior to 1997 and after 1993. It turns out that as we go towards 1993, our
results become more pronounced and signicant. This may partly stem from the technological lag
between European Union countries and the United States.
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Alternative Measures for Competition and Industry Share
We also calculate the price cost margin from rm-level data using the Amadeus database
(PCMa) and employ it as a competition measure.
Tables 2.10 reports correlations between all our competition measures. Table 2.11
reports correlations between the remaining industry level variables.
Column (7) in Table 2.12 reports the results for the price cost margin, which is
derived from the Amadeus database. The estimate of the coecient on the interaction
term has the expected sign and is signicant. It is considerably smaller, though, than
our main result [-0.55 (0.26)]. The predicted magnitude of the eect according to this
estimate is also smaller, -0.004. However, relative to the mean of this measure, 0.09,
the predicted magnitude is still comparably large, 5%.
Further, we have checked that our results hold when we take the number of rms
from the Amadeus database, which, in contrast to the OECD STAN database, does
not have full coverage.19
Finally, we have checked that our results are not qualitatively dierent if instead of
the share in sales we use the share in value-added.
Alternative Estimators and Robustness to Outliers
The competition measure PCM varies from 0 to 1. We estimate the baseline speci-
cation (2.1) with Tobit and report the results in column (1) of Table 2.13. Further, in
order to alleviate the inuence of outliers, if any, we estimate the baseline specication
using a quantile regression. We estimate it also on a sample that excludes the rst
and the last percentiles of the dependent variable, PCM. The results are reported in
columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.13.
When appropriate, we have checked that all our results are qualitatively the same
with these alternative estimators.
Alternative Sample Restrictions
Country-level  Is the UK dierent?
The UK might be expected to be dierent from the remaining countries, in terms of
the use of telecommunication technologies and its development level. Column (4) in
Table 2.13 excludes the UK from the sample. The result is the same as our main result.
Industry-level  Alternative measure for those that use telecommunications the least
19We have also used import penetration (imports over sales) as a competition measure. The data for
that measure were obtained from the OECD STAN database. The estimated coecient is positive,
though not signicant at the 10% level, and is not reported. The positive coecient is consistent with
the rest of our estimates. Meanwhile, the estimate is not signicant perhaps because we have few data
for that measure.
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Our main measure for identifying the industries that use telecommunication technolo-
gies the least is the interaction between the variables industry share and telecom de-
pendence. In a country, we take those industries that have a value lower than the
median in the country.
As a robustness check in a country, we also take those industries that have below the
median expenditures on telecommunications in 1995 in the country. The data for this
measure were obtained from the input-output tables from the OECD STAN database.
We use the dependence measure identied from that database in the estimation for this
group of industries since the OECD STAN database has a slightly dierent aggregation.
Column (5) of Table 2.13 reports the results. The estimate of the coecient is very
close to the result which we have obtained using OECD STAN data for the dependence
measure [column (2) of Table 2.3].
Alternative Additional Variables/Interaction Terms
In the main text for additional country-level variables that might proxy entry costs,
we use various measures to identify the ranking of industries according to the eect
of these variables. It may also be argued that the ranking of the industries according
to their dependence on telecommunication technologies corresponds to the ranking of
industries according to the eect these additional country-level variables have on them.
In columns (1)-(6) of Table 2.14, we include the interactions of Telecom Dependence
with the respective variable together with our main interaction term one-by-one. Our
main result, again, stays basically unchanged.
Our measure for telecom diusion, Telecom Subscribers, may proxy telecommuni-
cations industry regulation. The latter, meanwhile, may proxy for country-level market
regulation and entry costs, which matter more for industries that have a higher depen-
dence on telecommunication technologies. Although according to column (3) of Table
2.4 and column (2) of Table 2.14 most likely this is not driving our results, we continue
exploring such a possibility. From the OECD Stat database, we obtain a measure of
telecommunications industry regulation and include in our baseline specication its in-
teraction with Telecom Dependence. Column (7) of Table 2.14 oers the results. Our
main result is unaected.20
It could also be that countries with bigger shadow economies have a lower reporting
of output and lower competition due to the adherence to rather informal agreements.21
Meanwhile, it could be that the industries that depend more on telecommunication
technologies have a higher share in the shadow economy (e.g., services).
20We have also checked that the changes in economy-wide product market regulation and telecommu-
nications industry regulation (i.e., dierences between 2006 and 1997 values) do not drive our results.
21For example, in our sample PCM is 6% higher in countries where the shadow economy is more than
the median compared to the remaining countries.
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We take the measure of the size of the shadow economy and the data for it from
Schneider (2002). This variable is in percentage of GNP and is averaged over the
period 19992000. Column (1) of Table 2.15 includes the interaction of this variable
with the measure of dependence on telecommunication technologies and reports the
results. The estimate of the coecient on our main interaction term is virtually not
aected.
In the same vein, in the baseline specication (2.1), we have also included the
interactions between GDP per capita and Telecom Dependence and CPI and Telecom
Dependence [see columns (2) and (3) in Table 2.15]. The main result is, again, virtually
unaected.
Finally, we add to our baseline specication the initial intensity of competition in
a industry-country pair. Columns (5) of Table 2.15 reports the results. The estimate
of the coecient on the interaction term stays negative which rearms our results.
Additional and Unreported Robustness Checks
We have performed further robustness checks. For example, we have checked that our
results stay unaected if we:
• use as a measure of telecom dependence the per capita number of broadband
subscribers in 2000;
• include in the baseline specication the principal components of the matrix of all
additional variables which explain more than 90% of the variation in the data. We
have used principal components due to the high collinearity between variables;
• measure labor intensity with labor expenditures over output instead of the num-
ber of employees over output;
• add to the baseline specication the interactions of labor intensity and entry rate
variables with the overall economic freedom index (in 1997) from the Heritage
Foundation;
• measure nancial development with private credit over GDP; and
• use other measures of human capital development from the Barro-Lee tables.
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Summary Statistics and Correlations
Table 2.6: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Country-level
Corruption perception index in 1997 [CPI] 18 7.20 1.78 5.03 9.94
Real GDP per capita in 1997 [GDPC] 21 16140.24 8999.58 3517.05 35325.19
Shadow economy in 19992000 [Shadow Economy] 20 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.29
Telecom regulation in 1997 [Telecom Regulation] 18 3.86 1.32 1.05 5.63
Telecom revenue in 1997 [Telecom Revenue] 21 381.16 213.09 85.44 863.10
Internet subscribers in 1997 [Internet Subscribers] 21 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.07
Industry-level
Coecients of inverse Leontief matrix 19972006 47 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
[Telecom Dependence (Leontief)]
Telecom dependence in 1994 47 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06
[Telecom Dependence (1994)]
Telecom dependence using UK data 19952005 30 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.15
[Telecom Dependence UK]
Telecommunications expenditures relative to output 47 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
19972006 [Telecom Dependence (Output)]
Industry-country-level
Price cost margin from Amadeus data 19972006 [PCMa] 928 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.52
Price cost margin in 1997 [PCM (1997)] 840 0.19 0.14 0.00 0.90
Note: This table reports statistics for the key variables used in the paper. All variables and data sources are dened in
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: Rank Correlations - Telecom Dependence Measures
Telecom Dependence [] EU JP The UK  (1994) (Leontief) (OECD)
JP 0.83
The UK 0.78 0.80
 0.87 0.87 0.75
(1994) 0.89 0.86 0.74 0.99
(Leontief) 0.65 0.56 0.52 0.78 0.79
(OECD) 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.88 0.89 0.80
(Output) 0.83 0.84 0.69 0.97 0.97 0.86 0.87
Note: This table oers the pairwise Spearman's rank correlation coecients between the measures of dependence on
telecommunication technologies. See Table A in the Data Appendix and Table B in the Additional Data Appendix for
the denitions and the data sources. All correlation coecients are signicant at the 1% level.
Table 2.9: Rank Correlations - Telecom Dependence Measures and Shares of Expenditures
on Telecommunications in EU Industries
Telecom Dependence [] EU JP The UK  (OECD)
JP 0.83
The UK 0.78 0.80
 0.87 0.87 0.75
(OECD) 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.88
Austria 0.83 0.72 0.71 0.68 0.78
Belgium 0.91 0.76 0.61 0.81 0.82
The Czech Republic 0.89 0.85 0.83 0.91 0.87
Denmark 0.85 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.80
Estonia 0.77 0.68 0.62 0.75 0.77
Finland 0.82 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.66
France 0.83 0.84 0.74 0.85 0.80
Germany 0.90 0.75 0.67 0.74 0.76
Greece 0.93 0.74 0.68 0.85 0.81
Hungary 0.82 0.87 0.75 0.90 0.81
Ireland 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.39
Italy 0.84 0.77 0.63 0.84 0.78
The Netherlands 0.83 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.82
Norway 0.71 0.57 0.50 0.63 0.58
Poland 0.83 0.77 0.73 0.78 0.85
Portugal 0.88 0.89 0.85 0.87 0.80
Slovakia 0.91 0.80 0.71 0.85 0.87
Slovenia 0.91 0.78 0.70 0.86 0.84
Spain 0.88 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.73
Sweden 0.87 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.80
Note: This table oers the pairwise Spearman's rank correlation coecients between the measures of dependence on
telecommunication technologies identied from the data for the US, the UK, and Japan and the share of telecommuni-
cations expenditures out of total expenditures on intermediate inputs in industries in EU countries. See Table A in the
Data Appendix and Table B in the Additional Data Appendix for denitions and sources of variables. All correlation
coecients are signicant at the 1% level.
Table 2.10: Correlations - Competition Measures
HI logN MS PCM PCMa
logN -0.66*
MS 0.88* -0.74*
PCM -0.00 0.16* -0.06
PCMa 0.16* -0.19* 0.16* 0.49*
PE -0.24* 0.29* -0.29* 0.27* 0.31*
Note: This table oers the pairwise correlation coecients between competition measures. All measures are averaged
over the period 19972006. See Table A in the Data Appendix and Table B in the Additional Data Appendix for
complete denitions and sources of variables. * indicates the 5% level of signicance.
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Table 2.11: Correlations - Industry-level Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Entry Rate
2 Ext. Fin. Dependence 0.05
3 Growth Potential EU 0.01 0.31*
4 Growth Potential 0.20 0.43* 0.44*
5 Labor Intensity 0.29 -0.03 -0.39 0.36
6 R&D Intensity 0.42* 0.60* 0.22 0.44* -0.10
7 Telecom Dependence 0.35* 0.11 0.07 0.52* 0.31 0.14
Note: This table oers the pairwise correlation coecients between industry-level variables, excluding the competition
measures. See Table A in the Data Appendix and Table B in the Additional Data Appendix for complete denitions
and sources of variables. * indicates the 5% level of signicance.
Regression Results
Table 2.12: Alternative Measures of Telecom Diusion and Dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Telecom Internet
(Output) (Leontief) (1994) UK PCMa
Revenue Subscribers
Telecom Dependence -1.46***
× Telecom Revenue (0.24)
Telecom Dependence -45.26***
× Internet Subscribers (8.03)
Telecom Dependence [ ] -7.22*** -11.12*** -2.70*** -0.67**
× Telecom Subscribers (1.01) (1.67) (0.38) (0.30)
Telecom Dependence -0.55**
× Telecom Subscribers (0.26)
Industry Share 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.79** 0.38***
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.32) (0.10)
Observations 902 902 902 902 902 618 876
R2 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.49
Note: This table reports the results from the baseline specication (2.1) for various measures of telecom diusion,
dependence, and intensity of competition. In columns (1)-(6), the dependent variable is the competition measure PCM,
which we calculate using OECD STAN data and average over the period 19972006. In column (1), the diusion
measure is the (logarithm of) Telecom Revenue in 1997. In column (2), the diusion measure is the Internet Subscribers
in 1997. In columns (3)-(6), we vary the dependence measure. In column (3), the dependence measure is the ratio
of expenditures on telecommunications to output, Telecom Dependence (Output). In column (4), the dependence
measure is US industries' coecients of the inverse Leontief matrix, Telecom Dependence (Leontief). In column (5),
the dependence measure is the share of expenditures on telecommunications out of expenditures on intermediate inputs
in US industries in 1994, Telecom Dependence (1994). In column (6), the telecom dependence measure is identied
from UK industries. In column (7), the dependent variable is the competition measure PCMa, which we calculate
using Amadeus data and average over the period 19972006. We use our main measures of diusion and dependence in
column (7). See Table A in the Data Appendix and Table B in the Additional Data Appendix for complete denitions
and sources of variables. All regressions include industry and country dummies and use the least squares estimation
method. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and
* at the 10% level.
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Table 2.13: Alternative Estimators and Various Sample Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





Telecom Dependence -2.66*** -2.27*** -2.56*** -2.67***
× Telecom Subscribers (0.35) (0.42) (0.36) (0.37)
Telecom Dependence (OECD) -1.16**
× Telecom Subscribers (0.50)
Chow test (p-value) 0.80 0.03
Industry Share 0.69*** 0.43* 0.46** 0.69** 0.26
(0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.28) (0.54)
Observations 902 902 884 861 307
R2 - 0.50 0.68 0.72 0.70
Note: This table reports the results from the baseline specication for alternative estimators and various sample
restrictions. The dependent variable is the competition measure PCM, averaged over the period 19972006. Column
(1) reports the estimates from the Tobit regression with censoring at 0 and 1, and column (2) reports the estimates
from a quantile regression. Columns (3)-(5) use the least squares estimation method. Column (3) reports the results
for a sample that excludes the rst and last percentiles of PCM. In column (4), the United Kingdom is excluded
from the sample. Column (5) excludes the industries in a country that have higher-than-median expenditures on
telecommunications in the country in 1995. For samples in columns (4)-(5), we perform Chow tests for the coecients
on the interaction terms. The p-values of corresponding t-statistics are reported in the row Chow test. See Table A in
Data Appendix and Table B in the Additional Data Appendix for complete denitions and sources of variables. Pseudo
R2 is reported for the quantile regression. All regressions include industry and country dummies. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ***indicates signicance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Table 2.14: Specication Check - Additional Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
B.Entry Market Financial Labor Property Human Telecom
Cost Regulation Development Regulation Rights Capital Regulation
Telecom Dependence -2.49*** -3.17*** -2.55*** -2.68*** -3.50*** -2.69*** -3.34***
× Telecom Subscribers (0.40) (0.71) (0.41) (0.37) (0.47) (0.36) (0.45)
Telecom Dependence 1.07
× B.Entry Cost (1.07)
Telecom Dependence 0.11
× Market Regulation (0.47)
Telecom Dependence -0.43
× Financial Development (0.76)
Telecom Dependence -0.19
× Labor Regulation (1.34)
Telecom Dependence 4.36***
× Property Rights (1.47)
Telecom Dependence -2.01
× Human Capital (1.28)
Telecom Dependence -0.05
× Telecom Regulation (0.13)
Industry Share 0.72*** 0.80*** 0.69*** 0.72*** 0.67** 0.69*** 0.79***
(0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Observations 857 769 902 857 902 902 769
R2 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.70
Note: This table reports the results from specications that augment the baseline with additional interaction terms.
The dependent variable is the competition measure PCM averaged over the period 19972006. See Table A in Data
Appendix and Table B in Additional Data Appendix for complete denitions and sources of variables. All regressions
include industry and country dummies and use the least squares estimation method. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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Table 2.15: Specication Check - Additional Variables





Telecom Dependence -2.64*** -2.56*** -3.52*** -0.70***
× Telecom Subscribers (0.43) (0.77) (0.73) (0.27)
Telecom Dependence 0.86







Industry Share 0.72*** 0.69** 0.79*** 0.02
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.08)
Observations 857 902 769 840
R2 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.93
Note: This table reports the results from specications that augment the baseline with additional variables/interaction
terms. The dependent variable is the competition measure PCM averaged over the period 19972006. See Table A in
the Data Appendix and Table B in the Additional Data Appendix for complete denitions and sources of variables.
All regressions include industry and country dummies and use the least squares estimation method. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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Additional Data Appendix
Table B: Denitions and Sources of Additional Variables
Variable Name Denition and Source
Country-level Variables
CPI Corruption perception index. The data are for 1997. Source: Trans-
parency International.
GDPC GDP per capita (in 2000 US$). The data are for 1997. Source: WDI.
Telecom Regulation Telecommunications industry regulation indicator in 1997. This indicator
takes into account public control, entry and market structure. Source:
OECD Stat.
Telecom Revenue The revenue of the telecommunications industry per capita (in 2000 US$).
The data are for 1997. Source: ITU and GMID.
Internet Subscribers The per capita number of total internet subscriptions with xed (wired)
access. The data are for 1997. Source: ITU and GMID.
Shadow Economy The size of the informal economy as the share of GNP, averaged over the
period 1999-2000. Source: Schneider (2002).
Industry-level Variables
Telecom Dependence UK The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out of expendi-
tures on intermediate inputs in UK industries, averaged over the years
1995, 2000, and 2005. Source: Authors' calculations using data from
OECD STAN, I-O tables.
Telecom Dependence
(1994)
The share of (real) expenditures on telecommunications out of expendi-
tures on intermediate inputs in US industries in 1994. Source: Authors'
calculations using data from BEA, I-O tables.
Telecom Dependence
(Leaontief)
The coecients of the inverse Leontief matrix of US industries, averaged




The ratio of (real) expenditures on telecommunications to output in US
industries, averaged over 19972006. Source: Authors' calculations using
data from BEA, I-O tables.
Industry-country-level Variables
PCMa Price cost margin is dened as the weighted average of rm-level price cost
margins computed as operational prot over operational revenue within
an industry, averaged over 19972006. Source: Authors' calculations
using data from Amadeus.
PCM (1997) PCM in 1997. Source: Authors' calculations using data from OECD
STAN.
Least Telecom Users (Ex-
penditure)
Dummy variable that takes value 1 for a industry-country pair if ex-
penditures on telecommunications are below the median in 1995 in the
country, and zero otherwise. Source: Authors' calculations using data
from OECD STAN and BEA.
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Appendix - Data Cleaning
The Amadeus database is a product of Bureau van Dijk. It consists of full and stan-
dardized information from balance sheets and prot/loss account items, identication
information, and the industry codes of European rms.
Amadeus has a specic feature regarding the exclusion of rms from the database.
If a rm exits or stops reporting its nancial data, Amadeus keeps this rm four years
and then excludes it from the database. For example, in the 2010 edition of Amadeus,
the data for 2006 do not include rms that exited in 2006 or before. For our analysis,
we need to have as full a dataset as possible in order to obtain competition measures
that better approximate the real intensity of competition. Therefore, we combine and
use several Amadeus editions: March 2011, May 2010, and June 2007 downloaded from
WRDS and August 2003 and October 2001 DVD updates from Bureau van Dijk.
From the Amadeus database, we take operational revenues (for computing the
Herndahl index and the market share of the four largest rms), operational prots
(for computing the PCM), and the industry codes of the rms. We transform all
industry codes into ISIC rev. 3.1. We perform basic data cleaning in order to reduce
potential selection bias and measurement errors by:
• dropping the rms that do not report operational revenue or total assets and
rms that report their data in consolidated statements;
• imputing the missing values of key variables using linear interpolation across
years. This helps to restore possibly erroneously missing values;
• dropping the industries which have less than four rms in a given year;
• dening severe outliers as the rst and the last percentiles of relative yearly
changes in operational revenue and total assets for each country and the 2-digit
industry code. If an outlier is at the beginning or at the end of the time period
for a rm, then only the rst or last observation is dropped. If an outlier is in
the middle of the time period, the whole rm is dropped; and
• excluding observations with PCM below 0 and above 1 while computing the PCM.
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Chapter 3
Specic and General Human Capital in an
Endogenous Growth Model
(Joint work with Evangelia Vourvachaki and Sergey Slobodyan)
Abstract
In this paper, we dene specic (general) human capital in terms of the occupations whose use
is spread in a limited (wide) set of industries. We analyze the growth impact of an economy's
composition of specic and general human capital, in a model where education and R&D are
costly and complementary activities. The model suggests that there can be long-run welfare
costs involved in a declining share of specic human capital as observed in the Czech Republic.
We also discuss optimal educational policies in the presence of market frictions.
JEL Codes: O52; O40; O49; I20
Keywords: Human capital types; Education policy; Endogenous growth
This work is dedicated to the memory of Viatcheslav Vinogradov, the author of the original research
idea, the project's inspiration, and its rst leader. An earlier version of this work is available online
as Vourvachaki, Jerbashian, and Slobodyan (2013). This work was presented at the 2nd Armenian
Economic Association meeting in Yerevan (2012). The support of GA R grant IAA 700850902 is
gratefully acknowledged. All errors remaining in this text are the responsibility of the author.
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3.1 Introduction
Education systems across developed countries are highly diverse with respect to their
nancing (private vs. public), structure and philosophy (e.g., see OECD, 2010). Be-
cause of this, even though there is no high cross-country variation in terms of the
average level of skills (e.g., in terms of average years of schooling, see the Barro-Lee
data), there is important variation in terms of the types of skills developed via edu-
cation across countries and time. A number of studies examine the role of the latter
for economic outcomes at the individual or aggregate level. One stream of literature
dierentiates skills according to their "vocational intensity," where a vocation is as-
sociated with "practical and technical" skills (e.g., see Krueger and Kumar, 2004a,b;
Hanushek, Wössmann, and Zhang, 2011). Another stream of literature dierentiates
skills according to the "routine intensity" of the tasks performed as part of an occupa-
tion, where high routine intensity is associated with "codiable" tasks (e.g., see Autor
and Dorn, 2009; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
We propose an alternative way to horizontally dierentiate across skill types in
order to analyze the impact of human capital composition on aggregate economic per-
formance. Similarly to existing literature, we exploit the cross-occupational dierences.
Our point of departure is that our denition derives from cross-industry heterogeneity
in the production function: We dierentiate human capital skills according to their
"industry specicity." This builds a suciently general conceptual framework to an-
alyze the impact of shocks, aggregate or industry-specic, skill-biased technology or
not.
In particular, we dene two distinct types of human capital: "general" and "spe-
cic." As general human capital, we dene a set of skills that enable individuals to
perform generic tasks that are required for production in a wide range of industries
(e.g., services skills of managers, manual skills of cleaners). In contrast, specic human
capital is dened as a set of skills that enable one to perform highly specialized tasks
in few industries (e.g., the cognitive skills of doctors, manual skills of craft workers).2
Our classication is used to summarize the facts regarding the employment and
education levels of the two human capital types for the Czech economy. This results
in a rather uniform level of skills across the specic and general human capital, which
agrees with our horizontal dierentiation of skills. We nd that in 2007, approximately
36 percent of the total labor input is comprised of specic human capital. Moreover,
the evidence suggests that this share has been steadily falling since the mid-1990s.
To illustrate how this horizontal dierentiation of human capital can matter for
long-run growth and welfare, we build up an endogenous growth model, where edu-
2Our denitions of specic and general skills are conceptually similar with Becker's denitions in Becker
(1962).
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cation and R&D are costly activities. In the model, both general and specic human
capital are used in nal goods production, while only specic human capital can serve
as input into the educational sector and R&D. This structure highlights that specic,
intensive training on the details of production is essential for the ability to innovate
or train new human capital. We also explicitly take into account the acclaimed com-
plementarity between basic and/or applied R&D and education processes and positive
externalities in R&D (e.g., see Griliches, 1992; Nadiri, 1993; Jones andWilliams, 1998).3
In such a context, there is underinvestment in R&D at the aggregate level because eco-
nomic agents do not fully internalize the benets of their R&D investments. The more
the economic agents internalize the benets of their investments, the more they accu-
mulate specic human capital. Because the latter is the engine of growth, the economy
enjoys higher growth.
Our theoretical framework can be used to gain an insight into what can drive the
decline in the share of specic human capital that is observed in the Czech economy.
We note that to the extent a more centralized education system is more suitable to
account for any economy-wide human capital externalities, then our model suggests
that the Czech Republic would have been endowed with a high level of specic human
capital.4 In turn, the gradual decentralization of the Czech educational system and
interest in individual-level wage returns would imply a declining share of specic human
capital, which is consistent with Czech data. In this respect, our model suggests that
in an otherwise frictionless and stable economic environment, this trend could involve
signicant long-run welfare costs.
This framework oers other potentially plausible explanations for the falling share
of specic human capital as observed in the Czech Republic. For example, it suggests
that such a pattern can hold if the eciency of the education process of general human
capital increases relative to the eciency of the education process of specic human
capital. This explanation can be reasonable to the extent that technical change implied
by the introduction of IT could have increased the eciency in the education process
in the eld of Computing, relative to other elds. Meanwhile, more than 90% of the
graduates in this eld have general human capital according to our classication and
data for the Czech Republic. It further suggests that such a pattern can hold in case
when the centralized economy involved frictions and over accumulated specic human
capital (e.g., due to political objectives). Clearly, if these were complete explanations,
3Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Moretti (2003) identify signicant and positive human capital
externalities. The presence of such externalities implies that in a decentralized equilibrium, returns
on human capital are lower than is socially optimal. In our case, it also implies that there is less R&D
than is socially optimal which is in line with, for example, Jones and Williams (1998).
4The returns from sharing experience/knowledge might be easier to appropriate in a more centralized
environment since it can be easy to track the use of shared knowledge in such an environment.
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the declining share would not necessarily involve welfare costs.5
The policy implications derived from the model contribute to the debate concerning
the role of public education and R&D and their nance in light of the recent crisis and
subsequent budgetary cuts. For example, the United States and the United Kingdom
were the rst countries to move towards limiting the funds for public education, while in
the United Kingdom this has been more the case in individual elds such as humanities.
The Czech Republic, among other European countries, is also considering taking action
in similar directions. Our results highlight that to the extent market distortions cannot
be excluded, long-run welfare can be promoted by introducing subsidies to the returns
on human capital, which would encourage its accumulation.
With regards to the model, we relate to the endogenous growth literature that
focuses on input accumulation, like Romer (1990) and Lucas (1988). Closer to our
framework is the model presented in Eicher (1996), where educational investment is
costly, and technology advances as its by-product. Our main innovation is that we
allow households to internalize partially the benets from their inventions.
Finally, our work relates broadly to studies that examine the intra- and inter-
temporal trade-os between dierent types of human capital in environments with
high uncertainty, the introduction of new technologies, or trade. Such mechanisms
are analyzed in Autor and Dorn (2009), Krueger and Kumar (2004a,b), Gould, Moav,
and Weinberg (2001), Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2011) among others.
Sarychev (1999) oers a theoretical model specic to the transition experience from
centrally planned economies to market based ones. Generalizing the economic environ-
ment of our model in the spirit of the aforementioned studies would necessarily benet
the relative value of general human capital in our framework. Thereby, our baseline re-
sults regarding the benets from increasing the intensity of specic human capital will
not generalize in a straightforward way. Nevertheless, our present framework is su-
ciently parsimonious to highlight the benets of specic human capital in the long-run
and study the impact of the composition of human capital types on welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the composition of specic
and general human capital in the Czech Republic. Section 3 presents the model and
its results. Section 4 concludes.
5The observed trend can be also the net output of a number of dierent factors apart from those that
we highlight in our stylized model, like structural change or regulatory barriers.
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3.2 General and Specic Human Capital: The Case
of the Czech Republic
We treat every occupation as dening a particular set of skills that enable the perfor-
mance of specic tasks that are necessary as a part of the production process. In this
respect, occupations tightly dene the labor services input in the production of each
industry. To the extent that industries dier in their technological needs in terms of
the types of labor services, their demand for occupations would also be dierent. If
input/output markets are frictionless, then the observed demand for an occupation by
dierent industries can be used to gure out the degree of an occupation's "industry
specicity." We classify an occupation as "specic human capital" if it is used by a lim-
ited set of industries, i.e., its employment share exhibits a high degree of concentration
across industries. Accordingly, we classify an occupation as "general human capital"
if it is used in the production of a wide variety of products, i.e., its employment share
has a high degree of dispersion.
Employing our denition of specic human capital, we systematically summarize
how specic skills are produced and used in the Czech economy. The details of the
sources and properties of the data, and the methodology we used to group data ac-
cording to human capital skill types, are provided in Appendices D.1 and D.2. The
summary tables with the detailed list of occupations and education elds that are as-
sociated with specic human capital, as well as all gures, are oered at the end of the
paper.
The results tend to be intuitive. As an illustration, health professionals are classied
as specic human capital since they are employed almost exclusively (80%) in the health
industry. The health industry itself is highly intensive in health professionals (40% of
total labor input). The training for such professionals comes almost exclusively from
the health eld.6 On the contrary, another highly skilled group, corporate managers,
is classied as general human capital since they are almost evenly distributed across
all industries. They are used rather non-intensively and can graduate from a wide set
of elds: from business and administration to engineering. We also observe seemingly
counterintuitive cases of highly skilled groups (lawyers), which are employed by a wide
variety of industries despite being trained (almost) exclusively in the educational eld
of law and, thus, classied as general human capital.
Importantly, the average distribution of skill-levels across the two types of human
capital is such that no human capital type is singled out as exclusively high- or low-
skilled. As an illustration, 92% of workers with specic human capital have completed
6The relationship between education and the training of health care professionals could be overstated
since they are typically obligated by law to have training in medicine.
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the basic education and have at least ISCED-97 education level 3, while 14% are
graduates of ISCED-97 levels 5-6 , as opposed to 95% and 16% respectively for the
workers with general human capital.
The overall employment (use) share of specic human capital is 36.4% for 2007.7
Figure 3.1 illustrates how the employment share of specic human capital has evolved
over the period 1994-2007 in the Czech Republic.8
Figure 3.1: The Employment Share of Specic Human Capital
Note: This gure oers the employment share of specic human capital in the Czech Republic for the period 1994-2007
and for Germany for the period 1992-2002.
There is a clear downward trend with the share falling by 5 percentage points over
the course of the entire period. The downward trend in the employment of specic
human capital is not specic to the Czech Republic since Germany matches it over the
course of 1992-2002.9
Concerning the production of specic skills, we highlight the education elds whose
majority of graduates (more than 50%) end up in specic human capital related occu-
pations according to our employment data. In 2007, 34.5% of total graduates in the
Czech Republic graduated from elds that intensively produce specic human capital.
The corresponding share in 2007 for Germany was 35% and 34% for the Euro area. In
7This excludes military personnel, ISCO-88 0.
8The information for the period 1994-2002 is taken from Jeong, Kejak, and Vinogradov (2008). For
this period, the calculation of the specic human capital employment share excludes ISCO-88 62 as
the relevant data are not reported in the original source.
9The downward trend is further conrmed by the European average employment share data by occu-
pation that we obtain from Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010). The average employment share of
specic human capital in Europe was 36.3% in 1993 and decreased to 31.3% by 2006. This evidence
excludes ISCO-88 11, 6, 33, 23, 92, as these occupations are not reported. Excluding the same ISCO-
88 codes in our data, we nd that the Czech Republic moved from an employment share of 34.6% in
1994 to 31.8% in 2007.
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2000, the share for the Czech Republic is also close to its German counterpart (33.1%
and 30.6% respectively). We do not have suciently long data to comment on the
existence of any systematic time patterns. Moreover, there are further limitations in
this respect, as educational data are bound to lag behind labor market developments
due to demographics, diculty to change institutions and culture, uncertainty, etc.
Overall, the data presented here show that the Czech Republic has changed its
composition of human capital types in a way that closely matches its neighbors. This
outcome may strike one as surprising as the Czech Republic, among other former tran-
sition and Central European countries, is often presented as a "vocational" economy.
For example, in their recent review Hanushek et al. (2011) show that the Czech Re-
public, Hungary and Poland together with Germany and Switzerland feature as top
apprenticeship countries in Europe with 72% of the male population completing "voca-
tional education," and with the rest completing "general education." Notably though,
they dene the latter as tertiary type-A programs [...] largely theory-based [...] de-
signed to provide sucient qualications for entry to advanced research programs and
professions with high skill requirements(p. 9).10 In this respect, their denition is
more tied to the level of skills than to the type of skills and the degree to which they
are used for the production of a wide range of products, which is our own primary
focus. This highlights the importance of the original choice of the denition for specic
human capital.
3.3 The Model
The nal goods (Y ) producers use physical capital (K), specic human capital (Hs)
and general human capital (Hg), in order to produce homogenous goods.
The economy is populated by a continuum of innitely lived and identical house-
holds of mass one. The representative household owns all types of physical and human
capital and derives utility from the consumption (C) of nal goods. The household
nances its consumption expenditures with the labor income and interest earned on
capital. The household rents its two types of human capital and physical capital at the
prevailing market prices (ws, wg, and r, respectively).
Further, the household can accumulate either type of its human capital through
education. Having an intensive training on the details of production, the specic hu-
man capital is the necessary input in the education process. Each human capital has
a dierent accumulation process in the education sector (i.e., dierent schooling func-
tion).11
10See footnote 7 in Hanushek et al. (2011).
11Human capital accumulation processes in our model can constitute any type of training.
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Human capital employed in the schooling of specic human capital also engages
in generation of new technology. This process captures the R&D in education-related
institutions. The technology generated through this process improves the quality of
the physical capital.
Given that the household owns physical capital and the innovations are embodied
in it, the household internalizes this R&D process and its eect on physical capital. In
the spirit of Romer (1990) and Lucas (1988), the household has decreasing returns from
that process; however, the externalities that stem from others' involvement in R&D
make the returns constant at the aggregate level.12 These externalities stem from
knowledge sharing between researchers, where the level of knowledge of researchers is
proportional to the level of their human capital.13
Final Goods Sector








1 > γ1 > 0, 1 > γ2 > 0, λY > 0,
where λY is an exogenous productivity level, and usY is the share of specic human
capital employed in the production of nal goods.




{Y − wgHg − wsusYHs − rK} , (3.2)
s.t. (3.1) .
The resulting optimal rules are
wgHg = γ1Y, (3.3)
wsu
s
YHs = (1− γ1) γ2Y, (3.4)
rK = (1− γ1) (1− γ2)Y. (3.5)
The rst expression is the nal goods producer's demand for general human capital.
The second and third are the demands for specic human capital and physical capital,
respectively.
12Constant returns are required in order to have a balanced growth path.
13We abstract from any issues of obsolescence and any further labor market frictions in order to highlight
the impact of friction in R&D on human capital allocations.
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Education Sector
Specic and general types of human capital have dierent accumulation processes








respectively, where λs, λg > 0 are exogenous productivity levels, and uss and u
s
g are the
shares of specic human capital employed in the respective accumulation processes.
The human capital employed in the accumulation of specic human capital also
produces new technology Λ according to the following rule
Λ̇ = δ (ussHs)
γ3 , (3.8)
where 1 ≥ γ3 ≥ 0, and δ is a productivity level that is exogenous from an individual
perspective. The technology thus generated improves the quality of physical capital:
K = Λk, (3.9)
where k is normalized to 1.
At the aggregate level, there are constant returns in the R&D process, and δ is
given by




where λΛ > 0 is an exogenous productivity level. Therefore, 1 − γ3 equals the degree
of externalities that stem from others' involvement in R&D. In the limiting case when
γ3 = 1, there are no such externalities, whereas when γ3 = 0, the R&D process per se
is an externality.
Households
The representative household has a standard CIES utility function with an inter-
temporal substitution parameter 1
θ
and discounts the future streams of utility with






exp (−ρt) dt. (3.11)
14The inclusion of physical capital in human capital accumulation processes does not change our results
though it makes the algebra more cumbersome.
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The household's decisions follow its preferences and satisfy its budget constraint
0 = rK + wsu
s
Y (1 + τ
s
Y )Hs + wg (1 + τ
g
Y )Hg − C − T, (3.12)
1 ≥ τ sY ≥ −1, 1 ≥ τ
g
Y ≥ −1,
where the triple {τ sY , τ
g
Y , T} represents government policy consisting of proportional
taxes (or subsidies) on earnings from specic and general human capital employed in
the production of nal goods and a lump-sum tax T. The tax T, which is needed to








The sum of shares of specic capital in the education and nal goods sectors is
1 ≥ usY + uss + usg. (3.14)












(3.12) , (3.6) , (3.7) , (3.8) , (3.9) , (3.14) ,
Hs (0) , Hg (0) ,Λ (0) > 0− given.
Assigning shadow values {qi} to constraints (3.12), (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8), the decision
rules that follow from the household's optimization are
C−θ = q1, (3.15)
q1ws (1 + τ
s





















Y (1 + τ
s











q̇3 = q3ρ− q1wg (1 + τ gY ) , (3.19)
q̇4 = q4ρ− q1rk. (3.20)
The rst optimal decision is for the consumption path. The next two are the allocations
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of specic human capital in the nal goods and education sectors, where the second
term on the right-hand side is the value stemming from R&D (voluntarily) performed
by the specic human capital.15 The remaining decision rules describe the returns on
the accumulation of specic and general human capitals and technology.16
Using letter g for the growth rates of variables and expressions (3.3), (3.4), (3.5),
(3.16), and (3.17), the returns on accumulation of all types of asset holdings can be
rewritten as




− gq3 = λg
1 + τ gY























shows the value from relaxing the constraint for Λ̇, (3.8), compared to
the value from relaxing the constraint for Ḣs, (3.6). According to (3.21) and (3.23), the
return on the accumulation of specic human capital −gq2 increases with that ratio,
whereas the return on the accumulation of technology −gq4 declines with it.
3.4 Features of the Dynamic Equilibrium
The results regarding the balanced growth path behavior of the economy are the fol-
lowing.
Proposition 1. The balanced growth path growth rates and allocations of the economy
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(λs − ρ) + ρ
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Proof. See Appendix T.1.
15When γ3 = 0, the second term in the right-hand side of expressions (3.16) and (3.17) is zero since
R&D is a pure externality for the household.
16Given that the pair (τsY , τ
g
Y ) aects the household's trade-o between training and working, it is
referred to as education policy in this model.
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Since the quadratic coecient is positive, a sucient condition for two real roots is
a negative free term. The free term is negative when
θ ≥ 1. (3.25)
This condition implies that the household needs to have a relatively low elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution. It is a common condition that ensures balanced growth in
multi-sector growth models. In our framework, it implies also that there is only one
positive root. Hereafter, it is assumed that (3.25) holds.
Proposition 2. In the decentralized equilibrium on the balanced growth path, all quan-


















. Moreover, all relative prices are
constant, and the growth rates of shadow values q1, q2, q3, and q4 are equal.
Proof. See Appendix T.1 which also oers the system of equations that can be solved
for the relative allocations.
Therefore, the condition that ensures a positive growth rate of consumption on the





Together with (3.25) this condition is necessary in order to have bounded lifetime utility.
Hereafter, it is assumed that (3.27) holds for any value of γ3, which is equivalent to
assuming that λs > ρ.
In order to highlight the properties of the decentralized equilibrium, Table 3.1 oers
the (main) comparative statics. Some of the derivatives in this table are obtained using
numerical methods since the analytical derivations become cumbersome due to high
non-linearity of equations (for further details see Appendix T.1).
The non-linearity arises because the return on the accumulation of specic human
capital −gq2 increases with q4q2 , while the return on accumulation of technology −gq4
declines with it, but on the balanced growth path they need to be equal. When R&D
is pure externality (i.e., γ3 = 0), −gq2 does not depend on q4q2 , and the comparative
statics are easily computed. Appendix E.1 presents derivations for this case.17
17The return on the accumulation of specic human capital −gq2 also does not depend on the ratio
q4
q2
when the allocation of specic human capital to R&D activity is a (separate) choice variable. In this
case, the comparative statics can be derived analytically (see Appendix E.2).
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Table 3.1: Comparative Statics











ρ [0.001, 0.09] + + − 0 − − ± + −
θ [1, 10] + + − 0 − − ± + −
γ1 [0.01, 0.99] − − − 0 − − + − −
γ2 [0.01, 0.99] − − ± 0 − − ± + ±
γ3 [0.01, 0.99] ± + + 0 + + ± − +
λs [0.1, 10] ± + + + + + ± − +
λg 0 − − 0 0 0 0 0 0
λs, λs ≡ λg [0.1, 10] ± − + + + + ± − +
λΛ − 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0
τ sY [−0.99, 0.99] − − + 0 − − − + +
τ sY , τ
g
Y ≡ τ sY [−0.99, 0.99] − − − 0 − − ± + −
Note: The sign + means a positive relationship, − negative, 0 no relationship, and ± means that the relationship
depends on model parameters. Some of these comparative statics were derived with a numerical exercise (see for details
Appendix T.1). The intervals for parameter values used in the exercise are oered in the table, where the grids are
equally spaced and each has 5 points.
Focusing on the most interesting comparative statics, according to Table 3.1, the
share of specic human capital uss increases with γ3. This happens since higher γ3
implies a higher internalized benet from R&D and, thus, a higher value of specic
human capital. This is also the reason why the ratio of specic and general human
capitals Hs
Hg
, thus the share of specic human capital Hs
Hg+Hs
, increases with γ3. Mean-
while, the growth rate g increases with γ3 since the driver of growth in this economy is
the accumulation of specic human capital. Figure 3.2 illustrates the behavior of the
share of specic human capital in the decentralized equilibrium as γ3 declines.
The relation between Hs
Hs+Hg
and γ3, when the latter declines, matches the trend in
the data for the Czech Republic (see Figure 3.1) and seems to be a plausible explanation
for that trend. The intuition behind this is that more centralized mechanisms are,
arguably, better at accounting for possible externalities. The transition process to a
market/a more decentralized economy in the Czech Republic, therefore, would have
increased the eective degree of externalities, 1− γ3.
According to Table 3.1, another seemingly reasonable explanation for the decline
in the share of specic human capital Hs
Hs+Hg
can be the increase in the eciency of the
education process of general human capital λg for a given λs. Such an explanation is
plausible to the extent that the introduction and use of information and communication
technologies have increased the productivity of the education process in the Computing
eld relative to other elds. Meanwhile, our data suggest that almost all graduates in
this eld have general human capital.
These comparative statics can be interpreted as unexpected shocks to the economy,
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Figure 3.2: The Share of Specic Human Capital and R&D Externality
Note: [Hs/(Hs +Hg)]
DE is the share of specic human capital in decentralized equilibrium, and [Hs/(Hs +Hg)]
SP is
the social planner's choice for the share of specic human capital.
which induce it to adjust to a new balanced growth path with dierent human capital
portfolio. It is worth noting that, depending on the stocks of human capital Hs and
Hg and on the magnitude of the shocks, the economy can stop accumulating one of the
types of human capital during this transition.
In this respect, if the economy starts with a share of specic human capital higher
than the balanced growth path value then the share of specic human capital declines
during the transition. This can be another explanation for the observed trend in the
data for the Czech Republic. Such an explanation can be plausible when the centralized
economy involved frictions and over-accumulated specic human capital (Appendix T.2
analyzes transition dynamics).
Policy Inference
Clearly, when γ3 = 1 and the tax rates are zero, the decentralized equilibrium solution
coincides with the social planner's solution. However, when γ3 < 1 in the decentralized
equilibrium the benets from allocating specic human capital to the education sector
that stems from the increased rate of innovation cannot be fully appropriated by the
household. This distortion arises because of the decreasing returns in education at the
individual level. As a result, for any uss, specic human capital earns higher returns in
social optimum than in the decentralized equilibrium. Thus, at least on the balanced
growth path, the socially optimal growth rate and the share of specic human capital
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are all higher than their counterparts in the decentralized economy.
Proposition 3. The policy in the decentralized equilibrium that delivers the same al-
locations and growth rates as in the social planner's solution is
1 + τ sY = γ3, (3.28)







where SP stands for the social planner's solution.
Proof. See Appendix T.3.
This result is intuitive. The tax rate τ sY corrects the distortion in the value of
allocating specic human capital to its accumulation that stems from an increase in
the innovation rate. It equates the shadow value of specic human capital in the
decentralized equilibrium adjusted for the externality q4γ3 to the shadow value in the
social optimum qSP4 . Meanwhile, the tax rate τ
g
Y is such that it keeps the optimal rule
(3.22) in accordance with the socially optimal rule, where there are no tax rates. The
reason why τ gY and τ
s
Y need to be equal is that there are no frictions in the production
side; therefore, the ratio of wages is not distorted. Such a horizontal education policy,
therefore, retains the optimal ratio. However, it reduces the value of the specic human
capital less than the value of the general human capital since the former also conducts
R&D. Given the nature of the externalities, such a disproportionate change is essential
for attaining socially optimal outcomes.
Discussion of the Model
As noted in the introduction, for the sake of highlighting the role of specic human
capital as the engine of growth in the most parsimonious way, we built a model that
does not capture the inherent exibility of general human capital. This implies that
our ndings regarding the benets from accumulating specic human capital are biased
upwards. However, our present framework still captures how the choice of the type of
human capital is tied to a choice between current and future consumption levels: The
higher the utility cost is of sacricing present consumption, the more likely the economy
would be relatively abundant in general human capital.
In this respect, we view the present model as the rst step towards building a
generalized theoretical framework that would capture more aspects of the economic
environment. Importantly, this would involve, rst, building a multi-sector production
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structure and second, adding sources of aggregate uncertainty. The former allows us
to model explicitly the dening feature of general human capital, i.e., its usability
across a variety of production sectors. The latter allows us to analyze explicitly the
advantage of general human capital over specic one, namely its ability to adjust to
new economic conditions. Such a framework would necessarily complicate the inter-
temporal trade-o between the two types of human capital to a signicant degree,
making growth and welfare implications non-straightforward. Our conjecture is that
for highly stable economic environments, the results would be qualitatively similar to
those of our present model. This extension is left for future research.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider industry-specicity as a distinct source of human capital het-
erogeneity that is dened irrespective of the skill-level accumulated through education.
Accordingly, we dene general and specic human capital. We apply our denitions to
study the composition of the production structure and education in the Czech Republic
in terms of the two types of human capital and nd a declining employment (use) share
of specic human capital in the Czech economy.
Moreover, we develop a stylized model that captures trade-os between the two
types of human capital and the importance of specic human capital as the source
of long-run growth. Through the lens of the model, we may interpret the declining
share of specic human capital as an aspect of transition from the previous centralized
system of education and production to a market-based mechanism.
In an environment with frictions in R&D, we discuss optimal educational policies.
Our model suggests that providing public funds for R&D and education could be
optimal in the presence of the R&D externality, which corresponds to a common policy
implication in endogenous growth models with externalities. More empirical work is
needed to establish the position of the Czech and European economies with respect to
an optimal specic human capital share.
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Tables
Table 3.2: Czech LFS Sample Population Labor Status
Status Number of people Percentage out of total
Employed 454110 63.72
Unemployed 31853 4.47
Out of labor force 226748 31.81
Total 712711 100
Table 3.3: ISCED-97 Classication
Education eld Code Education level Code
General Programs 01 Pre-primary education 0
Literacy and Numeracy 08 Primary education or rst stage of 1
Personal Skills 09 basic education
Teacher Training and 14 Lower secondary or second stage of 2
Educational Science basic education
Arts 21 (Upper) Secondary education 3
Humanities 22 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 4
Social and Behavioral Science 31 First stage of tertiary education (not 5
Journalism and Information 32 leading directly to an advanced
Business and Administration 34 research qualication)
Law 38 Second stage of tertiary education 6
Life Science 42 (leading to an advanced
Physical Science 44 research qualication)
Mathematics and Statistics 46
Computing 48
Engineering and Engineering 52
Trades
Manufacturing and Processing 54
Architecture and Building 58










Table 3.4: Industry Classication According to NACE
Industry Letter
Agriculture, Hunting and Related Service Activities A
Fishing B
Mining and Quarrying C
Manufacturing D
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply E
Construction F
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles, G
Motorcycles and Personal and Household Goods
Hotels and Restaurants H
Transport, Storage and Communication I
Financial Intermediation J
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities K
Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security L
Education M
Health and Social Work N
Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities O
Private Households with Employed Persons P
Extra-territorial Organizations and Bodies Q
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Table 3.5: Classication of Occupations
Occupation Wide groupA Skill levelB
Legislators and senior ocials 1 Highly skilled white collar
Corporate managers
Managers of small enterprises
Physical, mathematical and engineering
science professionals 2





Life science and health associate professionals
Teaching associate professionals
Other associate professionals
Oce clerks 4 Low-skilled white collar
Customer services clerks
Personal and protective services workers 5
Models, salespersons and demonstrators
Skilled agricultural and shery workers 6 Highly skilled blue collar
Subsistence agricultural and shery workers
Extraction and building trades workers 7
Metal, machinery and related trades workers
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and
related trades workers
Other craft and related trades workers
Stationary plant and related operators 8 Low-skilled blue collar
Machine operators and assemblers
Drivers and mobile plant operators
Sales and services elementary occupations 9
Agricultural, shery and related laborers
Laborers in mining, construction,
manufacturing and transport
Note: A - classication according to ISCO-88; B - division according to OECD (2010).
Table 3.6: Correlation Across Concentration Statistics
CI CV HI EI EXI GI
CV 0.955 1
HI 0.936 0.991 1
EI -0.869 -0.830 -0.823 1
EXI 0.861 0.831 0.850 -0.926 1
GI 0.919 0.979 0.950 -0.831 0.787 1
Note: CI - concentration index; CV - coecient of variation; HI - Herndahl index; EI - entropy index; EXI - exponential
index; GI - Gini index.
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Table 3.7: Assignment of Occupations into Specic and General Human Capital Types
Occupation Specic = 1; General = 0 Average CI
Legislators and senior ocials 1 1
Life science and health professionals 1 1
Teaching professionals 1 1
Life science and health associate professionals 1 0.6
Teaching associate professionals 1 1
Models, salespersons and demonstrators 1 1
Skilled agricultural and shery workers 1 1
Subsistence agricultural and shery workers 1 1
Extraction and building trades workers 1 0.6
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and
related trades workers 1 1
Other craft and related trades workers 1 1
Stationary plant and related operators 1 1
Machine operators and assemblers 1 1
Agricultural, shery and related laborers 1 1
Laborers in mining, construction,
manufacturing and transport 1 0.8
Corporate managers 0 0
Managers of small enterprises 0 0
Physical, mathematical and engineering
science professionals 0 0.2
Other professionals 0 0
Physical and engineering
associate professionals 0 0
Other associate professionals 0 0
Oce clerks 0 0
Customer services clerks 0 0.2
Personal and protective services workers 0 0
Metal, machinery and related trades workers 0 0.2
Drivers and mobile plant operators 0 0
Sales and services elementary occupations 0 0
Note: CI - concentration index.
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Table 3.8: Share of Specic Human Capital
Industry name NACE code








Health and Social Work N 57.0
Manufacturing D 45.0
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair
of Motor Vehicles, Motorcycles and
Personal and Household Goods
G 42.7
Mining and Quarrying C 40.4
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply E 23.8
Public Administration and Defence;
Compulsory Social Security
L 14.5
Extra-territorial Organizations and Bodies Q 12.3
Other Community, Social and Personal
Service Activities
O 11.4
Private Households with Employed Persons P 7.7
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities K 5.9
Transport, Storage and Communication I 3.8
Hotels and Restaurants H 3.4
Financial Intermediation J 0.6
Note: Industries are ranked by shares.
153
Table 3.9: Share of Specic Human Capital within Education Fields
Education eld
Share of specic human capital
within education eld, %
Health 79.8
Teacher Training and Educational Science 75.1
Life Science 64.0
Manufacturing and Processing 59.9
Architecture and Building 53.2
Veterinary 47.1





Business and Administration 32.9
Personal Skills 32.6
Mathematics and Statistics 31.6
Physical Science 27.3
Security Services 26.8




Social and Behavioral Science 9.8
Journalism and Information 9.3
Computing 7.5
Law 7.3
Note: Education elds are ranked by shares. The Literacy and Numeracy eld is missing from the table because we
have virtually no observations for that eld in the sample.
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Table 3.10: Distribution of Skill Groups Across Occupations,%
low-skilled medium-skilled highly skilled
Occupation ISCED-97 [0 - 2] ISCED-97 [3 - 4] ISCED-97 [5 - 6]
Agricultural, shery and related laborers 31.2 66.7 2.1
Sales and services elementary
occupations 29.7 69.8 0.5
Laborers in mining, construction,
manufacturing and transport 25.9 73.6 0.5
Skilled agricultural and shery workers 16.4 79.6 4
Machine operators and assemblers 12.2 87.4 0.5
Stationary plant and related operators 12 87.2 0.8
Other craft and related trades workers 8.8 90.6 0.7
Drivers and mobile plant operators 8.3 91.1 0.5
Models, salespersons and demonstrators 7.7 90.8 1.5
Personal and protective services workers 7.2 90.3 2.5
Oce clerks 4.7 90.6 4.7
Customer services clerks 4.6 92.6 2.9
Extraction and building trades workers 4.4 94.9 0.7
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and
related trades workers 3.7 94 2.3
Metal, machinery and related
related trades workers 3.7 95.6 0.7
Managers of small enterprises 2.2 67.5 30.3
Physical and engineering
associate professionals 1.3 82.4 16.3
Other associate professionals 1.1 80.7 18.2
Corporate managers 1 58.1 40.8
Life science and health associate
professionals 0.2 87.8 12
Other professionals 0.2 44.1 55.7
Physical, mathematical and engineering
science professionals 0.1 29.6 70.3
Legislators and senior ocials 0 45.7 54.3
Life science and health professionals 0 7.6 92.4
Teaching professionals 0 18.3 81.7
Teaching associate professionals 0 79.2 20.8
Subsistence agricultural and
shery workers 0 100 0
Note: Occupations are ranked by shares of low-skilled.
Table 3.11: Distribution of Skill Groups Across Specic and General Types of Human Cap-
ital, %
low-skilled medium-skilled highly skilled
Human capital type ISCED-97 [0 - 2] ISCED-97 [3 - 4] ISCED-97 [5 - 6]
Specic 8.1 78.2 13.7




We use two main data sources:
1. The Czech Labor Force Survey (LFS), quarter 2, 2007. All statistics are adjusted
to represent the population of the Czech labor force. At the time of the survey,
50% of total population was in the labor force of which 5.29% were unemployed.
From the survey we recover information on the number of workers in the labor
force (currently employed or unemployed), their education level and education
eld (ISCED-97), occupation (ISCO-88) and the industry (1-digit NACE) in
which they are employed. The complete lists of the respective classications can
be found in Tables 3.3-3.5.
2. EUROSTAT 2007 data for the Czech Republic, Germany and the Euro area. We
look into the number of all graduates from education levels ISCED-97 3-6 by eld
of education.
Appendix D.2
The Czech LFS data are used to calculate the number of employed individuals in
each occupation (2-digit ISCO-88)-industry (1-digit NACE) cell. Given this matrix,
we calculate the within-occupation employment share across industries, within-industry
employment shares across occupations, and total employment shares by occupation.
The within-occupation employment shares distribution is used to calculate a num-
ber of concentration statistics. Their information is summarized into an average index
that increases with the concentration of an occupation across industries. The correla-
tions across the dierent concentration statistics employed are presented in Table 3.6.
The ranking of the dierent occupations in terms of that index is summarized in Table
3.7. An occupation is classied as specic human capital if the index is greater than
an overall threshold, which is set to 0.5.18 Using this threshold, the specic human
capital includes occupations related to life science, teaching and health professionals,
legislators, skilled agricultural and handicraft workers.
Table 3.8 presents the within-industry employment shares for specic human cap-
ital occupations out of total industry labor input in terms of the absolute number of
employees. Industries are ranked from the highest to the lowest intensity in specic
human capital. The most intensive (above median) users of specic human capital are
18Using alternative thresholds, like the median or approximately the 30th percentile would not change
the ndings so drastically even though employing a more slack denition for the classication of
occupations as specic human capital, of course, increases the total employment rate of the group.
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Agriculture and Fishing, Health and Social Work, Education and Manufacturing, and
Mining and Construction industries. At the other end of the spectrum, occupations
that relate to basic services skills are rather evenly employed across dierent industries
and accordingly the services industries employ mostly general human capital.
We further identify how the workers' background in terms of educational elds map
onto occupations in the labor market. We use Czech LFS to calculate the number of
employees in each occupation (2-digit ISCO-88)-education eld (2-digit ISCED-97) cell.
We calculate the within-education eld total allocation of employees across dierent
occupations. We summarize the information by the within-education eld total share
of employees in specic human capital occupations (as dened in Table 3.7). Table 3.9
ranks education elds from the ones whose graduates mostly work as specic human
capital, like Health and Teacher Training and Educational Science, to the ones whose
graduates mostly work as general human capital, like Law and Computing. The median
eld results in producing 33% specic human capital among its graduates. We identify
the group of elds whose majority of graduates (more than 50%) work as specic human
capital. This implies the following highly intensive in specic human capital-producing
education elds: Architecture and Building, Health, Life Science, Manufacturing and
Processing, and Teacher Training and Educational Science. This group of education
elds alone produces 52% of all specic human capital in the economy.
Finally, Table 3.11 summarizes the education level for the group of specic human
capital occupations by reporting the within-occupation shares of those who have com-
pleted secondary education (up to level ISCED-97 3) and those with post-secondary
education (levels ISCED-97 4-6). At the group level, 92% specic human capital have
completed education levels above ISCED-97 3, and 95% of the general human capi-
tal. The group of legislators and senior ocials, life scientists, health and teaching
professionals are on the top of the distribution of skills in the economy.
Specic Human Capital Among the Labor Market Entrants
We investigate the composition of new graduates, i.e., the potential new entrants
into the labor force, in terms of specic and general human capital. In particular, we
examine the presence of graduates among the most specic human capital intensive
education elds, as identied using the Czech LFS data, using the EUROSTAT edu-
cational data for 2007 and 2000. Data from EUROSTAT, particularly for 2000, are
taken with precaution, and results are summarized in Section 2.
Appendix T.1
From the accumulation processes of the two types of human capital (3.6) and (3.7),
technology (3.8) and the expression for physical capital (3.9) and δ (3.10), it follows
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that on a balanced growth path
gHs = gHg = gK = gΛ ≡ g.
In turn, from the production function of nal goods (3.1), optimal rules of the rep-
resentative nal goods producer (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5), the budget constraint of the
household (3.12), and the balanced government budget condition (3.13), it follows that
on a balanced growth path
gY = gC = gT = g, (3.30)
gws = gwg = gr = 0.
Given that all quantities grow at the same rate from (3.16)-(3.20), it follows that
gq1 = gq2 = gq3 = gq4 ≡ gq. (3.31)
This expression states that on a balanced growth path the returns on the accumulation
of all types of asset holdings are equal.











The System of Equations that Solves for the Growth Rates and (Relative)
Allocations on Balanced Growth Path
From the production function of nal goods (3.1) and the optimal rules of nal goods


























(1− γ1) (1− γ2)
. (3.35)
From the accumulation processes of human capitals (3.6), (3.7), and ideas (3.8) and


















From the budget constraint (3.12) and the equation for shares of specic human






















1 + τ gY





















The system of equations (3.32)-(3.42) can be solved for balanced growth path (relative)
allocations and growth rates.








(θ + Γ1) g + ρ
, (3.43)
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From the last two equations of the remaining system g can be eliminated and the
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(λs − ρ) + ρ+














Since (3.48) is a quadratic equation in q4
q2
, there are two solutions. If a > 0 and
c < 0, the solutions are real numbers that have dierent signs. It can be shown that a
sucient condition for this is θ ≥ 1.
A similar quadratic equation can be derived for Hs
Hg






















λsθ + (θλs + ρ) γ3
λΛ
λs
Γ2 + Γ1 (λs − ρ)
]
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Similar to the case for q4
q2
, a sucient condition for having one real and positive root is
θ ≥ 1.
Comparative Statics
From (3.48), it is straightforward to notice that q4
q2
increases with ρ, does not depend on
λg, and is inversely proportional to λΛ. Moreover, from (3.48) it can be shown that the
sign of the derivative of q4
q2

























Since a > 0, ∂
∂γ1
b > 0, and ∂
∂γ1






does not depend on λg and is inversely proportional to λΛ, it follows
from (3.36) and (3.43)-(3.45) that Hs
Hg
declines with λg and does not depend on λΛ. In
turn, the signs of the derivatives of Hs
Hg
with respect to γ1 and θ are equivalent to the























These expressions are negative since c̃ < 0, ã ∂
∂θ
b̃ > b̃ ∂
∂θ
ã, and ã ∂
∂γ1

























from (3.49) it follows that Hs
Hg
increases with γ3 and λs.










From (3.49) it then follows that in this case Hs
Hg
declines with τ sY . According to (3.36),
the ratio of specic human capital to physical human capital Hs
Λ
depends only on λs
and λΛ. It increases with λs and declines with λΛ.
These results together with (3.36) and (3.43)-(3.45) imply the following signs of
comparative statics:
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Table 3.12: Analytical Comparative Statics











ρ + + 0
θ − 0 − − −
γ1 − − − 0 − −
γ2 0
γ3 + 0 + + +
λs + +
λg 0 − − 0 0 0 0 0 0
λs, λs ≡ λg +
λΛ − 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0
τ sY 0
τ sY , τ
g
Y ≡ τ sY − − − 0 − − −
Note: The sign + means a positive relationship, − negative, and 0 means no relationship.
Deriving the signs of the remaining comparative statics requires tedious algebra.
Numerical methods are used in order to obtain them. These additional results, together

















(0, 1)], it can be shown that the dynamic system of equations of the model reduces to















































































































Therefore, the Jacobian of the system is a two-by-two matrix, and its elements are
































































































Therefore, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the steady-state are J (1, 1) and
J (2, 2).
After some tedious calculus, it can be shown that at the steady-state
J (2, 2) < 0,
and J (1, 1) is positive if the determinant of matrix A is negative. The determinant of
matrix A is negative if{
(θ − 1) (1− γ1) (1− γ2)− γ3
λΛ
λs























+ (θ − 1) γ1
}
< 0,
where usY is given by (3.36) and (3.39).




1 + τ gY
1 + τ sY






When tax rates τ sY and τ
g








and holds, for example, for γ2 > 0.5 or for θ = 1.
If the initial value of the ratio of human capital types ω2 is not at its steady-state,
the model exhibits transition dynamics along the stable manifold. At time 0, the value
of usY jumps to the stable-manifold level, after which a monotonic convergence of u
s
Y ,
ω2, as well as ω1 to their steady-state values is observed.
Figure 3.3 presents the stable manifold in (usY , ω2) space for the following parameter
values:
ρ = 0.05, θ = 1, γ1 = 0.3, γ2 = 0.5, γ3 = 0.1, (3.51)





It might happen that the initial value of general human capital is such that either
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Figure 3.3: The Stable Manifold in (usY , ω2) Space







g hits zero bound.
19
For example, suppose that uss > 0 and u
s
g = 0. In this case,
λgq3 < λsq2 + γ3λΛq4. (3.52)
Since the wage of general human capital wg, Eq. (3.3), increases relative to the wage
of specic human capital ws, Eq. (3.4) and the return on physical capital r, Eq. (3.5),
as Hs and K grow, at some point in time wg will become so large that usg will become
positive. This is equivalent to a declining q2 and q4 and a constant q3 in (3.52) and can
hold if the economy is relatively abundant in general human capital. Such a situation
holds, for example, when ω1 ≥ 1, θ = 5, and the remaining parameters are given by
(3.51).
Similarly, when uss = 0 and u
s
g > 0
λgq3 > λsq2 + γ3λΛq4. (3.53)
In this case, since ws and r increase relative to wg as Hg grows at some point in time,
uss will become positive. This is equivalent to a declining q3 and a constant q2 and q4
in (3.53) and can hold if the economy is relatively abundant in specic human capital.
Such a situation holds, for example, when ω1 ≤ 0.2 and for parameter values (3.51).
19Given that (3.1) satises Inada conditions, it has to be that usY > 0.
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Appendix T.3



















(λs − ρ) + ρ+















where Γ̃1 and Γ̃2 are given by (3.46) and (3.47) with the tax rates τ sY and τ
g
Y set to
zero. This implies that when the tax rates in the decentralized equilibrium are set so
that
1 + τ sY = γ3, (3.55)
1 + τ gY = 1 + τ
s
Y , (3.56)
(thus making Γ̃1 = Γ1 and Γ̃2 = γ3Γ2), the positive root of (3.54) coincides with γ3










where SP denotes the social planner's solution.
Moreover, it can be easily shown that the system of equations which solves for the
balanced growth path allocations and growth rates of social optimum is essentially the
same as (3.32)-(3.42), except that γ3 is equal to 1 in (3.42). Therefore, it can be shown
that the policy (3.55) and (3.56) delivers socially optimal allocations and growth rates
in the decentralized equilibrium on the balanced growth path. According to (3.50), it
also does so on the transition path.
Appendix E.1
In this section, we oer the decentralized equilibrium results when γ3 = 0.
The problem and optimal decision rules of the nal goods producer and the human
capital accumulation processes remain the same. Therefore, the expressions (3.1)-(3.7)
are still valid. When γ3 = 0, the accumulation of technology is a pure externality for
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(3.12) , (3.6) , (3.7) , (3.14) ,
Hs (0) , Hg (0) , K (0) > 0− given.
Assigning shadow values {qi} to constraints (3.12), (3.6), (3.7), the decision rules that
follow from the household's optimization are
C−θ = q1,
q1ws (1 + τ
s
















Y (1 + τ
s








q̇3 = q3ρ− q1wg (1 + τ gY ) . (3.61)







− gq2 = λs − ρ,
− gq3 = λg
wg (1 + τ
g
Y )
ws (1 + τ sY )
− ρ.
This implies that when both types of human capital are accumulated, the ratio of wages
should be xed
wg (1 + τ
g
Y )





The economy is on a balanced growth path in such a case. The growth rate of the




(λs − ρ) .
The growth rate above is less than the socially optimal one, given by the equation
167
(3.26) with γ3 set to one. Therefore, the share of the specic human capital allocated
to its accumulation is lower than its socially optimal value, because uss is proportional
to the growth rate of Hs and all the quantities are growing at the same rate.
The comparative statics for this model can be derived analytically and are presented
in Table 3.13.
Table 3.13: Comparative Statics











ρ 0 − 0 − − ± + −
θ 0 − 0 − − ± + −
γ1 0 − 0 0 0 + − −
γ2 0 + 0 0 0 − + +
λs + + + + + ± − +
λg − − 0 0 0 0 0 0
λs, λs ≡ λg 0 + + + + ± − +
λΛ 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0
τ sY 0 + 0 0 0 − + +
τ sY , τ
g
Y ≡ τ sY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: The sign + means a positive relationship, − negative, 0 no relationship, and ± means that the relationship
depends on model parameters.
For example, usg increases with ρ and θ when θ = 1 and λs > 2ρ and declines with
these parameters when θ >> 1. Meanwhile, usg increases with λs when θ >> 1 and
λs < 2ρ and declines when λs > 2ρ.
Appendix E.2
In this section, we oer the decentralized equilibrium results when R&D intensity is a
choice variable.
Similarly to Appendix E.1, the problem and optimal decision rules of the nal goods
producer and the human capital accumulation processes remain the same. Therefore,
the expressions (3.1)-(3.7) are still valid. However, the R&D equation and the equation











(3.12) , (3.6) , (3.7) ,










Hs (0) , Hg (0) ,Λ (0) > 0− given.
Assigning shadow value {qi} to constraints (3.12), (3.6), (3.7), and (3.62), the decision
rules that follow from the household's optimization are
C−θ = q1,
q1ws (1 + τ
s






















Y (1 + τ
s











q̇3 = q3ρ− q1wg (1 + τ gY ) ,
q̇4 = q4ρ− q1rk.













− gq2 = λs − ρ,
− gq3 = λg
wg (1 + τ
g
Y )
ws (1 + τ sY )
− ρ,
− gq4 = γ3λΛ
rk
ws (1 + τ sY )
− ρ.
Therefore, on a balanced growth path the growth rate of the economy and the share









The comparative statics for this model can be derived analytically and are presented
in Table 3.14.
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Table 3.14: Comparative Statics













ρ 0 0 − − − − ± + ± −
θ 0 0 − − − − ± + ± −
γ1 0 0 − + 0 0 + − − −
γ2 0 0 + + 0 0 − + − +
γ3 − 0 + − 0 0 − − + −
λs + + + + + + ± − ± +
λg 0 − − 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
λs, λs ≡ λg + 0 + + + + ± − ± +
λΛ − 0 0 − 0 0 0 0 0 0
τ sY 0 0 + + 0 0 − + − +
τ sY , τ
g
Y ≡ τ sY 0 0 − + 0 0 + + − −
Note: The sign + means a positive relationship, − negative, 0 no relationship, and ± means that the relationship
depends on model parameters.





usΛ are both positive; these derivatives become negative





usΛ are negative but turn





usΛ are negative when θ >> 1, but
these derivatives change sign for γ2 ≈ 0 or γ1 ≈ 1.
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